Public–private collusion
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/41495 |
Resumo: | We study collusion between a public firm and a private firm facing linear demand and quadratic costs. We characterize the collusive outcome that results from Nash bargaining and compare it to the non-cooperative outcome. If the public firm’s taste for consumer surplus is mild, both firms reduce output (as in a private duopoly). If it is intermediate, while the public firm reduces output, the private firm expands output to such an extent that total output increases. If it is strong, the private firm’s output expansion does not compensate for the public firm’s output contraction, and thus total output decreases. We also characterize collusion sustainability, and assess the impact of relative bargaining power, degree of cost convexity, public firm’s taste for total surplus, and cost asymmetry. We conclude that, by reducing the productive inefficiency that is caused by the public firm being more expansionary, collusion may lead to higher profits and consumer surplus. |
id |
RCAP_258a6a7779a615e6061f851cd7bdc1bf |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/41495 |
network_acronym_str |
RCAP |
network_name_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository_id_str |
7160 |
spelling |
Public–private collusionCollusionPublic firmsMixed oligopolyNash bargainingWe study collusion between a public firm and a private firm facing linear demand and quadratic costs. We characterize the collusive outcome that results from Nash bargaining and compare it to the non-cooperative outcome. If the public firm’s taste for consumer surplus is mild, both firms reduce output (as in a private duopoly). If it is intermediate, while the public firm reduces output, the private firm expands output to such an extent that total output increases. If it is strong, the private firm’s output expansion does not compensate for the public firm’s output contraction, and thus total output decreases. We also characterize collusion sustainability, and assess the impact of relative bargaining power, degree of cost convexity, public firm’s taste for total surplus, and cost asymmetry. We conclude that, by reducing the productive inefficiency that is caused by the public firm being more expansionary, collusion may lead to higher profits and consumer surplus.Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaMota, FilipaCorreia-da-Silva, JoãoPinho, Joana2023-06-30T11:00:28Z20232023-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/41495eng0889-938X10.1007/s11151-023-09903-385162940979info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-25T01:39:13Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/41495Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:34:10.853004Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Public–private collusion |
title |
Public–private collusion |
spellingShingle |
Public–private collusion Mota, Filipa Collusion Public firms Mixed oligopoly Nash bargaining |
title_short |
Public–private collusion |
title_full |
Public–private collusion |
title_fullStr |
Public–private collusion |
title_full_unstemmed |
Public–private collusion |
title_sort |
Public–private collusion |
author |
Mota, Filipa |
author_facet |
Mota, Filipa Correia-da-Silva, João Pinho, Joana |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Correia-da-Silva, João Pinho, Joana |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Mota, Filipa Correia-da-Silva, João Pinho, Joana |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Collusion Public firms Mixed oligopoly Nash bargaining |
topic |
Collusion Public firms Mixed oligopoly Nash bargaining |
description |
We study collusion between a public firm and a private firm facing linear demand and quadratic costs. We characterize the collusive outcome that results from Nash bargaining and compare it to the non-cooperative outcome. If the public firm’s taste for consumer surplus is mild, both firms reduce output (as in a private duopoly). If it is intermediate, while the public firm reduces output, the private firm expands output to such an extent that total output increases. If it is strong, the private firm’s output expansion does not compensate for the public firm’s output contraction, and thus total output decreases. We also characterize collusion sustainability, and assess the impact of relative bargaining power, degree of cost convexity, public firm’s taste for total surplus, and cost asymmetry. We conclude that, by reducing the productive inefficiency that is caused by the public firm being more expansionary, collusion may lead to higher profits and consumer surplus. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-06-30T11:00:28Z 2023 2023-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/41495 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/41495 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
0889-938X 10.1007/s11151-023-09903-3 85162940979 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799132068569939968 |