One - Memory in Repeated Games
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2006 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82858 |
Resumo: | We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1 – memory strategies. First, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile that cannot be obtained by any 1 – memory subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, a complete characterization of 1 – memory simple strategies is provided, and it is employed to establish the following in games with more than two players each having connected action spaces: 1. all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by an ε – subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of 1 – memory, 2. all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by a 1 – memory subgame equilibrium, and 3. the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds for 1 – memory strategies. While no further restrictions are needed for the third result to hold in 2 – player games, an additional restriction is needed for the first two: players must have common punishments. |
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One - Memory in Repeated GamesRepeated GamesMemoryBounded RationalityFolk TheoremWe study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1 – memory strategies. First, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile that cannot be obtained by any 1 – memory subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, a complete characterization of 1 – memory simple strategies is provided, and it is employed to establish the following in games with more than two players each having connected action spaces: 1. all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by an ε – subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of 1 – memory, 2. all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by a 1 – memory subgame equilibrium, and 3. the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds for 1 – memory strategies. While no further restrictions are needed for the third result to hold in 2 – player games, an additional restriction is needed for the first two: players must have common punishments.Nova SBERUNBarlo, MehmetCarmona, Guilherme2019-10-01T14:55:03Z2006-11-172006-11-17T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/82858engBarlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme, One - Memory in Repeated Games (November, 2006). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 500info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:36:49Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/82858Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:13.952223Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
One - Memory in Repeated Games |
title |
One - Memory in Repeated Games |
spellingShingle |
One - Memory in Repeated Games Barlo, Mehmet Repeated Games Memory Bounded Rationality Folk Theorem |
title_short |
One - Memory in Repeated Games |
title_full |
One - Memory in Repeated Games |
title_fullStr |
One - Memory in Repeated Games |
title_full_unstemmed |
One - Memory in Repeated Games |
title_sort |
One - Memory in Repeated Games |
author |
Barlo, Mehmet |
author_facet |
Barlo, Mehmet Carmona, Guilherme |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Carmona, Guilherme |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Barlo, Mehmet Carmona, Guilherme |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Repeated Games Memory Bounded Rationality Folk Theorem |
topic |
Repeated Games Memory Bounded Rationality Folk Theorem |
description |
We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1 – memory strategies. First, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile that cannot be obtained by any 1 – memory subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, a complete characterization of 1 – memory simple strategies is provided, and it is employed to establish the following in games with more than two players each having connected action spaces: 1. all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by an ε – subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of 1 – memory, 2. all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by a 1 – memory subgame equilibrium, and 3. the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds for 1 – memory strategies. While no further restrictions are needed for the third result to hold in 2 – player games, an additional restriction is needed for the first two: players must have common punishments. |
publishDate |
2006 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2006-11-17 2006-11-17T00:00:00Z 2019-10-01T14:55:03Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82858 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82858 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme, One - Memory in Repeated Games (November, 2006). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 500 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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