Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Abath, André J.
Data de Publicação: 2020
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70665
Resumo: Burge (1979) famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions—such as “Peter has the concept of arthritis”—according to which these ascriptions are to be analysed in terms of ascriptions of the knowledge of what something is. The upshot is that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) can be explained is terms of the idea of subjects knowing in part what something is.
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spelling Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something isIncomplete Understanding of Concepts and Knowing In Part What Something IsBurge (1979) famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions—such as “Peter has the concept of arthritis”—according to which these ascriptions are to be analysed in terms of ascriptions of the knowledge of what something is. The upshot is that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) can be explained is terms of the idea of subjects knowing in part what something is.Burge (1979) famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions—such as “Peter has the concept of arthritis”—according to which these ascriptions are to be analysed in terms of ascriptions of the knowledge of what something is. The upshot is that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) can be explained is terms of the idea of subjects knowing in part what something is.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2020-11-18info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/7066510.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p419Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 24 No. 2 (2020); 419–431Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 24 Núm. 2 (2020); 419–431Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 24 n. 2 (2020); 419–4311808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70665/44665Copyright (c) 2021 André J. Abathhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAbath, André J.2020-11-18T13:13:27Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/70665Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2020-11-18T13:13:27Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is
Incomplete Understanding of Concepts and Knowing In Part What Something Is
title Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is
spellingShingle Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is
Abath, André J.
title_short Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is
title_full Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is
title_fullStr Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is
title_full_unstemmed Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is
title_sort Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is
author Abath, André J.
author_facet Abath, André J.
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Abath, André J.
description Burge (1979) famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions—such as “Peter has the concept of arthritis”—according to which these ascriptions are to be analysed in terms of ascriptions of the knowledge of what something is. The upshot is that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) can be explained is terms of the idea of subjects knowing in part what something is.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-11-18
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70665
10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p419
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70665
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p419
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70665/44665
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 André J. Abath
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 André J. Abath
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 24 No. 2 (2020); 419–431
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 24 Núm. 2 (2020); 419–431
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 24 n. 2 (2020); 419–431
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
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reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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