Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bugarin, Maurício Soares
Data de Publicação: 2017
Outros Autores: Bugarin, Tomás Tenshin Sataka
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista Direito GV
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816
Resumo: This article presents an applied mechanism design and a legal analysis of a Bill proposed into law by the Brazilian Federal District House of Representatives in 2013. The Bill offers monetary rewards for citizens that denounce corruption. In our decision-theoretic model, corruption control may give the citizens utility due to their civic responsibility feeling. The main trade-off brought about by the reward mechanism is that, by receiving compensation, citizens’ civic impulse to dedicate effort to curb corruption may be reduced. However, our model shows that if society is heterogeneous enough, the monetary reward motive prevails and the Bill fosters social involvement. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism that transforms the moral dissatisfaction of receiving money into a moral incentive to dedicate to corruption control. Finally, a careful analysis of the Law and of a series of case studies in Brazil suggest that such a mechanism does not violate the Constitution and, furthermore, has actually been used under different forms in the Brazilian legal system.
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spelling Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?Ética & incentivos: devemos recompensar quem denuncia corrupção?Law and EconomicsSocial control of corruptionIncentivesCivic dutyMoralAnálise econômica do DireitoControle social da corrupçãoIncentivosDever cívicoÉticaThis article presents an applied mechanism design and a legal analysis of a Bill proposed into law by the Brazilian Federal District House of Representatives in 2013. The Bill offers monetary rewards for citizens that denounce corruption. In our decision-theoretic model, corruption control may give the citizens utility due to their civic responsibility feeling. The main trade-off brought about by the reward mechanism is that, by receiving compensation, citizens’ civic impulse to dedicate effort to curb corruption may be reduced. However, our model shows that if society is heterogeneous enough, the monetary reward motive prevails and the Bill fosters social involvement. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism that transforms the moral dissatisfaction of receiving money into a moral incentive to dedicate to corruption control. Finally, a careful analysis of the Law and of a series of case studies in Brazil suggest that such a mechanism does not violate the Constitution and, furthermore, has actually been used under different forms in the Brazilian legal system.Tendo como objeto o Projeto de Lei n. 857/2012, aprovado pela Câmara Legislativa do Distrito Federal em 2013, este artigo analisa o princípio da compensação pecuniária ao cidadão que denuncia a corrupção, sob a ótica da Teoria de Desenhos de Mecanismos e do Direito. Um modelo de Teoria da Decisão estabelece um potencial conflito para o cidadão entre a satisfação com o benefício monetário auferido pela denúncia (“incentivo pecuniário”) e a insatisfação com o sentimento de estar sendo pago para exercer seu dever cívico (“desincentivo moral”). Mostra-se que, quando há heterogeneidade na sociedade, o efeito do incentivo pecuniário predomina e a introdução da compensação é benéfica para a sociedade. Além disso, propomos uma alteração no PL que transforma o desincentivo moral em incentivo à dedicação ao controle da corrupção. Finalmente, por meio da análise de leis e de estudos de casos, confirmamos que, além de compatível com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, esse mecanismo já é efetivamente aplicado em diferentes situações no país.Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas2017-07-28info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816Revista Direito GV; Vol. 13 No. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-427Revista Direito GV; Vol. 13 Núm. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-427Revista Direito GV; v. 13 n. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-4272317-6172reponame:Revista Direito GVinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816/68243Copyright (c) 2017 Revista Direito GVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBugarin, Maurício SoaresBugarin, Tomás Tenshin Sataka2019-08-13T13:02:50Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/70816Revistahttps://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/revista/revista-direito-gvPRIhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br2317-61721808-2432opendoar:2019-08-13T13:02:50Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?
Ética & incentivos: devemos recompensar quem denuncia corrupção?
title Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?
spellingShingle Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?
Bugarin, Maurício Soares
Law and Economics
Social control of corruption
Incentives
Civic duty
Moral
Análise econômica do Direito
Controle social da corrupção
Incentivos
Dever cívico
Ética
title_short Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?
title_full Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?
title_fullStr Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?
title_full_unstemmed Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?
title_sort Moral & incentives: should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?
author Bugarin, Maurício Soares
author_facet Bugarin, Maurício Soares
Bugarin, Tomás Tenshin Sataka
author_role author
author2 Bugarin, Tomás Tenshin Sataka
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bugarin, Maurício Soares
Bugarin, Tomás Tenshin Sataka
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Law and Economics
Social control of corruption
Incentives
Civic duty
Moral
Análise econômica do Direito
Controle social da corrupção
Incentivos
Dever cívico
Ética
topic Law and Economics
Social control of corruption
Incentives
Civic duty
Moral
Análise econômica do Direito
Controle social da corrupção
Incentivos
Dever cívico
Ética
description This article presents an applied mechanism design and a legal analysis of a Bill proposed into law by the Brazilian Federal District House of Representatives in 2013. The Bill offers monetary rewards for citizens that denounce corruption. In our decision-theoretic model, corruption control may give the citizens utility due to their civic responsibility feeling. The main trade-off brought about by the reward mechanism is that, by receiving compensation, citizens’ civic impulse to dedicate effort to curb corruption may be reduced. However, our model shows that if society is heterogeneous enough, the monetary reward motive prevails and the Bill fosters social involvement. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism that transforms the moral dissatisfaction of receiving money into a moral incentive to dedicate to corruption control. Finally, a careful analysis of the Law and of a series of case studies in Brazil suggest that such a mechanism does not violate the Constitution and, furthermore, has actually been used under different forms in the Brazilian legal system.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-07-28
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816
url https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/70816/68243
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Revista Direito GV
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Revista Direito GV
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV; Vol. 13 No. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-427
Revista Direito GV; Vol. 13 Núm. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-427
Revista Direito GV; v. 13 n. 2 (2017): mai-ago. (27); 391-427
2317-6172
reponame:Revista Direito GV
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista Direito GV
collection Revista Direito GV
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br
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