“The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Lima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira de
Data de Publicação: 2019
Outros Autores: Hogemann, Edna Raquel
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
eng
Título da fonte: Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470
Resumo: The suppression of the moral and juridical status of the woman is discussed hereby, as an extension of the process of depersonification of the human being in the work The Handmaid’s Tale, by Margaret Atwood. Offred’s story unfolds in a dystopian future where women are the main victims of a new political order. In a United States transformed into the Gilead dictatorship, in the face of eventual loss of fertility by the female population, women are divided into castes and practically lose their rights over themselves, becoming the property of men. Personalization means more than observing rights to the biological being, it is a dialectical process in which individuality and rationality flirt with the inscription of moral importance. This process, being built in the instances of practical philosophy, is prior to the definitions of Law, characterizing itself as a moral construct. Personally, the human being happens to be accepted as the impregnable subject of the Law, which has precisely in the entity of the person its nucleus and the very meaning of its existence. This essay works with the idea of person as a complex being, as in the works by Immanuel Kant (1785), Lucien Sève (1994), Raquel Hogemann (2015) and Oswaldo Pereira de Lima Junior (2017).
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spelling “The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women“O conto da aia”: a (des)pessoalização como dimensão epistêmico-moral fundadora da condição de sujeito de direito da mulherdepersonificationMargaret Atwoodmoral statusdignitysexism.despessoalizaçãoMargaret Atwoodstatus moraldignidadesexismo.Teoria ética e jurídica da pessoaThe suppression of the moral and juridical status of the woman is discussed hereby, as an extension of the process of depersonification of the human being in the work The Handmaid’s Tale, by Margaret Atwood. Offred’s story unfolds in a dystopian future where women are the main victims of a new political order. In a United States transformed into the Gilead dictatorship, in the face of eventual loss of fertility by the female population, women are divided into castes and practically lose their rights over themselves, becoming the property of men. Personalization means more than observing rights to the biological being, it is a dialectical process in which individuality and rationality flirt with the inscription of moral importance. This process, being built in the instances of practical philosophy, is prior to the definitions of Law, characterizing itself as a moral construct. Personally, the human being happens to be accepted as the impregnable subject of the Law, which has precisely in the entity of the person its nucleus and the very meaning of its existence. This essay works with the idea of person as a complex being, as in the works by Immanuel Kant (1785), Lucien Sève (1994), Raquel Hogemann (2015) and Oswaldo Pereira de Lima Junior (2017).Discute-se a supressão do status moral e jurídico da mulher como uma extensão do processo de despessoalização do ser humano na obra O conto da aia, de Margaret Atwood. A história de Offred desenvolve-se num futuro distópico em que as mulheres são as maiores atingidas por uma nova ordem política. Num Estados Unidos transformado na ditadura Gilead, diante de eventual perda da fecundidade de parte da população feminina, as mulheres são divididas em castas e praticamente perdem o direito sobre si mesmas, mantendo-se como propriedade dos homens. A pessoalização significa mais do que observância de direitos ao ser biológico, é processo dialético no qual individualidade e racionalidade flertam com a ascripção de importância moral. Esse processo, por ser construído nas instâncias da filosofia prática, é prévio às definições de Direito, caracterizando-se como constructo moral. Pessoalizado, o ser humano se torna aceito como o sujeito inafastável do Direito, que tem justamente na pessoa o seu núcleo e o próprio sentido de sua existência. Trabalha-se com a ideia de pessoa como ser complexo, tal como se espelha nas obras de Immanuel Kant (1785), Lucien Sève (1994), Raquel Hogemann (2015) e Oswaldo Pereira de Lima Junior (2017).Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL)2019-06-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresPesquisa hipotético-dedutiva a partir da ideia de pessoa.application/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/47010.21119/anamps.51.69-93ANAMORPHOSIS - International Journal of Law and Literature; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93ANAMORPHOSIS – Revista Internacional de Derecho y Literatura; Vol. 5 Núm. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93ANAMORPHOSIS – Revue internationale de droit et littérature; Vol. 5 No 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93ANAMORPHOSIS - Rivista Internazionale di Diritto e Letteratura; V. 5 N. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93ANAMORPHOSIS - Revista Internacional de Direito e Literatura; v. 5 n. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-932446-80882446-808810.21119/anamps.51.2019reponame:Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre)instname:Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL)instacron:RDLporenghttps://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470/pdfhttps://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470/pdf_1Copyright (c) 2019 ANAMORPHOSIS - Revista Internacional de Direito e Literaturainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira deHogemann, Edna Raquel2019-07-17T16:02:17Zoai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/470Revistahttp://rdl.org.br/seer/index.php/anampsONGhttps://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/oairevista@rdl.org.br||henriete@rdl.org.br2446-80882446-8088opendoar:2019-07-17T16:02:17Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre) - Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv “The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women
“O conto da aia”: a (des)pessoalização como dimensão epistêmico-moral fundadora da condição de sujeito de direito da mulher
title “The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women
spellingShingle “The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women
Lima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira de
depersonification
Margaret Atwood
moral status
dignity
sexism.
despessoalização
Margaret Atwood
status moral
dignidade
sexismo.
Teoria ética e jurídica da pessoa
title_short “The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women
title_full “The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women
title_fullStr “The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women
title_full_unstemmed “The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women
title_sort “The Handmaid’s Tale”: (de)personification as an epistemical-moral dimension, founder of the condition of subject of law for women
author Lima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira de
author_facet Lima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira de
Hogemann, Edna Raquel
author_role author
author2 Hogemann, Edna Raquel
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lima Junior, Oswaldo Pereira de
Hogemann, Edna Raquel
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv depersonification
Margaret Atwood
moral status
dignity
sexism.
despessoalização
Margaret Atwood
status moral
dignidade
sexismo.
Teoria ética e jurídica da pessoa
topic depersonification
Margaret Atwood
moral status
dignity
sexism.
despessoalização
Margaret Atwood
status moral
dignidade
sexismo.
Teoria ética e jurídica da pessoa
description The suppression of the moral and juridical status of the woman is discussed hereby, as an extension of the process of depersonification of the human being in the work The Handmaid’s Tale, by Margaret Atwood. Offred’s story unfolds in a dystopian future where women are the main victims of a new political order. In a United States transformed into the Gilead dictatorship, in the face of eventual loss of fertility by the female population, women are divided into castes and practically lose their rights over themselves, becoming the property of men. Personalization means more than observing rights to the biological being, it is a dialectical process in which individuality and rationality flirt with the inscription of moral importance. This process, being built in the instances of practical philosophy, is prior to the definitions of Law, characterizing itself as a moral construct. Personally, the human being happens to be accepted as the impregnable subject of the Law, which has precisely in the entity of the person its nucleus and the very meaning of its existence. This essay works with the idea of person as a complex being, as in the works by Immanuel Kant (1785), Lucien Sève (1994), Raquel Hogemann (2015) and Oswaldo Pereira de Lima Junior (2017).
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-06-11
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado pelos pares
Pesquisa hipotético-dedutiva a partir da ideia de pessoa.
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470
10.21119/anamps.51.69-93
url https://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470
identifier_str_mv 10.21119/anamps.51.69-93
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
eng
language por
eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470/pdf
https://periodicos.rdl.org.br/anamps/article/view/470/pdf_1
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2019 ANAMORPHOSIS - Revista Internacional de Direito e Literatura
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2019 ANAMORPHOSIS - Revista Internacional de Direito e Literatura
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv ANAMORPHOSIS - International Journal of Law and Literature; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93
ANAMORPHOSIS – Revista Internacional de Derecho y Literatura; Vol. 5 Núm. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93
ANAMORPHOSIS – Revue internationale de droit et littérature; Vol. 5 No 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93
ANAMORPHOSIS - Rivista Internazionale di Diritto e Letteratura; V. 5 N. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93
ANAMORPHOSIS - Revista Internacional de Direito e Literatura; v. 5 n. 1 (2019): janeiro-junho; 69-93
2446-8088
2446-8088
10.21119/anamps.51.2019
reponame:Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre)
instname:Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL)
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instname_str Rede Brasileira Direito e Literatura (RDL)
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reponame_str Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre)
collection Anamorphosis (Porto Alegre)
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