BOARD INFLUENCE ON THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Marquezan, Luiz Henrique Figueira
Data de Publicação: 2024
Outros Autores: Velho, Maria Laura Pereira, Zonatto, Vinícius Costa da Silva
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista Universo Contábil
Texto Completo: https://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/10946
Resumo: This study analyzes the board's influence on the misalignment between the company's financial and market performance and executive compensation. Secondary data from 181 companies listed on the B3 from 2010 to 2018 were analyzed using panel data regression. The results reveal that executive compensation, total and variable, is related to accounting and market performance, with part not explained by this, titled misaligned compensation. The findings denote that the board size aggravates the misalignment, while duality and independence do not influence it. Furthermore, the ratio between the number of directors and board size, which can increase the complexity of compensation contracts and the managerial power, also increases the misalignment. The results reveal worrying factors regarding the board's relationship with agency costs, emphasizing principal-agent misalignment, evaluated by executive compensation and the principal's interests in performance. Contributes by discussing the misalignment of executive compensation, presenting influences from board and directors, with highlights for the literature and organizations.
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spelling BOARD INFLUENCE ON THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCELA INFLUENCIA DEL DIRECTORIO EN LA DESALINEACIÓN ENTRE LA COMPENSACIÓN EJECUTIVA Y EL DESEMPEÑO ORGANIZACIONALINFLUÊNCIA DO CONSELHO DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO NO DESALINHAMENTO ENTRE REMUNERAÇÃO EXECUTIVA E DESEMPENHO ORGANIZACIONALExecutive compensationBoardAgency TheoryCorporate GovernanceRemuneración de ejecutivosDirectorioTeoría de la AgenciaGobierno CorporativoRemuneração de executivosConselho de administraçãoTeoria de AgênciaGovernança CorporativaThis study analyzes the board's influence on the misalignment between the company's financial and market performance and executive compensation. Secondary data from 181 companies listed on the B3 from 2010 to 2018 were analyzed using panel data regression. The results reveal that executive compensation, total and variable, is related to accounting and market performance, with part not explained by this, titled misaligned compensation. The findings denote that the board size aggravates the misalignment, while duality and independence do not influence it. Furthermore, the ratio between the number of directors and board size, which can increase the complexity of compensation contracts and the managerial power, also increases the misalignment. The results reveal worrying factors regarding the board's relationship with agency costs, emphasizing principal-agent misalignment, evaluated by executive compensation and the principal's interests in performance. Contributes by discussing the misalignment of executive compensation, presenting influences from board and directors, with highlights for the literature and organizations.Este estudio analiza la influencia del directorio en el desajuste entre el desempeño financiero y de mercado de la empresa y la compensación de los ejecutivos. Se analizaron datos secundarios de 181 empresas cotizadas en B3, de 2010 a 2018, mediante regresión de datos de panel. Los resultados revelan que la compensación de los ejecutivos, total y variable, está relacionada con el desempeño contable y de mercado, con una parte no explicada por este, denominada compensación desalineada. Los hallazgos denotan que el tamaño del directorio agrava el desajuste, mientras que la dualidad e independencia no influyen. Además, la relación entre el número de directores y el tamaño del directorio, factor que puede aumentar la complejidad de los contratos de compensación y el poder gerencial, también aumenta la desalineación. Los resultados revelan factores preocupantes sobre la relación del directorio con los costos de agencia, con énfasis en la desalineación principal-agente, evaluada por la remuneración de los ejecutivos y los intereses del principal por el desempeño. Contribuye discutiendo la desalineación de la compensación ejecutiva, presentando influencias de la junta y los directores, con aspectos destacados para la literatura y las organizaciones.Este estudo objetiva analisar a influência do conselho de administração no desalinhamento entre o desempenho financeiro e de mercado da empresa com a remuneração dos executivos. Para isso, analisa dados secundários de 181 empresas listadas na B3, de 2010 a 2018, tratados por análise de regressão com dados em painel. Os resultados revelam que a remuneração dos executivos, total e variável, está relacionada ao desempenho contábil e de mercado, com parte não explicada por esse, intitulada no estudo como remuneração desalinhada. Os achados mostram que o conselho de administração, avaliado por tamanho, agrava o desalinhamento, enquanto a dualidade de cargos e independência não influenciam. Ainda, a relação entre o tamanho da diretoria e do conselho, discutido como fator que pode aumentar a complexidade dos contratos de compensação e o poder gerencial, também aumenta o nível de desalinhamento. Os resultados revelam fatores preocupantes quanto às relações do conselho com custos de agência, com destaque a níveis desalinhados da remuneração dos agentes com os interesses do principal por desempenho. Contribui ao discutir o desalinhamento da remuneração executiva, apresentando evidências das relações entre conselho de administração e diretoria executiva, com destaques no texto para a literatura e as organizações.Universidade Regional de Blumenau2024-03-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/1094610.4270/ruc.2023108Revista Universo Contábil; v. 19 n. 1 (2023): Revista Universo Contábil 1809-33371809-3337reponame:Revista Universo Contábilinstname:Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB)instacron:FURBporhttps://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/10946/6099Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Universo Contábilinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMarquezan, Luiz Henrique FigueiraVelho, Maria Laura PereiraZonatto, Vinícius Costa da Silva2024-04-01T19:46:13Zoai:ojs.bu.furb.br:article/10946Revistahttps://proxy.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/PUBhttps://proxy.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/oai||universocontabil@furb.br1809-33371809-3337opendoar:2024-04-01T19:46:13Revista Universo Contábil - Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv BOARD INFLUENCE ON THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
LA INFLUENCIA DEL DIRECTORIO EN LA DESALINEACIÓN ENTRE LA COMPENSACIÓN EJECUTIVA Y EL DESEMPEÑO ORGANIZACIONAL
INFLUÊNCIA DO CONSELHO DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO NO DESALINHAMENTO ENTRE REMUNERAÇÃO EXECUTIVA E DESEMPENHO ORGANIZACIONAL
title BOARD INFLUENCE ON THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
spellingShingle BOARD INFLUENCE ON THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Marquezan, Luiz Henrique Figueira
Executive compensation
Board
Agency Theory
Corporate Governance
Remuneración de ejecutivos
Directorio
Teoría de la Agencia
Gobierno Corporativo
Remuneração de executivos
Conselho de administração
Teoria de Agência
Governança Corporativa
title_short BOARD INFLUENCE ON THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
title_full BOARD INFLUENCE ON THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
title_fullStr BOARD INFLUENCE ON THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
title_full_unstemmed BOARD INFLUENCE ON THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
title_sort BOARD INFLUENCE ON THE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
author Marquezan, Luiz Henrique Figueira
author_facet Marquezan, Luiz Henrique Figueira
Velho, Maria Laura Pereira
Zonatto, Vinícius Costa da Silva
author_role author
author2 Velho, Maria Laura Pereira
Zonatto, Vinícius Costa da Silva
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Marquezan, Luiz Henrique Figueira
Velho, Maria Laura Pereira
Zonatto, Vinícius Costa da Silva
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Executive compensation
Board
Agency Theory
Corporate Governance
Remuneración de ejecutivos
Directorio
Teoría de la Agencia
Gobierno Corporativo
Remuneração de executivos
Conselho de administração
Teoria de Agência
Governança Corporativa
topic Executive compensation
Board
Agency Theory
Corporate Governance
Remuneración de ejecutivos
Directorio
Teoría de la Agencia
Gobierno Corporativo
Remuneração de executivos
Conselho de administração
Teoria de Agência
Governança Corporativa
description This study analyzes the board's influence on the misalignment between the company's financial and market performance and executive compensation. Secondary data from 181 companies listed on the B3 from 2010 to 2018 were analyzed using panel data regression. The results reveal that executive compensation, total and variable, is related to accounting and market performance, with part not explained by this, titled misaligned compensation. The findings denote that the board size aggravates the misalignment, while duality and independence do not influence it. Furthermore, the ratio between the number of directors and board size, which can increase the complexity of compensation contracts and the managerial power, also increases the misalignment. The results reveal worrying factors regarding the board's relationship with agency costs, emphasizing principal-agent misalignment, evaluated by executive compensation and the principal's interests in performance. Contributes by discussing the misalignment of executive compensation, presenting influences from board and directors, with highlights for the literature and organizations.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024-03-27
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/10946
10.4270/ruc.2023108
url https://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/10946
identifier_str_mv 10.4270/ruc.2023108
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/10946/6099
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Universo Contábil
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Universo Contábil
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Regional de Blumenau
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Regional de Blumenau
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Universo Contábil; v. 19 n. 1 (2023): Revista Universo Contábil
1809-3337
1809-3337
reponame:Revista Universo Contábil
instname:Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB)
instacron:FURB
instname_str Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB)
instacron_str FURB
institution FURB
reponame_str Revista Universo Contábil
collection Revista Universo Contábil
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Universo Contábil - Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||universocontabil@furb.br
_version_ 1798945118269472768

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