Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Nilssen, Tore
Data de Publicação: 2011
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15670
Resumo: I discuss the role to be played by central banks in payment systems by way of an oligopoly model of a payments market where firms exert negative risk externalities upon each other. A central bank participating actively in this market is modelled as benign in two ways: exerting less externalities than other banks and maximizing welfare rather than profit. Because other banks react strategically to the central bank’s presence due to its low externalities, there is a risk that it backfires, with these other banks’ taking more risky positions than if the central bank were not there. The proper role of the central bank may actually be to stay out.
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spelling Risk externalities in a payments oligopolyPaymentsRisk externalitiesInterbank marketMixed oligopolyCentral bankI discuss the role to be played by central banks in payment systems by way of an oligopoly model of a payments market where firms exert negative risk externalities upon each other. A central bank participating actively in this market is modelled as benign in two ways: exerting less externalities than other banks and maximizing welfare rather than profit. Because other banks react strategically to the central bank’s presence due to its low externalities, there is a risk that it backfires, with these other banks’ taking more risky positions than if the central bank were not there. The proper role of the central bank may actually be to stay out.Springer VerlagRepositório da Universidade de LisboaNilssen, Tore2018-06-21T09:27:25Z2011-122011-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15670engNilssen, Tore (2011). "Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly". Portuguese Economic Journal, 10(3):211-2341617-982X (print)10.1007/s10258-010-0064-6info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-12T01:31:00Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/15670Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:01:17.430760Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly
title Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly
spellingShingle Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly
Nilssen, Tore
Payments
Risk externalities
Interbank market
Mixed oligopoly
Central bank
title_short Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly
title_full Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly
title_fullStr Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly
title_full_unstemmed Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly
title_sort Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly
author Nilssen, Tore
author_facet Nilssen, Tore
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Nilssen, Tore
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Payments
Risk externalities
Interbank market
Mixed oligopoly
Central bank
topic Payments
Risk externalities
Interbank market
Mixed oligopoly
Central bank
description I discuss the role to be played by central banks in payment systems by way of an oligopoly model of a payments market where firms exert negative risk externalities upon each other. A central bank participating actively in this market is modelled as benign in two ways: exerting less externalities than other banks and maximizing welfare rather than profit. Because other banks react strategically to the central bank’s presence due to its low externalities, there is a risk that it backfires, with these other banks’ taking more risky positions than if the central bank were not there. The proper role of the central bank may actually be to stay out.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-12
2011-12-01T00:00:00Z
2018-06-21T09:27:25Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15670
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15670
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Nilssen, Tore (2011). "Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly". Portuguese Economic Journal, 10(3):211-234
1617-982X (print)
10.1007/s10258-010-0064-6
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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