Risk of capture due to information asymmetry in Brazilian National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels

• Autor(a) principal: Azevedo, Pedro Antonio Pereira de
• Data de Publicação: 2021
• Outros Autores: Moreira, Marina Figueiredo
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Cadernos Gestão Pública e Cidadania (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/cgpc/article/view/79636
• topic: estado regulador; corrupção; captura regulatória; assimetria de informação; agências reguladoras.

Among the studies that deal with the fight against corruption, the discussion regarding regulation as a result of a change on the State’s role from public service provider to public service regulator stands out. In this scenario, the regulatory agencies are the ones responsible for balancing market forces in order to grant the proper rendering of public services. In imperfect and asymmetric markets, economic agents could have access to privileged information and attempt to capture regulatory agents, which could configure as a new form of corruption. Although the risk of capture by the market has been already consolidated within the theoretical field, there is still a gap for empirical researches that measure the manifestation of such phenomenon. This study performs an empirical research on a Brazilian regulatory agency in order to assess its risk of capture due to information asymmetry between the regulatory agent and other economic agents within the regulated market. Results show that the risk of capture due to asymmetry of information can be assessed through nine categories: effort, diversification, internationalization, unfavorable selection, signaling, moral hazard, company size and transversality.