HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT?
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.1.1.56 |
Resumo: | I take up the question of what argument, if any, Hobbes has for state legitimacy, which term I stipulatively use to mean the general, exclusive permission to enforce compliance with their directives or laws that states are standardly taken to have. I will argue that, contrary to what one might imagine, the ground of state legitimacy for Hobbes is not to be found in the social contract or the authorisation of the state’s subjects, but rather in the sovereign’s simply not being subject to the kind of laws that rule out enforcement for subjects. The sovereign’s right to enforce is based in exactly the same sort of right that all have when not subject to any higher sovereign power. Though this must be nuanced (the sovereign does not literally retain its right to all things from the state of nature, since no sovereign existed in the state of nature), the permissibility of enforcement for Hobbes is to be found simply in the lack of anything that might make it impermissible. |
id |
RCAP_4148feec4be5ca4e7bfc1694a54333e6 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:journals.uminho.pt:article/4658 |
network_acronym_str |
RCAP |
network_name_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository_id_str |
7160 |
spelling |
HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT?HOBBES: UM VOLUNTARISTA ACERCA DA PERMISSIBILIDADE DA AUTORIDADE ESTATAL?8TH BRAGA MEETINGS ON ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, WITH GUSTAF ARRHENIUSI take up the question of what argument, if any, Hobbes has for state legitimacy, which term I stipulatively use to mean the general, exclusive permission to enforce compliance with their directives or laws that states are standardly taken to have. I will argue that, contrary to what one might imagine, the ground of state legitimacy for Hobbes is not to be found in the social contract or the authorisation of the state’s subjects, but rather in the sovereign’s simply not being subject to the kind of laws that rule out enforcement for subjects. The sovereign’s right to enforce is based in exactly the same sort of right that all have when not subject to any higher sovereign power. Though this must be nuanced (the sovereign does not literally retain its right to all things from the state of nature, since no sovereign existed in the state of nature), the permissibility of enforcement for Hobbes is to be found simply in the lack of anything that might make it impermissible.Trato a questão de saber que argumento tem Hobbes a favor da legitimidade do Estado, um termo que uso para designar a permissão geral e exclusiva para impor a obediência com as directivas e leis que os Estados tipicamente têm. Irei argumentar que, ao contrário do que possamos imaginar, o fundamento da legitimidade do Estado para Hobbes não se encontra no contrato social ou na autorização dos súbditos do Estado, mas antes no facto de o soberano não estar sujeito ao tipo de leis que retiram aos súbditos a autoridade de impor. O direito do soberano impor a lei baseia-se exactamente no mesmo tipo de direito que todos têm quando não estão submetidos a um poder soberano superior. Embora isto deva ser qualificado (o soberano não mantém literalmente o seu direito natural a todas as coisas, uma vez que não existia qualquer soberano no estado de natureza), a permissibilidade da autoridade encontra-se, em Hobbes, simplesmente na falta de algo que poderia tornar essa autoridade inaceitável.Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho2023-09-26info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttps://doi.org/10.21814/eps.1.1.56eng2184-25822184-2574Guillery, Danielinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-29T10:56:31Zoai:journals.uminho.pt:article/4658Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T01:58:41.416301Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT? HOBBES: UM VOLUNTARISTA ACERCA DA PERMISSIBILIDADE DA AUTORIDADE ESTATAL? |
title |
HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT? |
spellingShingle |
HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT? Guillery, Daniel 8TH BRAGA MEETINGS ON ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, WITH GUSTAF ARRHENIUS |
title_short |
HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT? |
title_full |
HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT? |
title_fullStr |
HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT? |
title_full_unstemmed |
HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT? |
title_sort |
HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT? |
author |
Guillery, Daniel |
author_facet |
Guillery, Daniel |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Guillery, Daniel |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
8TH BRAGA MEETINGS ON ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, WITH GUSTAF ARRHENIUS |
topic |
8TH BRAGA MEETINGS ON ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, WITH GUSTAF ARRHENIUS |
description |
I take up the question of what argument, if any, Hobbes has for state legitimacy, which term I stipulatively use to mean the general, exclusive permission to enforce compliance with their directives or laws that states are standardly taken to have. I will argue that, contrary to what one might imagine, the ground of state legitimacy for Hobbes is not to be found in the social contract or the authorisation of the state’s subjects, but rather in the sovereign’s simply not being subject to the kind of laws that rule out enforcement for subjects. The sovereign’s right to enforce is based in exactly the same sort of right that all have when not subject to any higher sovereign power. Though this must be nuanced (the sovereign does not literally retain its right to all things from the state of nature, since no sovereign existed in the state of nature), the permissibility of enforcement for Hobbes is to be found simply in the lack of anything that might make it impermissible. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-09-26 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.1.1.56 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.1.1.56 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
2184-2582 2184-2574 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799137071283044352 |