Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
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Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Revista Direito GV |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816 |
Resumo: | This article presents an applied mechanism design and a legal analysis of a Bill proposed into law by the Brazilian Federal District House of Representatives in 2013. The Bill offers monetary rewards for citizens that denounce corruption. In our decision-theoretic model, corruption control may give the citizens utility due to their civic responsibility feeling. The main trade-off brought about by the reward mechanism is that, by receiving compensation, citizens’ civic impulse to dedicate effort to curb corruption may be reduced. However, our model shows that if society is heterogeneous enough, the monetary reward motive prevails and the Bill fosters social involvement. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism that transforms the moral dissatisfaction of receiving money into a moral incentive to dedicate to corruption control. Finally, a careful analysis of the Law and of a series of case studies in Brazil suggest that such a mechanism does not violate the Constitution and, furthermore, has actually been used under different forms in the Brazilian legal system. |
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Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?Ética & incentivos: devemos recompensar quem denuncia corrupção?Law and EconomicsSocial control of corruptionIncentivesCivic dutyMoralAnálise econômica do DireitoControle social da corrupçãoIncentivosDever cívicoÉticaThis article presents an applied mechanism design and a legal analysis of a Bill proposed into law by the Brazilian Federal District House of Representatives in 2013. The Bill offers monetary rewards for citizens that denounce corruption. In our decision-theoretic model, corruption control may give the citizens utility due to their civic responsibility feeling. The main trade-off brought about by the reward mechanism is that, by receiving compensation, citizens’ civic impulse to dedicate effort to curb corruption may be reduced. However, our model shows that if society is heterogeneous enough, the monetary reward motive prevails and the Bill fosters social involvement. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism that transforms the moral dissatisfaction of receiving money into a moral incentive to dedicate to corruption control. Finally, a careful analysis of the Law and of a series of case studies in Brazil suggest that such a mechanism does not violate the Constitution and, furthermore, has actually been used under different forms in the Brazilian legal system.Tendo como objeto o Projeto de Lei n. 857/2012, aprovado pela Câmara Legislativa do Distrito Federal em 2013, este artigo analisa o princípio da compensação pecuniária ao cidadão que denuncia a corrupção, sob a ótica da Teoria de Desenhos de Mecanismos e do Direito. Um modelo de Teoria da Decisão estabelece um potencial conflito para o cidadão entre a satisfação com o benefício monetário auferido pela denúncia (“incentivo pecuniário”) e a insatisfação com o sentimento de estar sendo pago para exercer seu dever cívico (“desincentivo moral”). Mostra-se que, quando há heterogeneidade na sociedade, o efeito do incentivo pecuniário predomina e a introdução da compensação é benéfica para a sociedade. Além disso, propomos uma alteração no PL que transforma o desincentivo moral em incentivo à dedicação ao controle da corrupção. Finalmente, por meio da análise de leis e de estudos de casos, confirmamos que, além de compatível com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, esse mecanismo já é efetivamente aplicado em diferentes situações no país.Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas2017-07-28info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816Revista Direito GV; Vol. 13 No. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-427Revista Direito GV; Vol. 13 Núm. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-427Revista Direito GV; v. 13 n. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-4272317-6172reponame:Revista Direito GVinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816/68243Copyright (c) 2017 Revista Direito GVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBugarin, Maurício SoaresBugarin, Tomás Tenshin Sataka2019-08-13T13:02:50Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/70816Revistahttps://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/revista/revista-direito-gvPRIhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br2317-61721808-2432opendoar:2019-08-13T13:02:50Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded? Ética & incentivos: devemos recompensar quem denuncia corrupção? |
title |
Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded? |
spellingShingle |
Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded? Bugarin, Maurício Soares Law and Economics Social control of corruption Incentives Civic duty Moral Análise econômica do Direito Controle social da corrupção Incentivos Dever cívico Ética |
title_short |
Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded? |
title_full |
Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded? |
title_fullStr |
Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded? |
title_sort |
Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded? |
author |
Bugarin, Maurício Soares |
author_facet |
Bugarin, Maurício Soares Bugarin, Tomás Tenshin Sataka |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Bugarin, Tomás Tenshin Sataka |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Bugarin, Maurício Soares Bugarin, Tomás Tenshin Sataka |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Law and Economics Social control of corruption Incentives Civic duty Moral Análise econômica do Direito Controle social da corrupção Incentivos Dever cívico Ética |
topic |
Law and Economics Social control of corruption Incentives Civic duty Moral Análise econômica do Direito Controle social da corrupção Incentivos Dever cívico Ética |
description |
This article presents an applied mechanism design and a legal analysis of a Bill proposed into law by the Brazilian Federal District House of Representatives in 2013. The Bill offers monetary rewards for citizens that denounce corruption. In our decision-theoretic model, corruption control may give the citizens utility due to their civic responsibility feeling. The main trade-off brought about by the reward mechanism is that, by receiving compensation, citizens’ civic impulse to dedicate effort to curb corruption may be reduced. However, our model shows that if society is heterogeneous enough, the monetary reward motive prevails and the Bill fosters social involvement. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism that transforms the moral dissatisfaction of receiving money into a moral incentive to dedicate to corruption control. Finally, a careful analysis of the Law and of a series of case studies in Brazil suggest that such a mechanism does not violate the Constitution and, furthermore, has actually been used under different forms in the Brazilian legal system. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-07-28 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816 |
url |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816/68243 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Revista Direito GV info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Revista Direito GV |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Direito GV; Vol. 13 No. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-427 Revista Direito GV; Vol. 13 Núm. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-427 Revista Direito GV; v. 13 n. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-427 2317-6172 reponame:Revista Direito GV instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
instname_str |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Revista Direito GV |
collection |
Revista Direito GV |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br |
_version_ |
1798943709807509504 |