Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Marques Segundo, Luiz Helvécio
Data de Publicação: 2015
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33
Resumo: Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.
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spelling Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type GrueIndução, confiabilidade e predicados do tipo verdulCollin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.Collin Howson (2000) desafia a defesa confiabilista de van Cleve da indução (1984) baseada numa adaptação do paradoxo de Goodman (ou novo enigma da indução).  Tentarei mostrar que o argumento de Howson não é bem sucedido, uma vez que é auto-destrutivo. Não obstante,  indicarei outra maneira em que Howson poderia ter empregado o novo enigma para solapar a defesa confiabilista.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2015-04-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p3310.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 19 No. 1 (2015); 33-47Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 19 Núm. 1 (2015); 33-47Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 19 n. 1 (2015); 33-471808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33/30576Copyright (c) 2021 Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMarques Segundo, Luiz Helvécio2019-09-13T10:24:32Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/40966Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T10:24:32Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue
Indução, confiabilidade e predicados do tipo verdul
title Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue
spellingShingle Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue
Marques Segundo, Luiz Helvécio
title_short Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue
title_full Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue
title_fullStr Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue
title_full_unstemmed Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue
title_sort Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue
author Marques Segundo, Luiz Helvécio
author_facet Marques Segundo, Luiz Helvécio
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Marques Segundo, Luiz Helvécio
description Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-04-30
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33
10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33/30576
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 19 No. 1 (2015); 33-47
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 19 Núm. 1 (2015); 33-47
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 19 n. 1 (2015); 33-47
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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