MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Kriterion (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/35061 |
Resumo: | The main aim of this paper is to reflect on the scope of moral knowledge from the virtue ethics model, which is based on the idea of virtuous character and human flourishing, and this approach seems very promising to respond to the skeptical argument that says that moral disagreement is an irrefutable proof of the impossibility of knowledge in the field of ethics. To this end, I begin by problematizing moral knowledge, with a specific consideration of ethical reasoning. Subsequently, I investigate the role of the epistemic virtues of practical wisdom, humility, and integrity for the acquisition of moral knowledge. Finally, I postulate that a virtue ethics that rely on certain epistemic virtues can explain adequately the moral knowledge and respond more effectively to skepticism. |
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MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUESCONHECIMENTO MORAL E VIRTUDES EPISTÊMICASConhecimento moralVirtudes epistêmicasSabedoria práticaHumildadeIntegridadeMoral knowledgeepistemic virtuespractical wisdomhumilityintegrityThe main aim of this paper is to reflect on the scope of moral knowledge from the virtue ethics model, which is based on the idea of virtuous character and human flourishing, and this approach seems very promising to respond to the skeptical argument that says that moral disagreement is an irrefutable proof of the impossibility of knowledge in the field of ethics. To this end, I begin by problematizing moral knowledge, with a specific consideration of ethical reasoning. Subsequently, I investigate the role of the epistemic virtues of practical wisdom, humility, and integrity for the acquisition of moral knowledge. Finally, I postulate that a virtue ethics that rely on certain epistemic virtues can explain adequately the moral knowledge and respond more effectively to skepticism.O objetivo é refletir sobre o escopo do conhecimento moral a partir do modelo da ética das virtudes, que toma por base a ideia de caráter virtuoso e florescimento humano, sendo esta abordagem bastante promissora para responder ao argumento cético que diz que o desacordo moral é uma prova irrefutável da impossibilidade do conhecimento no campo da ética. Para este fim, inicio problematizando o conhecimento moral, com a consideração específica do raciocínio ético. Posteriormente, investigo o papel das virtudes epistêmicas de sabedoria prática, humildade e integridade para a aquisição do conhecimento moral. Por fim, postulo que a ética das virtudes, que conta com certas virtudes epistêmicas, pode explicar adequadamente o conhecimento moral e responder de forma mais eficiente ao ceticismo.Revista KriterionRevista KriterionKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaRevista Kriterion2021-10-26info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/35061Revista Kriterion; Vol. 62 No. 149 (2021)Revista Kriterion; Vol. 62 Núm. 149 (2021)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 62 No 149 (2021)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 62 N. 149 (2021)Revista Kriterion; v. 62 n. 149 (2021)1981-53360100-512Xreponame:Kriterion (Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGporhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/35061/28813Copyright (c) 2021 Revista Kriterioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCoitinho, Denis 2021-10-26T19:59:10Zoai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/35061Revistahttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterionPUBhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/oairevistakriterion@gmail.com1981-53360100-512Xopendoar:2024-01-24T12:41:29.557778Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES CONHECIMENTO MORAL E VIRTUDES EPISTÊMICAS |
title |
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES |
spellingShingle |
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES Coitinho, Denis Conhecimento moral Virtudes epistêmicas Sabedoria prática Humildade Integridade Moral knowledge epistemic virtues practical wisdom humility integrity |
title_short |
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES |
title_full |
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES |
title_fullStr |
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES |
title_full_unstemmed |
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES |
title_sort |
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES |
author |
Coitinho, Denis |
author_facet |
Coitinho, Denis |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Coitinho, Denis |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Conhecimento moral Virtudes epistêmicas Sabedoria prática Humildade Integridade Moral knowledge epistemic virtues practical wisdom humility integrity |
topic |
Conhecimento moral Virtudes epistêmicas Sabedoria prática Humildade Integridade Moral knowledge epistemic virtues practical wisdom humility integrity |
description |
The main aim of this paper is to reflect on the scope of moral knowledge from the virtue ethics model, which is based on the idea of virtuous character and human flourishing, and this approach seems very promising to respond to the skeptical argument that says that moral disagreement is an irrefutable proof of the impossibility of knowledge in the field of ethics. To this end, I begin by problematizing moral knowledge, with a specific consideration of ethical reasoning. Subsequently, I investigate the role of the epistemic virtues of practical wisdom, humility, and integrity for the acquisition of moral knowledge. Finally, I postulate that a virtue ethics that rely on certain epistemic virtues can explain adequately the moral knowledge and respond more effectively to skepticism. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-10-26 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/35061 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/35061 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/35061/28813 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Revista Kriterion info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Revista Kriterion |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion Revista Kriterion Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Revista Kriterion |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion Revista Kriterion Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Revista Kriterion |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion; Vol. 62 No. 149 (2021) Revista Kriterion; Vol. 62 Núm. 149 (2021) Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 62 No 149 (2021) Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 62 N. 149 (2021) Revista Kriterion; v. 62 n. 149 (2021) 1981-5336 0100-512X reponame:Kriterion (Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) instacron:UFMG |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
instacron_str |
UFMG |
institution |
UFMG |
reponame_str |
Kriterion (Online) |
collection |
Kriterion (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revistakriterion@gmail.com |
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1799711183343714304 |