Why we are our Brains: Challenging Enactivism

• Autor(a) principal: Pereira, Roberto Horácio de Sá
• Data de Publicação: 2021
• Outros Autores: Souza Filho, Sérgio Farias de, Barcellos, Victor Machado
• Tipo de documento: preprint
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: SciELO Preprints
• Texto Completo: https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/3278
• topic: Enativismo; Externismo Fenomenal Enativista; Know-how; Enactivism; Phenomenal Externalist Enactivism; Know-how

(This article is part of a project by Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Philosophy Journal. It is the Authorial Philosophy Dossier, to be published in 2022.) In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent. 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- phenomenal externalism of enactivist nature, even in its mild form, is empirically implausible: the correlation between the conscious character of sensory experience with spatiotemporal neuronal patterns is much more systematic and regular than with anything outside the brain. But in its radical form is entirely implausible and contra-intuitive: phenomenal duplicates are not necessarily duplicates of agency; in short, 5-we are our own brain that has a body, avatars, and artifacts, properly configured and molded by the brain, and not a body that has a brain among other essential organs.