Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2024 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | preprint |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | SciELO Preprints |
Texto Completo: | https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/7907 |
Resumo: | This essay consists of a thorough critical analysis of the dogmatic premises behind Brazilian electoral legislation and the official rhetoric of authorities, conveyed by Electoral Justice through propaganda and legal coercion. Adopting public choice theory as the main methodological paradigm, pragmatic and impartial, the argumentation is developed around the paradox identified by economist Anthony Downs, a corollary of the discrepancy between individual utility of a vote and probability of a vote and its public utility, tethered to the probability of a vote being decisive in an election, a paradox examined in the context of Brazilian democracy. The arguments presented are based on objective data, information theory, statistics and probabilistic calculus, presented in an accessible form, primarily descriptive, regarding the functioning of the electoral system and government communication, concluding with normative considerations. |
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Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For YouParadoxo Eleitoral: Os Outros Sempre Escolhem Por Vocêdemocraciavotoeleiçõesparadoxo do vototeoria da escolha públicaJudiciarydemocracydemocracyvoteelectionsvoting paradoxpublic-choice theoryThis essay consists of a thorough critical analysis of the dogmatic premises behind Brazilian electoral legislation and the official rhetoric of authorities, conveyed by Electoral Justice through propaganda and legal coercion. Adopting public choice theory as the main methodological paradigm, pragmatic and impartial, the argumentation is developed around the paradox identified by economist Anthony Downs, a corollary of the discrepancy between individual utility of a vote and probability of a vote and its public utility, tethered to the probability of a vote being decisive in an election, a paradox examined in the context of Brazilian democracy. The arguments presented are based on objective data, information theory, statistics and probabilistic calculus, presented in an accessible form, primarily descriptive, regarding the functioning of the electoral system and government communication, concluding with normative considerations.O presente ensaio consiste de uma minuciosa análise crítica das premissas dogmáticas por trás da legislação eleitoral brasileira a retórica oficial das autoridades, veiculada pela Justiça Eleitoral por meio de propaganda e coerção legal. Valendo-se como principal paradigma metodológico a teoria da escolha pública (public choice theory), pragmática e imparcial, é desenvolvida a argumentação ao redor do paradoxo identificado pelo economista Anthony Downs, corolário da discrepância entre a utilidade individual do voto e utilidade pública, atrelada à probabilidade de um voto decidir uma eleição; paradoxo examinado no contexto da democracia brasileira. Os argumentos apresentados têm por base dados objetivos, princípios da teoria da informação, estatística e cálculo probabilístico, apresentados de forma acessível, primariamente expositiva, acerca do funcionamento do sistema eleitoral e da comunicação governamental, concluindo com considerações normativas.SciELO PreprintsSciELO PreprintsSciELO Preprints2024-01-23info:eu-repo/semantics/preprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/790710.1590/SciELOPreprints.7907porhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/7907/14864Copyright (c) 2024 Pedro Serafim Anes Pires, Vinícius Novicki Obadowskihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPires, Pedro Serafim AnesObadowski, Vinícius Novickireponame:SciELO Preprintsinstname:Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO)instacron:SCI2024-01-18T14:24:31Zoai:ops.preprints.scielo.org:preprint/7907Servidor de preprintshttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scieloONGhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/oaiscielo.submission@scielo.orgopendoar:2024-01-18T14:24:31SciELO Preprints - Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You Paradoxo Eleitoral: Os Outros Sempre Escolhem Por Você |
title |
Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You |
spellingShingle |
Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You Pires, Pedro Serafim Anes democracia voto eleições paradoxo do voto teoria da escolha pública Judiciarydemocracy democracy vote elections voting paradox public-choice theory |
title_short |
Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You |
title_full |
Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You |
title_fullStr |
Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You |
title_full_unstemmed |
Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You |
title_sort |
Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You |
author |
Pires, Pedro Serafim Anes |
author_facet |
Pires, Pedro Serafim Anes Obadowski, Vinícius Novicki |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Obadowski, Vinícius Novicki |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pires, Pedro Serafim Anes Obadowski, Vinícius Novicki |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
democracia voto eleições paradoxo do voto teoria da escolha pública Judiciarydemocracy democracy vote elections voting paradox public-choice theory |
topic |
democracia voto eleições paradoxo do voto teoria da escolha pública Judiciarydemocracy democracy vote elections voting paradox public-choice theory |
description |
This essay consists of a thorough critical analysis of the dogmatic premises behind Brazilian electoral legislation and the official rhetoric of authorities, conveyed by Electoral Justice through propaganda and legal coercion. Adopting public choice theory as the main methodological paradigm, pragmatic and impartial, the argumentation is developed around the paradox identified by economist Anthony Downs, a corollary of the discrepancy between individual utility of a vote and probability of a vote and its public utility, tethered to the probability of a vote being decisive in an election, a paradox examined in the context of Brazilian democracy. The arguments presented are based on objective data, information theory, statistics and probabilistic calculus, presented in an accessible form, primarily descriptive, regarding the functioning of the electoral system and government communication, concluding with normative considerations. |
publishDate |
2024 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2024-01-23 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
preprint |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/7907 10.1590/SciELOPreprints.7907 |
url |
https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/7907 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.1590/SciELOPreprints.7907 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/7907/14864 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2024 Pedro Serafim Anes Pires, Vinícius Novicki Obadowski https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2024 Pedro Serafim Anes Pires, Vinícius Novicki Obadowski https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:SciELO Preprints instname:Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO) instacron:SCI |
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Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO) |
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SCI |
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SCI |
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SciELO Preprints |
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SciELO Preprints |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
SciELO Preprints - Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
scielo.submission@scielo.org |
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1797047814792937472 |