The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n3p383 |
Resumo: | It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings (unlike other animals) are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further to the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view. |
id |
UFSC-5_3e39b58ce699add49e92d64a2c226856 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/33673 |
network_acronym_str |
UFSC-5 |
network_name_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-ViewThe Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-ViewIt is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings (unlike other animals) are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further to the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view.É uma crença generalizada entre filósofos que nós seres humanos (ao contrário de outros animais) somos capazes de dar um passo atrás diante de nossas inclinações para agir de certo modo e de considerar se devemos assim agir. Se julgarmos que há razões o suficiente em favor de seguir nossa inclinação inicial, estaremos definitivamente motivados a assim agir e, caso tudo corra bem, agiremos. Essa forma de ver a agência humana naturalmente leva à ideia de que nossas ações são auto-determinadas, ou que estão sob nosso controle. Alguns vão além a ponto de dizer que deveríamos estender os aspectos fundamentais desta concepção do agir humano à dimensão epistêmica. Nós chamamos essa de ‘a tese do controle’. Apresentaremos aqui um argumento forte contra a tese do controle. Enquanto que temos controle substancial sobre nossas vidas práticas, é muito improvável que isto se estenda para nossas vidas epistêmicas. Nossa discussão procederá em três estágios. Apresentaremos duas assimetrias entre nossas vidas práticas e epistêmicas que serão seguidas de um argumento geral contra a tese do controle. Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2013-09-28info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n3p38310.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n3p383Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 No. 3 (2013); 383–394Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 Núm. 3 (2013); 383–394Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 17 n. 3 (2013); 383–3941808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n3p383/26783Copyright (c) 2021 André J. Abath, Leonardo de Mello Ribeiroinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAbath, André J.Ribeiro, Leonardo de Mello2019-09-13T09:18:46Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/33673Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T09:18:46Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View |
title |
The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View |
spellingShingle |
The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View Abath, André J. |
title_short |
The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View |
title_full |
The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View |
title_fullStr |
The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View |
title_sort |
The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View |
author |
Abath, André J. |
author_facet |
Abath, André J. Ribeiro, Leonardo de Mello |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Ribeiro, Leonardo de Mello |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Abath, André J. Ribeiro, Leonardo de Mello |
description |
It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings (unlike other animals) are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further to the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-09-28 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n3p383 10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n3p383 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n3p383 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n3p383 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n3p383/26783 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 André J. Abath, Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 André J. Abath, Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 No. 3 (2013); 383–394 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 Núm. 3 (2013); 383–394 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 17 n. 3 (2013); 383–394 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435107604430848 |