On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: León, Malena
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Griot : Revista de Filosofia
Texto Completo: http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1742
Resumo: Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the “self” is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs.
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spelling On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”Acerca de la naturaleza del “yo” narrativo en DennettDaniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.Daniel Dennett; “Self”; Stories; Center of gravity.Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the “self” is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs.Dennett elabora una concepción del “yo” entendido como un centro de gravedad narrativo. Uno de los obstáculos principales para valorar esta propuesta radica en que resulta dificultoso entender cuál es la naturaleza del concepto dennettiano de “yo”: concretamente, cuáles son los compromisos ontológicos y epistemológicos que cabe atribuir al fenómeno en cuestión. En este artículo defendemos que el mejor modo de realizar una reconstrucción interpretativa de su noción de “yo” es apelando a la distinción elaborada por Reichenbach entre tres clases de entidades, Concreta, Abstracta e Illata, y entendiendo a los centros de gravedad narrativos como un caso de Abstracta reichenbachiano. Sostenemos que resulta pertinente e iluminador entender los centros de gravedad narrativos como Abstracta en el sentido de Reichenbach, apoyándonos en que: i) aunque no la aplica directamente al problema de la naturaleza del “yo”, Dennett sí emplea la distinción de Reichenbach en otras partes de su obra; ii) Dennett traza explícitamente una analogía del “yo” con los centros de gravedad que son, justamente, uno de sus ejemplos de Abstracta; iii)  este modo de entender al “yo” permite dar sentido y entender mejor ciertos aspectos de la teoría narrativista dennettiana. Además de permitirnos clarificar las metáforas empleadas por Dennett en la elaboración de su teoría narrativa, dicha elucidación conceptual permite comprender mejor la distinción entre las tres clases de psicología intencional trazada por Dennett (1987) y es útil para sugerir a cuál de estos tres tipos pertenece el concepto de “yo”.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2021-06-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/174210.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1742Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 2 (2020); 109-1282178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1742/1290Copyright (c) 2020 Malena Leonhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLeón, Malena2021-09-15T22:45:13Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/1742Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2021-09-15T22:45:13Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”
Acerca de la naturaleza del “yo” narrativo en Dennett
title On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”
spellingShingle On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”
León, Malena
Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.
Daniel Dennett; “Self”; Stories; Center of gravity.
Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.
Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.
title_short On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”
title_full On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”
title_fullStr On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”
title_full_unstemmed On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”
title_sort On the nature of Dennett’s narrative “self”
author León, Malena
author_facet León, Malena
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv León, Malena
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.
Daniel Dennett; “Self”; Stories; Center of gravity.
Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.
Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.
topic Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.
Daniel Dennett; “Self”; Stories; Center of gravity.
Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.
Daniel Dennett; “Yo”; Narraciones; Centro de gravedad.
description Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the “self” is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-06-09
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-Reviewed
Evaluados por los pares
Avaliados pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1742
10.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1742
url http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1742
identifier_str_mv 10.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1742
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/1742/1290
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Malena Leon
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Malena Leon
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 2 (2020); 109-128
2178-1036
reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia
instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
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instname_str Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
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reponame_str Griot : Revista de Filosofia
collection Griot : Revista de Filosofia
repository.name.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
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