On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
Texto Completo: | http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1742 |
Resumo: | Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the “self” is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs. |
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On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”Acerca de la naturaleza del “yo” narrativo en DennettDaniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.Daniel Dennett; “Self”; Stories; Center of gravity.Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the “self” is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs.Dennett elabora una concepción del “yo” entendido como un centro de gravedad narrativo. Uno de los obstáculos principales para valorar esta propuesta radica en que resulta dificultoso entender cuál es la naturaleza del concepto dennettiano de “yo”: concretamente, cuáles son los compromisos ontológicos y epistemológicos que cabe atribuir al fenómeno en cuestión. En este artículo defendemos que el mejor modo de realizar una reconstrucción interpretativa de su noción de “yo” es apelando a la distinción elaborada por Reichenbach entre tres clases de entidades, Concreta, Abstracta e Illata, y entendiendo a los centros de gravedad narrativos como un caso de Abstracta reichenbachiano. Sostenemos que resulta pertinente e iluminador entender los centros de gravedad narrativos como Abstracta en el sentido de Reichenbach, apoyándonos en que: i) aunque no la aplica directamente al problema de la naturaleza del “yo”, Dennett sí emplea la distinción de Reichenbach en otras partes de su obra; ii) Dennett traza explícitamente una analogía del “yo” con los centros de gravedad que son, justamente, uno de sus ejemplos de Abstracta; iii) este modo de entender al “yo” permite dar sentido y entender mejor ciertos aspectos de la teoría narrativista dennettiana. Además de permitirnos clarificar las metáforas empleadas por Dennett en la elaboración de su teoría narrativa, dicha elucidación conceptual permite comprender mejor la distinción entre las tres clases de psicología intencional trazada por Dennett (1987) y es útil para sugerir a cuál de estos tres tipos pertenece el concepto de “yo”.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2021-06-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/174210.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1742Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 2 (2020); 109-1282178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1742/1290Copyright (c) 2020 Malena Leonhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLeón, Malena2021-09-15T22:45:13Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/1742Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2021-09-15T22:45:13Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self” Acerca de la naturaleza del “yo” narrativo en Dennett |
title |
On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self” |
spellingShingle |
On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self” León, Malena Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad. Daniel Dennett; “Self”; Stories; Center of gravity. Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad. Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad. |
title_short |
On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self” |
title_full |
On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self” |
title_fullStr |
On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self” |
title_full_unstemmed |
On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self” |
title_sort |
On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self” |
author |
León, Malena |
author_facet |
León, Malena |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
León, Malena |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad. Daniel Dennett; “Self”; Stories; Center of gravity. Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad. Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad. |
topic |
Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad. Daniel Dennett; “Self”; Stories; Center of gravity. Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad. Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad. |
description |
Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the “self” is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-06-09 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-Reviewed Evaluados por los pares Avaliados pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1742 10.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1742 |
url |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1742 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1742 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1742/1290 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Malena Leon http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Malena Leon http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 2 (2020); 109-128 2178-1036 reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) instacron:UFRB |
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Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
instacron_str |
UFRB |
institution |
UFRB |
reponame_str |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
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Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
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||griotrevista@gmail.com |
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