Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo
Data de Publicação: 2012
Outros Autores: Barroso, Marcelo Francini Girão, Rezende, Amaury José
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
por
Título da fonte: BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)
DOI: 10.15728/bbr.2012.9.2.4
Texto Completo: http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270
Resumo: Co-operative organizations have a unique property and decision rights distribution system that involve management problems and transaction costs. Such structure creates equity rights and risk transfers that directly affect these organizations' self-management efficiency. This paper analyses those costs and sources of inefficiency to explain their problems in two complementary and different ways. First it discusses main governance aspects that generate agency conflicts; second it analyses the characteristics of managerial systems which generate informational asymmetry and monitoring problems. An analysis regarding both property rights distribution among members and decision rights distribution between elected members and hired professional executives indicates that equity rights and risk sharing in co-operative's contractual relations leads to a typology on the kind of governance, the management model and the managerial information system characteristics which could reduce agency problems. The methodology used was theoretical discussion, and comparison of the management models and systems of rural credit and agricultural co-operatives in Brazil. A questionnaire was applied in five co-operatives to compare management models and systems. Our final considerations show that better co-operative's management model organization, as well as management systems, could reduce their agency costs.
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spelling Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approachGovernança cooperativa e sistemas de controle gerencial: uma abordagem teórica de custos da agênciaCo-operative governancemanagement accounting systemsagency costsGovernança cooperativasistemas de contabilidade gerencialcustos de agênciaCo-operative organizations have a unique property and decision rights distribution system that involve management problems and transaction costs. Such structure creates equity rights and risk transfers that directly affect these organizations' self-management efficiency. This paper analyses those costs and sources of inefficiency to explain their problems in two complementary and different ways. First it discusses main governance aspects that generate agency conflicts; second it analyses the characteristics of managerial systems which generate informational asymmetry and monitoring problems. An analysis regarding both property rights distribution among members and decision rights distribution between elected members and hired professional executives indicates that equity rights and risk sharing in co-operative's contractual relations leads to a typology on the kind of governance, the management model and the managerial information system characteristics which could reduce agency problems. The methodology used was theoretical discussion, and comparison of the management models and systems of rural credit and agricultural co-operatives in Brazil. A questionnaire was applied in five co-operatives to compare management models and systems. Our final considerations show that better co-operative's management model organization, as well as management systems, could reduce their agency costs.Organizações cooperativas têm um sistema único de distribuição de direitos de propriedade e decisão que envolvem problemas de gerenciamento e custos de transação. Tal estrutura cria direitos de propriedade e transferências de risco que afetam diretamente a eficiência do gerenciamento autônomo destas organizações. Este documento analisa os custos e as fontes de ineficiência para explicar seus problemas de dois modos diferentes e complementares. Primeiramente discute os principais aspectos da governança que geram conflitos de agência; em segundo lugar analisa as características dos sistemas de gerenciamento que geram assimetria informativa e problemas de monitoração. Uma análise a respeito da distribuição de direitos de propriedade entre membros e da distribuição de direitos de decisão entre membros eleitos e executivos profissionais contratados indica que os direitos sobre resultados e o compartilhamento de risco nas relações contratuais da cooperativa conduzem a uma tipologia do tipo de governança, do modelo de gerenciamento e das características do sistema de informações gerenciais que possam reduzir os problemas da agência. A metodologia utilizada foi a discussão teórica e comparação dos modelos e sistemas gerenciais de cooperativas agrícolas e de crédito rural no Brasil. Um questionário foi aplicado em cinco cooperativas para comparar modelos e sistemas gerenciais. Nossas considerações finais mostram que a melhor organização do modelo de gerenciamento da cooperativa, assim como sistemas gerenciais, poderiam reduzir seus custos de agência.FUCAPE Business Shool2012-04-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-reviewed ArticleArtigo revisado pelos paresapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/27010.15728/bbr.2012.9.2.4Brazilian Business Review; Vol. 9 No. 2 (2012): April to June 2012; 68-87Brazilian Business Review; v. 9 n. 2 (2012): Abril a Junho de 2012; 68-871808-23861807-734Xreponame:BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)instname:Fucape Business School (FBS)instacron:FBSengporhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270/411http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270/412Bialoskorski Neto, SigismundoBarroso, Marcelo Francini GirãoRezende, Amaury Joséinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2018-11-06T19:55:03Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/270Revistahttps://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/indexONGhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/oai|| bbronline@bbronline.com.br1808-23861808-2386opendoar:2018-11-06T19:55:03BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) - Fucape Business School (FBS)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
Governança cooperativa e sistemas de controle gerencial: uma abordagem teórica de custos da agência
title Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
spellingShingle Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo
Co-operative governance
management accounting systems
agency costs
Governança cooperativa
sistemas de contabilidade gerencial
custos de agência
Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo
Co-operative governance
management accounting systems
agency costs
Governança cooperativa
sistemas de contabilidade gerencial
custos de agência
title_short Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
title_full Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
title_fullStr Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
title_full_unstemmed Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
title_sort Co-operative governance and management control systems: an agency costs theoretical approach
author Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo
author_facet Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo
Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo
Barroso, Marcelo Francini Girão
Rezende, Amaury José
Barroso, Marcelo Francini Girão
Rezende, Amaury José
author_role author
author2 Barroso, Marcelo Francini Girão
Rezende, Amaury José
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bialoskorski Neto, Sigismundo
Barroso, Marcelo Francini Girão
Rezende, Amaury José
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Co-operative governance
management accounting systems
agency costs
Governança cooperativa
sistemas de contabilidade gerencial
custos de agência
topic Co-operative governance
management accounting systems
agency costs
Governança cooperativa
sistemas de contabilidade gerencial
custos de agência
description Co-operative organizations have a unique property and decision rights distribution system that involve management problems and transaction costs. Such structure creates equity rights and risk transfers that directly affect these organizations' self-management efficiency. This paper analyses those costs and sources of inefficiency to explain their problems in two complementary and different ways. First it discusses main governance aspects that generate agency conflicts; second it analyses the characteristics of managerial systems which generate informational asymmetry and monitoring problems. An analysis regarding both property rights distribution among members and decision rights distribution between elected members and hired professional executives indicates that equity rights and risk sharing in co-operative's contractual relations leads to a typology on the kind of governance, the management model and the managerial information system characteristics which could reduce agency problems. The methodology used was theoretical discussion, and comparison of the management models and systems of rural credit and agricultural co-operatives in Brazil. A questionnaire was applied in five co-operatives to compare management models and systems. Our final considerations show that better co-operative's management model organization, as well as management systems, could reduce their agency costs.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-04-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
Artigo revisado pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270
10.15728/bbr.2012.9.2.4
url http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270
identifier_str_mv 10.15728/bbr.2012.9.2.4
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
por
language eng
por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270/411
http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/270/412
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv FUCAPE Business Shool
publisher.none.fl_str_mv FUCAPE Business Shool
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Brazilian Business Review; Vol. 9 No. 2 (2012): April to June 2012; 68-87
Brazilian Business Review; v. 9 n. 2 (2012): Abril a Junho de 2012; 68-87
1808-2386
1807-734X
reponame:BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)
instname:Fucape Business School (FBS)
instacron:FBS
instname_str Fucape Business School (FBS)
instacron_str FBS
institution FBS
reponame_str BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)
collection BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) - Fucape Business School (FBS)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv || bbronline@bbronline.com.br
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.15728/bbr.2012.9.2.4