A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2003 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83505 |
Resumo: | We define social institutions as strategies in some repeated game. With this interpretation in mind, we consider the impact of introducing requirements on strategies which have been viewed as necessary properties for any social institution to endure. The properties we study are finite complexity, symmetry, global stability, and semiperfection. We show that: (1) If a strategy satisfies these properties then players play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period; (2) The set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game equals the set of Nash equilibria payoffs in the stage game; and (3) A strategy vector satisfies these properties in a Pareto optimal way if and only if players play some Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every stage. These results provide a social institution interpretation of Nash equilibrium: individual behavior in enduring social institutions is described by Nash equilibria. |
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A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social InstitutionsWe define social institutions as strategies in some repeated game. With this interpretation in mind, we consider the impact of introducing requirements on strategies which have been viewed as necessary properties for any social institution to endure. The properties we study are finite complexity, symmetry, global stability, and semiperfection. We show that: (1) If a strategy satisfies these properties then players play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period; (2) The set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game equals the set of Nash equilibria payoffs in the stage game; and (3) A strategy vector satisfies these properties in a Pareto optimal way if and only if players play some Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every stage. These results provide a social institution interpretation of Nash equilibrium: individual behavior in enduring social institutions is described by Nash equilibria.Nova SBERUNCarmona, Guilherme2019-10-07T13:19:12Z2003-01-292003-01-29T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/83505engCarmona, Guilherme, A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions (January, 2003). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 425info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:37:14Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/83505Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:20.008027Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions |
title |
A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions |
spellingShingle |
A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions Carmona, Guilherme |
title_short |
A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions |
title_full |
A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions |
title_fullStr |
A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions |
title_sort |
A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions |
author |
Carmona, Guilherme |
author_facet |
Carmona, Guilherme |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Carmona, Guilherme |
description |
We define social institutions as strategies in some repeated game. With this interpretation in mind, we consider the impact of introducing requirements on strategies which have been viewed as necessary properties for any social institution to endure. The properties we study are finite complexity, symmetry, global stability, and semiperfection. We show that: (1) If a strategy satisfies these properties then players play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period; (2) The set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game equals the set of Nash equilibria payoffs in the stage game; and (3) A strategy vector satisfies these properties in a Pareto optimal way if and only if players play some Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every stage. These results provide a social institution interpretation of Nash equilibrium: individual behavior in enduring social institutions is described by Nash equilibria. |
publishDate |
2003 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2003-01-29 2003-01-29T00:00:00Z 2019-10-07T13:19:12Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83505 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83505 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Carmona, Guilherme, A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions (January, 2003). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 425 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799137982299504640 |