Resentment and Justice: articulations for an ethics of law from Nietzsche and Ricoeur
| Autor(a) principal: | |
|---|---|
| Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
| Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | por |
| Título da fonte: | Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno |
| Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/DDEM/article/view/59274 |
Resumo: | The thesis faces the problem of justice and resentment in a plural and postmodern society. To deal with such questions, we propose an articulation between Ricouer's ethics, especially in the works The Self as Another and Just I and II, and Nietzsche's philosophy of resentment, especially from the Genealogy of Morals, involving still others. studies. The authors start from their own philosophical challenges and contexts, but, based on the research, we show how the Nietzschean philosophy of law and morals lead to a critique that finds resonance in Ricoeur's ethical philosophy. We found that the Nietzschean critique of modern law provides important elements to understand the intensification of ethical-social differences aggravated in the plural and multicultural scenario of postmodern society. Nietzsche's diagnosis is that modern morality, but also modern law, was constituted as a triumph of reactive affects over active affects, a phenomenon that the author elaborates through the concept of resentment. Such a way of structuring morality implies a practice of law centered, on the one hand, on the norm as a ban on active impulses and, on the other hand, from the victim's perspective, equating justice with a kind of integral reparation for damages and negative freedom guaranteed by the standard. Nietzsche presents, however, a new conception of law as a form of antagonism between forces that meet and, in the legal dispute, elaborate a precarious form of self-preservation. This conception opens a possible bridge to a philosophy of law uncoupled from the strong notion of norm and justice as the integral realization of guaranteed rights. In this way, a possible dialogue is opened for the recovery of ethics from Ricoeur, a space in which a new semantics of the idea of good and the ends of law emerges, in order to complement formal normative reasoning with a broader teleological perspective. The philosophical correlation between Nietzsche's will to power and Ricouer's ethics is made possible by the figure of love and forgiveness, especially from Max Scheler's critique of Nietzsche, in the sense of the possibility of love appearing as an expression of the power of human. Thus, forgiveness, as a possible expression of love between enemies, highlights the connection between the will to power and the ethical notion of the common good, which leads to a new foundation of the norm from alterity and, ultimately, leads to the mutual recognition as a basic operation of justice. The idea of mutual recognition restores the prevalence of the objective idea of rights, through which it becomes possible to understand a right dispossessed of the individual, but as effectively what is recognized to the other as the cost of freedom in a plural life. Through these correlations, we find in Ricouer philosophical material to understand how the insertion of ethics in law responds to the challenge of overcoming resentment. From these correlations, comes the conclusion that overcoming resentment involves replacing the model of law as a norm and the idea of subjective right as a space for negative freedom or non-interference with another model of law, in which the role of institutions of justice is tied to the ethical end of engaging in an economy of mutual recognition. Consequently, there is a redefinition of the ends of the judicial process, which now takes on the meaning of agonistic dispute whose outcome cannot be predetermined, but only guided by tolerance and the search for peaceful coexistence in a plural society. |
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Resentment and Justice: articulations for an ethics of law from Nietzsche and RicoeurResentimiento y Justicia:: articulaciones para una ética del derecho desde Nietzsche y RicoeurRessentimento e Justiça: articulações para uma ética do direito a partir de Nietzsche e Ricoeurphilosophy of lawresentmentjusticeethicNietzscheRicoeurfilosofia do direitoressentimentojustiçaéticaNietzscheRicoeurfilosofía del derechoresentimientojusticiaprincipio moralNietzscheRicoeurThe thesis faces the problem of justice and resentment in a plural and postmodern society. To deal with such questions, we propose an articulation between Ricouer's ethics, especially in the works The Self as Another and Just I and II, and Nietzsche's philosophy of resentment, especially from the Genealogy of Morals, involving still others. studies. The authors start from their own philosophical challenges and contexts, but, based on the research, we show how the Nietzschean philosophy of law and morals lead to a critique that finds resonance in Ricoeur's ethical philosophy. We found that the Nietzschean critique of modern law provides important elements to understand the intensification of ethical-social differences aggravated in the plural and multicultural scenario of postmodern society. Nietzsche's diagnosis is that modern morality, but also modern law, was constituted as a triumph of reactive affects over active affects, a phenomenon that the author elaborates through the concept of resentment. Such a way of structuring morality implies a practice of law centered, on the one hand, on the norm as a ban on active impulses and, on the other hand, from the victim's perspective, equating justice with a kind of integral reparation for damages and negative freedom guaranteed by the standard. Nietzsche presents, however, a new conception of law as a form of antagonism between forces that meet and, in the legal dispute, elaborate a precarious form of self-preservation. This conception opens a possible bridge to a philosophy of law uncoupled from the strong notion of norm and justice as the integral realization of guaranteed rights. In this way, a possible dialogue is opened for the recovery of ethics from Ricoeur, a space in which a new semantics of the idea of good and the ends of law emerges, in order to complement formal normative reasoning with a broader teleological perspective. The philosophical correlation between Nietzsche's will to power and Ricouer's ethics is made possible by the figure of love and forgiveness, especially from Max Scheler's critique of Nietzsche, in the sense of the possibility of love appearing as an expression of the power of human. Thus, forgiveness, as a possible expression of love between enemies, highlights the connection between the will to power and the ethical notion of the common good, which leads to a new foundation of the norm from alterity and, ultimately, leads to the mutual recognition as a basic operation of justice. The idea of mutual recognition restores the prevalence of the objective idea of rights, through which it becomes possible to understand a right dispossessed of the individual, but as effectively what is recognized to the other as the cost of freedom in a plural life. Through these correlations, we find in Ricouer philosophical material to understand how the insertion of ethics in law responds to the challenge of overcoming resentment. From these correlations, comes the conclusion that overcoming resentment involves replacing the model of law as a norm and the idea of subjective right as a space for negative freedom or non-interference with another model of law, in which the role of institutions of justice is tied to the ethical end of engaging in an economy of mutual recognition. Consequently, there is a redefinition of the ends of the judicial process, which now takes on the meaning of agonistic dispute whose outcome cannot be predetermined, but only guided by tolerance and the search for peaceful coexistence in a plural society.La tesis enfrenta el problema de la justicia y el resentimiento en una sociedad plural y posmoderna. Para abordar tales interrogantes, proponemos una articulación entre la ética de Ricouer, especialmente en las obras El yo como otro y Justo I y II, y la filosofía del resentimiento de Nietzsche, especialmente a partir de la Genealogía de la moral, involucrando aún otros estudios. Los autores parten de sus propios desafíos y contextos filosóficos, pero, con base en la investigación, mostramos cómo la filosofía nietzscheana del derecho y la moral conducen a una crítica que encuentra resonancia en la filosofía ética de Ricoeur. Encontramos que la crítica nietzscheana al derecho moderno aporta elementos importantes para comprender la intensificación de las diferencias ético-sociales agravadas en el escenario plural y multicultural de la sociedad posmoderna. El diagnóstico de Nietzsche es que la moral moderna, pero también el derecho moderno, se constituyó como un triunfo de los afectos reactivos sobre los afectos activos, fenómeno que el autor elabora a través del concepto de resentimiento. Tal forma de estructurar la moral implica una práctica del derecho centrada, por un lado, en la norma como prohibición de los impulsos activos y, por otro lado, desde la perspectiva de la víctima, equiparando la justicia a una suerte de reparación integral de los daños y perjuicios. libertad negativa garantizada por la norma. Nietzsche presenta, sin embargo, una nueva concepción del derecho como una forma de antagonismo entre fuerzas que se encuentran y, en la disputa jurídica, elaboran una precaria forma de autoconservación. Esta concepción abre un puente posible hacia una filosofía del derecho desvinculada de la noción fuerte de norma y justicia como realización integral de derechos garantizados. De esta forma, se abre un diálogo posible para la recuperación de la ética desde Ricoeur, espacio en el que emerge una nueva semántica de la idea de bien y de los fines del derecho, con el fin de complementar el razonamiento normativo formal con una perspectiva teleológica más amplia. . La correlación filosófica entre la voluntad de poder de Nietzsche y la ética de Ricouer es posible gracias a la figura del amor y del perdón, especialmente a partir de la crítica de Max Scheler a Nietzsche, en el sentido de la posibilidad de que el amor aparezca como expresión del poder de lo humano. Así, el perdón, como expresión posible del amor entre enemigos, pone de relieve la conexión entre la voluntad de poder y la noción ética del bien común, lo que conduce a una nueva fundamentación de la norma desde la alteridad y, en última instancia, conduce al reconocimiento mutuo. como una operación básica de justicia. La idea de reconocimiento mutuo restituye la prevalencia de la idea objetiva de derechos, a través de la cual se hace posible entender un derecho desposeído del individuo, pero tan efectivamente lo que se reconoce al otro como el costo de la libertad en plural. vida. A través de estas correlaciones, encontramos en Ricouer material filosófico para comprender cómo la inserción de la ética en el derecho responde al desafío de la superación del resentimiento. De estas correlaciones se desprende que la superación del resentimiento implica sustituir el modelo de derecho como norma y la idea de derecho subjetivo como espacio de libertad negativa o de no injerencia por otro modelo de derecho, en el que el papel de las instituciones de la justicia está ligada al fin ético de comprometerse en una economía de reconocimiento mutuo. En consecuencia, hay una redefinición de los fines del proceso judicial, que ahora adquiere el sentido de disputa agonística cuyo resultado no puede ser predeterminado, sino solo guiado por la tolerancia y la búsqueda de la convivencia pacífica en una sociedad plural.A tese enfrenta o problema da justiça e do ressentimento na sociedade plural e pós-moderna. Para lidar com tais questões, propomos uma articulação entre a ética de Ricouer, sobretudo nas obras O Si-Mesmo Como Outro e Justo I e II, e a filosofia do ressentimento de Nietzsche, em especial a partir da Genealogia da Moral, envolvendo ainda outros estudos. Os autores partem de desafios e contextos filosóficos próprios, mas, a partir da pesquisa, mostramos como a filosofia nietzschiana do direito e da moral conduzem para uma crítica que encontra ressonância na filosofia ética de Ricoeur. Constatamos que a crítica nietzschiana ao direito moderno fornece elementos importantes para compreender o acirramento das diferenças ético-sociais agravadas no cenário plural e multicultural da sociedade pós-moderna. O diagnóstico de Nietzsche é de que a moral moderna, mas também o direito moderno, foi constituída como triunfo de afetos reativos sobre os afetos ativos, fenômeno que o autor elabora através do conceito de ressentimento. Tal forma de estruturação da moral implica uma prática do direito centrado, de um lado, na norma enquanto interdição das pulsões ativas e, de outro, na perspectiva da vítima, igualando a justiça a uma espécie de reparação integral dos danos e liberdade negativa garantida pela norma. Nietzsche apresenta, contudo, uma nova concepção de direito enquanto forma de antagonismo entre forças que se encontram e, na disputa jurídica, elaboram uma forma precária de conservação de si. Essa concepção abre uma ponte possível para uma filosofia do direito desatrelada da noção forte de norma e de justiça como realização integral de direitos garantidos. Desse modo, abre-se um diálogo possível para a recuperação da ética a partir de Ricoeur, espaço em que surge uma nova semântica da ideia de bem e dos fins do direito, de modo a complementar o raciocínio normativo formal com perspectiva teleológica mais ampla. A correlação filosófica entre a vontade de potência de Nietzsche e a ética de Ricouer se torna possível pela figura do amor e do perdão, sobretudo a partir da crítica de Max Scheler a Nietzsche, no sentido da possibilidade de o amor figurar como expressão da potência do humano. Assim, o perdão, enquanto expressão possível do amor entre inimigos, evidencia a conexão entre a vontade de potência e a noção ética do bem comum, o que remete a um novo fundamento da norma a partir da alteridade e, em última instância, conduz ao mútuo reconhecimento enquanto operação básica da justiça. A ideia de mútuo reconhecimento restitui a prevalência da ideia objetiva de direitos, através da qual se torna possível compreender um direito desapossado do indivíduo, mas como efetivamente aquilo que se reconhece ao outro como custo da liberdade numa vida plural. Através dessas correlações, encontramos em Ricouer material filosófico para compreender como a inserção na ética no direito responde ao desafio da superação do ressentimento. Dessas correlações, advém a conclusão de que a superação do ressentimento passa pela substituição do modelo do direito como norma e da ideia de direito subjetivo como espaço de liberdade negativa ou de não interferência por um outro modelo de direito, em que o papel das instituições de justiça está atrelado ao fim ético do engajamento numa economia do mútuo reconhecimento. Consequentemente, dá-se uma redefinição dos fins do processo judicial, que agora ganha o sentido de disputa agonística cujo resultado não pode ser pré-determinado, mas apenas guiado pela tolerância e pela busca da convivência pacífica numa sociedade plural.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2022-09-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionResumo de Tese - não avaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/DDEM/article/view/5927410.23925/ddem.v.2.n.5.59274Democratic Rights & Modern State; Vol. 2 No. 5 (2022): Revista Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno; 183-190Derechos democráticos & estado moderno; Vol. 2 Núm. 5 (2022): Revista Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno; 183-190Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno; v. 2 n. 5 (2022): Revista Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno; 183-1902675-764810.23925//ddem.v.2.n.5reponame:Direitos Democráticos & Estado Modernoinstname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPporhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/DDEM/article/view/59274/40537Copyright (c) 2022 Direitos Democráticos & Estado Modernohttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLuzes, Cristiano Araújo 2023-01-17T19:14:25Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/59274Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/DDEMPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/DDEM/oairevistadodireitopucsp@gmail.com2675-76482675-7648opendoar:2023-01-17T19:14:25Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
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Resentment and Justice: articulations for an ethics of law from Nietzsche and Ricoeur Resentimiento y Justicia:: articulaciones para una ética del derecho desde Nietzsche y Ricoeur Ressentimento e Justiça: articulações para uma ética do direito a partir de Nietzsche e Ricoeur |
| title |
Resentment and Justice: articulations for an ethics of law from Nietzsche and Ricoeur |
| spellingShingle |
Resentment and Justice: articulations for an ethics of law from Nietzsche and Ricoeur Luzes, Cristiano Araújo philosophy of law resentment justice ethic Nietzsche Ricoeur filosofia do direito ressentimento justiça ética Nietzsche Ricoeur filosofía del derecho resentimiento justicia principio moral Nietzsche Ricoeur |
| title_short |
Resentment and Justice: articulations for an ethics of law from Nietzsche and Ricoeur |
| title_full |
Resentment and Justice: articulations for an ethics of law from Nietzsche and Ricoeur |
| title_fullStr |
Resentment and Justice: articulations for an ethics of law from Nietzsche and Ricoeur |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Resentment and Justice: articulations for an ethics of law from Nietzsche and Ricoeur |
| title_sort |
Resentment and Justice: articulations for an ethics of law from Nietzsche and Ricoeur |
| author |
Luzes, Cristiano Araújo |
| author_facet |
Luzes, Cristiano Araújo |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Luzes, Cristiano Araújo |
| dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
philosophy of law resentment justice ethic Nietzsche Ricoeur filosofia do direito ressentimento justiça ética Nietzsche Ricoeur filosofía del derecho resentimiento justicia principio moral Nietzsche Ricoeur |
| topic |
philosophy of law resentment justice ethic Nietzsche Ricoeur filosofia do direito ressentimento justiça ética Nietzsche Ricoeur filosofía del derecho resentimiento justicia principio moral Nietzsche Ricoeur |
| description |
The thesis faces the problem of justice and resentment in a plural and postmodern society. To deal with such questions, we propose an articulation between Ricouer's ethics, especially in the works The Self as Another and Just I and II, and Nietzsche's philosophy of resentment, especially from the Genealogy of Morals, involving still others. studies. The authors start from their own philosophical challenges and contexts, but, based on the research, we show how the Nietzschean philosophy of law and morals lead to a critique that finds resonance in Ricoeur's ethical philosophy. We found that the Nietzschean critique of modern law provides important elements to understand the intensification of ethical-social differences aggravated in the plural and multicultural scenario of postmodern society. Nietzsche's diagnosis is that modern morality, but also modern law, was constituted as a triumph of reactive affects over active affects, a phenomenon that the author elaborates through the concept of resentment. Such a way of structuring morality implies a practice of law centered, on the one hand, on the norm as a ban on active impulses and, on the other hand, from the victim's perspective, equating justice with a kind of integral reparation for damages and negative freedom guaranteed by the standard. Nietzsche presents, however, a new conception of law as a form of antagonism between forces that meet and, in the legal dispute, elaborate a precarious form of self-preservation. This conception opens a possible bridge to a philosophy of law uncoupled from the strong notion of norm and justice as the integral realization of guaranteed rights. In this way, a possible dialogue is opened for the recovery of ethics from Ricoeur, a space in which a new semantics of the idea of good and the ends of law emerges, in order to complement formal normative reasoning with a broader teleological perspective. The philosophical correlation between Nietzsche's will to power and Ricouer's ethics is made possible by the figure of love and forgiveness, especially from Max Scheler's critique of Nietzsche, in the sense of the possibility of love appearing as an expression of the power of human. Thus, forgiveness, as a possible expression of love between enemies, highlights the connection between the will to power and the ethical notion of the common good, which leads to a new foundation of the norm from alterity and, ultimately, leads to the mutual recognition as a basic operation of justice. The idea of mutual recognition restores the prevalence of the objective idea of rights, through which it becomes possible to understand a right dispossessed of the individual, but as effectively what is recognized to the other as the cost of freedom in a plural life. Through these correlations, we find in Ricouer philosophical material to understand how the insertion of ethics in law responds to the challenge of overcoming resentment. From these correlations, comes the conclusion that overcoming resentment involves replacing the model of law as a norm and the idea of subjective right as a space for negative freedom or non-interference with another model of law, in which the role of institutions of justice is tied to the ethical end of engaging in an economy of mutual recognition. Consequently, there is a redefinition of the ends of the judicial process, which now takes on the meaning of agonistic dispute whose outcome cannot be predetermined, but only guided by tolerance and the search for peaceful coexistence in a plural society. |
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2022 |
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2022-09-21 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Resumo de Tese - não avaliado pelos pares |
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https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/DDEM/article/view/59274/40537 |
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Copyright (c) 2022 Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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Democratic Rights & Modern State; Vol. 2 No. 5 (2022): Revista Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno; 183-190 Derechos democráticos & estado moderno; Vol. 2 Núm. 5 (2022): Revista Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno; 183-190 Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno; v. 2 n. 5 (2022): Revista Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno; 183-190 2675-7648 10.23925//ddem.v.2.n.5 reponame:Direitos Democráticos & Estado Moderno instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
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