“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por eng |
Título da fonte: | Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470 |
Resumo: | The suppression of the moral and juridical status of the woman is discussed hereby, as an extension of the process of depersonification of the human being in the work The Handmaid’s Tale, by Margaret Atwood. Offred’s story unfolds in a dystopian future where women are the main victims of a new political order. In a United States transformed into the Gilead dictatorship, in the face of eventual loss of fertility by the female population, women are divided into castes and practically lose their rights over themselves, becoming the property of men. Personalization means more than observing rights to the biological being, it is a dialectical process in which individuality and rationality flirt with the inscription of moral importance. This process, being built in the instances of practical philosophy, is prior to the definitions of Law, characterizing itself as a moral construct. Personally, the human being happens to be accepted as the impregnable subject of the Law, which has precisely in the entity of the person its nucleus and the very meaning of its existence. This essay works with the idea of person as a complex being, as in the works by Immanuel Kant (1785), Lucien Sève (1994), Raquel Hogemann (2015) and Oswaldo Pereira de Lima Junior (2017). |
id |
RDL_04491fd9e7b153f6acbe5a5385f7c5bd |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/470 |
network_acronym_str |
RDL |
network_name_str |
Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women“O conto da aia”: a (des)pessoalização como dimensão epistêmico-moral fundadora da condição de sujeito de direito da mulherdepersonificationMargaret Atwoodmoral statusdignitysexism.despessoalizaçãoMargaret Atwoodstatus moraldignidadesexismo.Teoria ética e jurídica da pessoaThe suppression of the moral and juridical status of the woman is discussed hereby, as an extension of the process of depersonification of the human being in the work The Handmaid’s Tale, by Margaret Atwood. Offred’s story unfolds in a dystopian future where women are the main victims of a new political order. In a United States transformed into the Gilead dictatorship, in the face of eventual loss of fertility by the female population, women are divided into castes and practically lose their rights over themselves, becoming the property of men. Personalization means more than observing rights to the biological being, it is a dialectical process in which individuality and rationality flirt with the inscription of moral importance. This process, being built in the instances of practical philosophy, is prior to the definitions of Law, characterizing itself as a moral construct. Personally, the human being happens to be accepted as the impregnable subject of the Law, which has precisely in the entity of the person its nucleus and the very meaning of its existence. This essay works with the idea of person as a complex being, as in the works by Immanuel Kant (1785), Lucien Sève (1994), Raquel Hogemann (2015) and Oswaldo Pereira de Lima Junior (2017).Discute-se a supressão do status moral e jurídico da mulher como uma extensão do processo de despessoalização do ser humano na obra O conto da aia, de Margaret Atwood. A história de Offred desenvolve-se num futuro distópico em que as mulheres são as maiores atingidas por uma nova ordem política. Num Estados Unidos transformado na ditadura Gilead, diante de eventual perda da fecundidade de parte da população feminina, as mulheres são divididas em castas e praticamente perdem o direito sobre si mesmas, mantendo-se como propriedade dos homens. A pessoalização significa mais do que observância de direitos ao ser biológico, é processo dialético no qual individualidade e racionalidade flertam com a ascripção de importância moral. Esse processo, por ser construído nas instâncias da filosofia prática, é prévio às definições de Direito, caracterizando-se como constructo moral. Pessoalizado, o ser humano se torna aceito como o sujeito inafastável do Direito, que tem justamente na pessoa o seu núcleo e o próprio sentido de sua existência. Trabalha-se com a ideia de pessoa como ser complexo, tal como se espelha nas obras de Immanuel Kant (1785), Lucien Sève (1994), Raquel Hogemann (2015) e Oswaldo Pereira de Lima Junior (2017).Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL)2019-06-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresPesquisa hipotético-dedutiva a partir da ideia de pessoa.application/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/47010.21119/anamps.51.69-93ANAMORPHOSIS - International Journal of Law and Literature; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93ANAMORPHOSIS – Revista Internacional de Derecho y Literatura; Vol. 5 Núm. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93ANAMORPHOSIS – Revue internationale de droit et littérature; Vol. 5 No 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93ANAMORPHOSIS - Rivista Internazionale di Diritto e Letteratura; V. 5 N. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93ANAMORPHOSIS - Revista Internacional de Direito e Literatura; v. 5 n. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-932446-80882446-808810.21119/anamps.51.2019reponame:Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre)instname:Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL)instacron:RDLporenghttps://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470/pdfhttps://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470/pdf_1Copyright (c) 2019 ANAMORPHOSIS - Revista Internacional de Direito e Literaturainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira deHogemann, Edna Raquel2019-07-17T16:02:17Zoai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/470Revistahttp://rdl.org.br/seer/index.php/anampsONGhttps://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/oairevista@rdl.org.br||henriete@rdl.org.br2446-80882446-8088opendoar:2019-07-17T16:02:17Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre) - Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women “O conto da aia”: a (des)pessoalização como dimensão epistêmico-moral fundadora da condição de sujeito de direito da mulher |
title |
“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women |
spellingShingle |
“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women Lima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira de depersonification Margaret Atwood moral status dignity sexism. despessoalização Margaret Atwood status moral dignidade sexismo. Teoria ética e jurídica da pessoa |
title_short |
“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women |
title_full |
“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women |
title_fullStr |
“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women |
title_full_unstemmed |
“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women |
title_sort |
“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women |
author |
Lima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira de |
author_facet |
Lima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira de Hogemann, Edna Raquel |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Hogemann, Edna Raquel |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira de Hogemann, Edna Raquel |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
depersonification Margaret Atwood moral status dignity sexism. despessoalização Margaret Atwood status moral dignidade sexismo. Teoria ética e jurídica da pessoa |
topic |
depersonification Margaret Atwood moral status dignity sexism. despessoalização Margaret Atwood status moral dignidade sexismo. Teoria ética e jurídica da pessoa |
description |
The suppression of the moral and juridical status of the woman is discussed hereby, as an extension of the process of depersonification of the human being in the work The Handmaid’s Tale, by Margaret Atwood. Offred’s story unfolds in a dystopian future where women are the main victims of a new political order. In a United States transformed into the Gilead dictatorship, in the face of eventual loss of fertility by the female population, women are divided into castes and practically lose their rights over themselves, becoming the property of men. Personalization means more than observing rights to the biological being, it is a dialectical process in which individuality and rationality flirt with the inscription of moral importance. This process, being built in the instances of practical philosophy, is prior to the definitions of Law, characterizing itself as a moral construct. Personally, the human being happens to be accepted as the impregnable subject of the Law, which has precisely in the entity of the person its nucleus and the very meaning of its existence. This essay works with the idea of person as a complex being, as in the works by Immanuel Kant (1785), Lucien Sève (1994), Raquel Hogemann (2015) and Oswaldo Pereira de Lima Junior (2017). |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-06-11 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Avaliado pelos pares Pesquisa hipotético-dedutiva a partir da ideia de pessoa. |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470 10.21119/anamps.51.69-93 |
url |
https://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.21119/anamps.51.69-93 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por eng |
language |
por eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470/pdf https://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470/pdf_1 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 ANAMORPHOSIS - Revista Internacional de Direito e Literatura info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 ANAMORPHOSIS - Revista Internacional de Direito e Literatura |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
ANAMORPHOSIS - International Journal of Law and Literature; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93 ANAMORPHOSIS – Revista Internacional de Derecho y Literatura; Vol. 5 Núm. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93 ANAMORPHOSIS – Revue internationale de droit et littérature; Vol. 5 No 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93 ANAMORPHOSIS - Rivista Internazionale di Diritto e Letteratura; V. 5 N. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93 ANAMORPHOSIS - Revista Internacional de Direito e Literatura; v. 5 n. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93 2446-8088 2446-8088 10.21119/anamps.51.2019 reponame:Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre) instname:Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL) instacron:RDL |
instname_str |
Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL) |
instacron_str |
RDL |
institution |
RDL |
reponame_str |
Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre) |
collection |
Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre) - Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revista@rdl.org.br||henriete@rdl.org.br |
_version_ |
1809209865871032320 |