First and second-order justice: finding space for affections in social criticism
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | preprint |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | SciELO Preprints |
Texto Completo: | https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/3264 |
Resumo: | (This article is part of a project by Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Philosophy Journal. It is the Authorial Philosophy Dossier, to be published in 2022.) Over the last decades, different approaches linked to decolonial tradition have shifted the pendulum of critique from claims of universality towards individual accounts and experiences. However, in what we can call “narrative turn”, the moral justifications for first-person perspectives are not always evident. In this paper, I explore the boundaries of epistemic relevance regarding the role that subjective accounts and experiences play in the critique of injustice. For that, I start by inverting the question of objectivity in the critique considering the particularity of different experiences. The issue, in this case, is the position from where philosophers speak in their attempts to describe experiences of suffering. With regards to first-person standpoint, the question that is at stake is whether philosophers are capable of describing others’ experiences. In these terms, how can we share experiences of injustice after all? Next, I argue that there ought to be, in the debate, a distinction between two dimensions of justice. According to usual distinctions of “first- and second-order” approaches, I insist that theoretical claims related to the narrative turn refer to demands of first-order justice: it is about moral recognition of individuals’ epistemic claims, opening to the possibility to confront defective notions of universality and blind spots in theories of justice. However, these claims do not have justification criteria themselves, requiring, thus, normative dependencies which are external to experiences – these are situated in second-order justice. I argue, then, that this model has the advantage of incorporating the insights of decolonial theories without neglecting the potential for the critique of injustice. |
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First and second-order justice: finding space for affections in social criticismJUSTIÇA DE PRIMEIRA E DE SEGUNDA-ORDEM: ENCONTRANDO ESPAÇO PARA OS AFETOS NA CRÍTICA SOCIALNarrativasexperiênciascríticade(s)colonialidadeNarrativesexperiencecritiquedecoloniality(This article is part of a project by Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Philosophy Journal. It is the Authorial Philosophy Dossier, to be published in 2022.) Over the last decades, different approaches linked to decolonial tradition have shifted the pendulum of critique from claims of universality towards individual accounts and experiences. However, in what we can call “narrative turn”, the moral justifications for first-person perspectives are not always evident. In this paper, I explore the boundaries of epistemic relevance regarding the role that subjective accounts and experiences play in the critique of injustice. For that, I start by inverting the question of objectivity in the critique considering the particularity of different experiences. The issue, in this case, is the position from where philosophers speak in their attempts to describe experiences of suffering. With regards to first-person standpoint, the question that is at stake is whether philosophers are capable of describing others’ experiences. In these terms, how can we share experiences of injustice after all? Next, I argue that there ought to be, in the debate, a distinction between two dimensions of justice. According to usual distinctions of “first- and second-order” approaches, I insist that theoretical claims related to the narrative turn refer to demands of first-order justice: it is about moral recognition of individuals’ epistemic claims, opening to the possibility to confront defective notions of universality and blind spots in theories of justice. However, these claims do not have justification criteria themselves, requiring, thus, normative dependencies which are external to experiences – these are situated in second-order justice. I argue, then, that this model has the advantage of incorporating the insights of decolonial theories without neglecting the potential for the critique of injustice.(Este artigo faz parte de um projeto da Trans/Form/Ação: revista de filosofia da Unesp. Trata-se do Dossiê Filosofia Autoral, a ser publicado em 2022.) Nas últimas décadas, diferentes abordagens ligadas à tradição de(s)colonial têm movido o pêndulo da crítica de pretensões de universalidade para relatos e experiências particulares. Contudo, nisso que podemos chamar de virada narrativa, não é sempre evidente as justificativas morais de perspectivas em primeira pessoa. A questão que gostaria de explorar neste artigo é se seria possível encontrar relevância epistêmica de relatos e experiências subjetivas na crítica de injustiça. Começo por inverter a questão, partindo do problema da objetividade na crítica diante da particularidade das experiências. A questão, neste caso, é de onde fala o filósofo ou a filósofa na sua intenção de descrever experiências de sofrimento de outras pessoas. Se falamos sempre em primeira pessoa, e se existe algum limite cognitivo ou epistêmico de experiências, de onde viria a capacidade de criticar experiências que não são os nossos? Afinal, como podemos compartilhar experiências de injustiça? Em seguida, defendo que podemos avançar se distinguimos duas dimensões de justiça. Seguindo distinções conhecidas de teorias de primeira e segunda ordem, defendo que reinvindicações ligadas à virada narrativa se referem a demandas de justiça de primeira ordem: trata-se de reconhecer moralmente a pretensão epistêmica dos sujeitos, vendo ali a possibilidade de confrontar noções falhas de universalidade e pontos cegos em teorias da justiça. Contudo, essas pretensões não possuem em si próprias critérios de justificação, requerendo dependências normativas que são externas às próprias experiências – essas, sim, situadas em justiça de segunda ordem. Proponho que esse modelo tem a vantagem de tanto incorporar as vantagens teóricas de teorias de(s)coloniais sem negligenciar os potenciais da crítica da injustiça.SciELO PreprintsSciELO PreprintsSciELO Preprints2021-12-06info:eu-repo/semantics/preprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/326410.1590/SciELOPreprints.3264porhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/3264/5867Copyright (c) 2021 Filipe Campellohttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCampello, Filipereponame:SciELO Preprintsinstname:SciELOinstacron:SCI2021-12-03T20:27:31Zoai:ops.preprints.scielo.org:preprint/3264Servidor de preprintshttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scieloONGhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/oaiscielo.submission@scielo.orgopendoar:2021-12-03T20:27:31SciELO Preprints - SciELOfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
First and second-order justice: finding space for affections in social criticism JUSTIÇA DE PRIMEIRA E DE SEGUNDA-ORDEM: ENCONTRANDO ESPAÇO PARA OS AFETOS NA CRÍTICA SOCIAL |
title |
First and second-order justice: finding space for affections in social criticism |
spellingShingle |
First and second-order justice: finding space for affections in social criticism Campello, Filipe Narrativas experiências crítica de(s)colonialidade Narratives experience critique decoloniality |
title_short |
First and second-order justice: finding space for affections in social criticism |
title_full |
First and second-order justice: finding space for affections in social criticism |
title_fullStr |
First and second-order justice: finding space for affections in social criticism |
title_full_unstemmed |
First and second-order justice: finding space for affections in social criticism |
title_sort |
First and second-order justice: finding space for affections in social criticism |
author |
Campello, Filipe |
author_facet |
Campello, Filipe |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Campello, Filipe |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Narrativas experiências crítica de(s)colonialidade Narratives experience critique decoloniality |
topic |
Narrativas experiências crítica de(s)colonialidade Narratives experience critique decoloniality |
description |
(This article is part of a project by Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Philosophy Journal. It is the Authorial Philosophy Dossier, to be published in 2022.) Over the last decades, different approaches linked to decolonial tradition have shifted the pendulum of critique from claims of universality towards individual accounts and experiences. However, in what we can call “narrative turn”, the moral justifications for first-person perspectives are not always evident. In this paper, I explore the boundaries of epistemic relevance regarding the role that subjective accounts and experiences play in the critique of injustice. For that, I start by inverting the question of objectivity in the critique considering the particularity of different experiences. The issue, in this case, is the position from where philosophers speak in their attempts to describe experiences of suffering. With regards to first-person standpoint, the question that is at stake is whether philosophers are capable of describing others’ experiences. In these terms, how can we share experiences of injustice after all? Next, I argue that there ought to be, in the debate, a distinction between two dimensions of justice. According to usual distinctions of “first- and second-order” approaches, I insist that theoretical claims related to the narrative turn refer to demands of first-order justice: it is about moral recognition of individuals’ epistemic claims, opening to the possibility to confront defective notions of universality and blind spots in theories of justice. However, these claims do not have justification criteria themselves, requiring, thus, normative dependencies which are external to experiences – these are situated in second-order justice. I argue, then, that this model has the advantage of incorporating the insights of decolonial theories without neglecting the potential for the critique of injustice. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-12-06 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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preprint |
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publishedVersion |
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https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/3264 10.1590/SciELOPreprints.3264 |
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https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/3264 |
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10.1590/SciELOPreprints.3264 |
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por |
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por |
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https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/3264/5867 |
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Copyright (c) 2021 Filipe Campello https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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Copyright (c) 2021 Filipe Campello https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
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openAccess |
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SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints |
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SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints |
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