Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2012 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng por |
Título da fonte: | BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) |
DOI: | 10.15728/bbr.2012.9.2.4 |
Texto Completo: | http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270 |
Resumo: | Co-operative organizations have a unique property and decision rights distribution system that involve management problems and transaction costs. Such structure creates equity rights and risk transfers that directly affect these organizations' self-management efficiency. This paper analyses those costs and sources of inefficiency to explain their problems in two complementary and different ways. First it discusses main governance aspects that generate agency conflicts; second it analyses the characteristics of managerial systems which generate informational asymmetry and monitoring problems. An analysis regarding both property rights distribution among members and decision rights distribution between elected members and hired professional executives indicates that equity rights and risk sharing in co-operative's contractual relations leads to a typology on the kind of governance, the management model and the managerial information system characteristics which could reduce agency problems. The methodology used was theoretical discussion, and comparison of the management models and systems of rural credit and agricultural co-operatives in Brazil. A questionnaire was applied in five co-operatives to compare management models and systems. Our final considerations show that better co-operative's management model organization, as well as management systems, could reduce their agency costs. |
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BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) |
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Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approachGovernança cooperativa e sistemas de controle gerencial: uma abordagem teórica de custos da agênciaCo-operative governancemanagement accounting systemsagency costsGovernança cooperativasistemas de contabilidade gerencialcustos de agênciaCo-operative organizations have a unique property and decision rights distribution system that involve management problems and transaction costs. Such structure creates equity rights and risk transfers that directly affect these organizations' self-management efficiency. This paper analyses those costs and sources of inefficiency to explain their problems in two complementary and different ways. First it discusses main governance aspects that generate agency conflicts; second it analyses the characteristics of managerial systems which generate informational asymmetry and monitoring problems. An analysis regarding both property rights distribution among members and decision rights distribution between elected members and hired professional executives indicates that equity rights and risk sharing in co-operative's contractual relations leads to a typology on the kind of governance, the management model and the managerial information system characteristics which could reduce agency problems. The methodology used was theoretical discussion, and comparison of the management models and systems of rural credit and agricultural co-operatives in Brazil. A questionnaire was applied in five co-operatives to compare management models and systems. Our final considerations show that better co-operative's management model organization, as well as management systems, could reduce their agency costs.Organizações cooperativas têm um sistema único de distribuição de direitos de propriedade e decisão que envolvem problemas de gerenciamento e custos de transação. Tal estrutura cria direitos de propriedade e transferências de risco que afetam diretamente a eficiência do gerenciamento autônomo destas organizações. Este documento analisa os custos e as fontes de ineficiência para explicar seus problemas de dois modos diferentes e complementares. Primeiramente discute os principais aspectos da governança que geram conflitos de agência; em segundo lugar analisa as características dos sistemas de gerenciamento que geram assimetria informativa e problemas de monitoração. Uma análise a respeito da distribuição de direitos de propriedade entre membros e da distribuição de direitos de decisão entre membros eleitos e executivos profissionais contratados indica que os direitos sobre resultados e o compartilhamento de risco nas relações contratuais da cooperativa conduzem a uma tipologia do tipo de governança, do modelo de gerenciamento e das características do sistema de informações gerenciais que possam reduzir os problemas da agência. A metodologia utilizada foi a discussão teórica e comparação dos modelos e sistemas gerenciais de cooperativas agrícolas e de crédito rural no Brasil. Um questionário foi aplicado em cinco cooperativas para comparar modelos e sistemas gerenciais. Nossas considerações finais mostram que a melhor organização do modelo de gerenciamento da cooperativa, assim como sistemas gerenciais, poderiam reduzir seus custos de agência.FUCAPE Business Shool2012-04-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-reviewed ArticleArtigo revisado pelos paresapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/27010.15728/bbr.2012.9.2.4Brazilian Business Review; Vol. 9 No. 2 (2012): April to June 2012; 68-87Brazilian Business Review; v. 9 n. 2 (2012): Abril a Junho de 2012; 68-871808-23861807-734Xreponame:BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)instname:Fucape Business School (FBS)instacron:FBSengporhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270/411http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270/412Bialoskorski Neto, SigismundoBarroso, Marcelo Francini GirãoRezende, Amaury Joséinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2018-11-06T19:55:03Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/270Revistahttps://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/indexONGhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/oai|| bbronline@bbronline.com.br1808-23861808-2386opendoar:2018-11-06T19:55:03BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) - Fucape Business School (FBS)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach Governança cooperativa e sistemas de controle gerencial: uma abordagem teórica de custos da agência |
title |
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach |
spellingShingle |
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo Co-operative governance management accounting systems agency costs Governança cooperativa sistemas de contabilidade gerencial custos de agência Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo Co-operative governance management accounting systems agency costs Governança cooperativa sistemas de contabilidade gerencial custos de agência |
title_short |
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach |
title_full |
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach |
title_fullStr |
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach |
title_full_unstemmed |
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach |
title_sort |
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach |
author |
Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo |
author_facet |
Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo Barroso, Marcelo Francini Girão Rezende, Amaury José Barroso, Marcelo Francini Girão Rezende, Amaury José |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Barroso, Marcelo Francini Girão Rezende, Amaury José |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo Barroso, Marcelo Francini Girão Rezende, Amaury José |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Co-operative governance management accounting systems agency costs Governança cooperativa sistemas de contabilidade gerencial custos de agência |
topic |
Co-operative governance management accounting systems agency costs Governança cooperativa sistemas de contabilidade gerencial custos de agência |
description |
Co-operative organizations have a unique property and decision rights distribution system that involve management problems and transaction costs. Such structure creates equity rights and risk transfers that directly affect these organizations' self-management efficiency. This paper analyses those costs and sources of inefficiency to explain their problems in two complementary and different ways. First it discusses main governance aspects that generate agency conflicts; second it analyses the characteristics of managerial systems which generate informational asymmetry and monitoring problems. An analysis regarding both property rights distribution among members and decision rights distribution between elected members and hired professional executives indicates that equity rights and risk sharing in co-operative's contractual relations leads to a typology on the kind of governance, the management model and the managerial information system characteristics which could reduce agency problems. The methodology used was theoretical discussion, and comparison of the management models and systems of rural credit and agricultural co-operatives in Brazil. A questionnaire was applied in five co-operatives to compare management models and systems. Our final considerations show that better co-operative's management model organization, as well as management systems, could reduce their agency costs. |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2012-04-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article Artigo revisado pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270 10.15728/bbr.2012.9.2.4 |
url |
http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.15728/bbr.2012.9.2.4 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng por |
language |
eng por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270/411 http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270/412 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
FUCAPE Business Shool |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
FUCAPE Business Shool |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazilian Business Review; Vol. 9 No. 2 (2012): April to June 2012; 68-87 Brazilian Business Review; v. 9 n. 2 (2012): Abril a Junho de 2012; 68-87 1808-2386 1807-734X reponame:BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) instname:Fucape Business School (FBS) instacron:FBS |
instname_str |
Fucape Business School (FBS) |
instacron_str |
FBS |
institution |
FBS |
reponame_str |
BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) |
collection |
BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) - Fucape Business School (FBS) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|| bbronline@bbronline.com.br |
_version_ |
1822150699283120128 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.15728/bbr.2012.9.2.4 |