Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approach
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2010 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/1822/13033 |
Resumo: | We investigate the effect of competition on quality in health care markets with regulated prices taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (health care providers set the optimal investment plan at the initial period) and the feedback closed-loop solution (providers move investments in response to the dynamics of the states). Under the closed-loop solution competition is more intense in the sense that providers observe quality in each period and base their investment on this information. If the marginal provision cost is constant, the open-loop and closed-loop solutions coincide, and the results are similar to the ones obtained by static models. If the marginal provision cost is increasing, investment and quality are lower in the closed-loop solution (when competition is more intense). In this case, static models tend to exaggerate the positive effect of competition on quality. |
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Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approachHealth care marketsCompetitionQualitySocial SciencesScience & TechnologyWe investigate the effect of competition on quality in health care markets with regulated prices taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (health care providers set the optimal investment plan at the initial period) and the feedback closed-loop solution (providers move investments in response to the dynamics of the states). Under the closed-loop solution competition is more intense in the sense that providers observe quality in each period and base their investment on this information. If the marginal provision cost is constant, the open-loop and closed-loop solutions coincide, and the results are similar to the ones obtained by static models. If the marginal provision cost is increasing, investment and quality are lower in the closed-loop solution (when competition is more intense). In this case, static models tend to exaggerate the positive effect of competition on quality.Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)ElsevierUniversidade do MinhoBrekke, Kurt R.Cellini, RobertoSiciliani, LuigiStraume, Odd Rune2010-072010-07-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/13033eng0167-629610.1016/j.jhealeco.2010.05.00420542342info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:35:01Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/13033Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:30:49.792643Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approach |
title |
Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approach |
spellingShingle |
Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approach Brekke, Kurt R. Health care markets Competition Quality Social Sciences Science & Technology |
title_short |
Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approach |
title_full |
Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approach |
title_fullStr |
Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approach |
title_full_unstemmed |
Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approach |
title_sort |
Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approach |
author |
Brekke, Kurt R. |
author_facet |
Brekke, Kurt R. Cellini, Roberto Siciliani, Luigi Straume, Odd Rune |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Cellini, Roberto Siciliani, Luigi Straume, Odd Rune |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Brekke, Kurt R. Cellini, Roberto Siciliani, Luigi Straume, Odd Rune |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Health care markets Competition Quality Social Sciences Science & Technology |
topic |
Health care markets Competition Quality Social Sciences Science & Technology |
description |
We investigate the effect of competition on quality in health care markets with regulated prices taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (health care providers set the optimal investment plan at the initial period) and the feedback closed-loop solution (providers move investments in response to the dynamics of the states). Under the closed-loop solution competition is more intense in the sense that providers observe quality in each period and base their investment on this information. If the marginal provision cost is constant, the open-loop and closed-loop solutions coincide, and the results are similar to the ones obtained by static models. If the marginal provision cost is increasing, investment and quality are lower in the closed-loop solution (when competition is more intense). In this case, static models tend to exaggerate the positive effect of competition on quality. |
publishDate |
2010 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2010-07 2010-07-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/13033 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/13033 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
0167-6296 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2010.05.004 20542342 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799132813498253312 |