Frustrating absences

• Autor(a) principal: André Joffily Abath
• Data de Publicação: 2019
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UFMG
• Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0011; http://hdl.handle.net/1843/61052; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4747-5938
• topic: Absences; Frustration; Perception; Desires; Phenomenology; Frustração; Percepção (Filosofia); Desejo (Filosofia); Fenomenologia

Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regard- ing the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. Accord- ing to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence.