A test of collusive behavior based on incentives
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2008 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.3/4820 |
Resumo: | This paper proposes a novel collusion test based on the analysis of incentives faced by each firm in a colluding coalition. In fact, once collusion is in effect, each colluding firm faces the incentive to secretly deviate from the agreement, since it thereby increases its profits, although the colluding firms’ joint profit decreases. Thus, in a colluding coalition each firm has marginal revenues, calculated with Nash conjectures, which are larger than its marginal costs. The collusion test is based on the rejection of the null hypothesis that the firm marginal revenues with Nash conjectures are equal to or less than its marginal costs. |
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A test of collusive behavior based on incentivesCollusion TestCompetitivenessImperfect CompetitionThis paper proposes a novel collusion test based on the analysis of incentives faced by each firm in a colluding coalition. In fact, once collusion is in effect, each colluding firm faces the incentive to secretly deviate from the agreement, since it thereby increases its profits, although the colluding firms’ joint profit decreases. Thus, in a colluding coalition each firm has marginal revenues, calculated with Nash conjectures, which are larger than its marginal costs. The collusion test is based on the rejection of the null hypothesis that the firm marginal revenues with Nash conjectures are equal to or less than its marginal costs.Universidade dos AçoresRepositório da Universidade dos AçoresCabral, Ricardo2018-09-17T10:20:59Z2008-012008-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.3/4820engCabral, Ricardo (2008). A test of collusive behavior based on incentives, "Working Paper Series", 1, 28 pp.. Ponta Delgada: Universidade dos Açores, CEEAplA-A.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2022-12-20T14:33:04Zoai:repositorio.uac.pt:10400.3/4820Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:27:09.685932Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A test of collusive behavior based on incentives |
title |
A test of collusive behavior based on incentives |
spellingShingle |
A test of collusive behavior based on incentives Cabral, Ricardo Collusion Test Competitiveness Imperfect Competition |
title_short |
A test of collusive behavior based on incentives |
title_full |
A test of collusive behavior based on incentives |
title_fullStr |
A test of collusive behavior based on incentives |
title_full_unstemmed |
A test of collusive behavior based on incentives |
title_sort |
A test of collusive behavior based on incentives |
author |
Cabral, Ricardo |
author_facet |
Cabral, Ricardo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade dos Açores |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Cabral, Ricardo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Collusion Test Competitiveness Imperfect Competition |
topic |
Collusion Test Competitiveness Imperfect Competition |
description |
This paper proposes a novel collusion test based on the analysis of incentives faced by each firm in a colluding coalition. In fact, once collusion is in effect, each colluding firm faces the incentive to secretly deviate from the agreement, since it thereby increases its profits, although the colluding firms’ joint profit decreases. Thus, in a colluding coalition each firm has marginal revenues, calculated with Nash conjectures, which are larger than its marginal costs. The collusion test is based on the rejection of the null hypothesis that the firm marginal revenues with Nash conjectures are equal to or less than its marginal costs. |
publishDate |
2008 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2008-01 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z 2018-09-17T10:20:59Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.3/4820 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.3/4820 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Cabral, Ricardo (2008). A test of collusive behavior based on incentives, "Working Paper Series", 1, 28 pp.. Ponta Delgada: Universidade dos Açores, CEEAplA-A. |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade dos Açores |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade dos Açores |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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1799130726477594624 |