Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pires, Pedro Serafim Anes
Data de Publicação: 2024
Outros Autores: Obadowski, Vinícius Novicki
Tipo de documento: preprint
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: SciELO Preprints
Texto Completo: https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/7907
Resumo: This essay consists of a thorough critical analysis of the dogmatic premises behind Brazilian electoral legislation and the official rhetoric of authorities, conveyed by Electoral Justice through propaganda and legal coercion. Adopting public choice theory as the main methodological paradigm, pragmatic and impartial, the argumentation is developed around the paradox identified by economist Anthony Downs, a corollary of the discrepancy between individual utility of a vote and probability of a vote and its public utility, tethered to the probability of a vote being decisive in an election, a paradox examined in the context of Brazilian democracy. The arguments presented are based on objective data, information theory, statistics and probabilistic calculus, presented in an accessible form, primarily descriptive, regarding the functioning of the electoral system and government communication, concluding with normative considerations.
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spelling Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For YouParadoxo Eleitoral: Os Outros Sempre Escolhem Por Vocêdemocraciavotoeleiçõesparadoxo do vototeoria da escolha públicaJudiciarydemocracydemocracyvoteelectionsvoting paradoxpublic-choice theoryThis essay consists of a thorough critical analysis of the dogmatic premises behind Brazilian electoral legislation and the official rhetoric of authorities, conveyed by Electoral Justice through propaganda and legal coercion. Adopting public choice theory as the main methodological paradigm, pragmatic and impartial, the argumentation is developed around the paradox identified by economist Anthony Downs, a corollary of the discrepancy between individual utility of a vote and probability of a vote and its public utility, tethered to the probability of a vote being decisive in an election, a paradox examined in the context of Brazilian democracy. The arguments presented are based on objective data, information theory, statistics and probabilistic calculus, presented in an accessible form, primarily descriptive, regarding the functioning of the electoral system and government communication, concluding with normative considerations.O presente ensaio consiste de uma minuciosa análise crítica das premissas dogmáticas por trás da legislação eleitoral brasileira a retórica oficial das autoridades, veiculada pela Justiça Eleitoral por meio de propaganda e coerção legal. Valendo-se como principal paradigma metodológico a teoria da escolha pública (public choice theory), pragmática e imparcial, é desenvolvida a argumentação ao redor do paradoxo identificado pelo economista Anthony Downs, corolário da discrepância entre a utilidade individual do voto e utilidade pública, atrelada à probabilidade de um voto decidir uma eleição; paradoxo examinado no contexto da democracia brasileira. Os argumentos apresentados têm por base dados objetivos, princípios da teoria da informação, estatística e cálculo probabilístico, apresentados de forma acessível, primariamente expositiva, acerca do funcionamento do sistema eleitoral e da comunicação governamental, concluindo com considerações normativas.SciELO PreprintsSciELO PreprintsSciELO Preprints2024-01-23info:eu-repo/semantics/preprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/790710.1590/SciELOPreprints.7907porhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/7907/14864Copyright (c) 2024 Pedro Serafim Anes Pires, Vinícius Novicki Obadowskihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPires, Pedro Serafim AnesObadowski, Vinícius Novickireponame:SciELO Preprintsinstname:Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO)instacron:SCI2024-01-18T14:24:31Zoai:ops.preprints.scielo.org:preprint/7907Servidor de preprintshttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scieloONGhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/oaiscielo.submission@scielo.orgopendoar:2024-01-18T14:24:31SciELO Preprints - Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You
Paradoxo Eleitoral: Os Outros Sempre Escolhem Por Você
title Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You
spellingShingle Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You
Pires, Pedro Serafim Anes
democracia
voto
eleições
paradoxo do voto
teoria da escolha pública
Judiciarydemocracy
democracy
vote
elections
voting paradox
public-choice theory
title_short Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You
title_full Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You
title_fullStr Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You
title_full_unstemmed Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You
title_sort Electoral Paradox: The Others Always Choose For You
author Pires, Pedro Serafim Anes
author_facet Pires, Pedro Serafim Anes
Obadowski, Vinícius Novicki
author_role author
author2 Obadowski, Vinícius Novicki
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pires, Pedro Serafim Anes
Obadowski, Vinícius Novicki
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv democracia
voto
eleições
paradoxo do voto
teoria da escolha pública
Judiciarydemocracy
democracy
vote
elections
voting paradox
public-choice theory
topic democracia
voto
eleições
paradoxo do voto
teoria da escolha pública
Judiciarydemocracy
democracy
vote
elections
voting paradox
public-choice theory
description This essay consists of a thorough critical analysis of the dogmatic premises behind Brazilian electoral legislation and the official rhetoric of authorities, conveyed by Electoral Justice through propaganda and legal coercion. Adopting public choice theory as the main methodological paradigm, pragmatic and impartial, the argumentation is developed around the paradox identified by economist Anthony Downs, a corollary of the discrepancy between individual utility of a vote and probability of a vote and its public utility, tethered to the probability of a vote being decisive in an election, a paradox examined in the context of Brazilian democracy. The arguments presented are based on objective data, information theory, statistics and probabilistic calculus, presented in an accessible form, primarily descriptive, regarding the functioning of the electoral system and government communication, concluding with normative considerations.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024-01-23
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format preprint
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/7907
10.1590/SciELOPreprints.7907
url https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/7907
identifier_str_mv 10.1590/SciELOPreprints.7907
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/7907/14864
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2024 Pedro Serafim Anes Pires, Vinícius Novicki Obadowski
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2024 Pedro Serafim Anes Pires, Vinícius Novicki Obadowski
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
publisher.none.fl_str_mv SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SciELO Preprints
instname:Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO)
instacron:SCI
instname_str Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO)
instacron_str SCI
institution SCI
reponame_str SciELO Preprints
collection SciELO Preprints
repository.name.fl_str_mv SciELO Preprints - Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv scielo.submission@scielo.org
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