Empirismo, Estructuralismo y Cambio Científico
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2010 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n1p87 |
Resumo: | In the last decades there was a structural turn in the classic debate between scientific realists and antirealists with empiricist orientation. Two main arguments support the realist conception: the ‘No Miracle Argument’ and the thesis of continuity. The thesis of continuity states that some parts of a theory are retained when a scientific change takes place. In a current famous article, J. Worrall (1989) defends the continuity argument by stating that what is preserved in the succession of two empirically successful theories are the relations among the postulated entities and not the nature of the relata (structural or syntactical realism). Based on this perspective, van Fraassen introduces his position named Empiricist Structuralism, which claims that only the structures of phenomena are retained. This conception tries to explain the success of science and at the same time defend the continuity of structures. I will demonstrate in this paper that the accomplishment of the two mentioned requirements imply a capitulation in favor of realistic intuitions. |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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Empirismo, Estructuralismo y Cambio CientíficoIn the last decades there was a structural turn in the classic debate between scientific realists and antirealists with empiricist orientation. Two main arguments support the realist conception: the ‘No Miracle Argument’ and the thesis of continuity. The thesis of continuity states that some parts of a theory are retained when a scientific change takes place. In a current famous article, J. Worrall (1989) defends the continuity argument by stating that what is preserved in the succession of two empirically successful theories are the relations among the postulated entities and not the nature of the relata (structural or syntactical realism). Based on this perspective, van Fraassen introduces his position named Empiricist Structuralism, which claims that only the structures of phenomena are retained. This conception tries to explain the success of science and at the same time defend the continuity of structures. I will demonstrate in this paper that the accomplishment of the two mentioned requirements imply a capitulation in favor of realistic intuitions.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2010-11-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n1p8710.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p87Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 12 No. 1 (2008); 87-96Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 12 Núm. 1 (2008); 87-96Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 12 n. 1 (2008); 87-961808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n1p87/14900Copyright (c) 2021 Susana Luceroinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLucero, Susana2019-09-12T10:16:41Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/16363Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-12T10:16:41Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Empirismo, Estructuralismo y Cambio Científico |
title |
Empirismo, Estructuralismo y Cambio Científico |
spellingShingle |
Empirismo, Estructuralismo y Cambio Científico Lucero, Susana |
title_short |
Empirismo, Estructuralismo y Cambio Científico |
title_full |
Empirismo, Estructuralismo y Cambio Científico |
title_fullStr |
Empirismo, Estructuralismo y Cambio Científico |
title_full_unstemmed |
Empirismo, Estructuralismo y Cambio Científico |
title_sort |
Empirismo, Estructuralismo y Cambio Científico |
author |
Lucero, Susana |
author_facet |
Lucero, Susana |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lucero, Susana |
description |
In the last decades there was a structural turn in the classic debate between scientific realists and antirealists with empiricist orientation. Two main arguments support the realist conception: the ‘No Miracle Argument’ and the thesis of continuity. The thesis of continuity states that some parts of a theory are retained when a scientific change takes place. In a current famous article, J. Worrall (1989) defends the continuity argument by stating that what is preserved in the succession of two empirically successful theories are the relations among the postulated entities and not the nature of the relata (structural or syntactical realism). Based on this perspective, van Fraassen introduces his position named Empiricist Structuralism, which claims that only the structures of phenomena are retained. This conception tries to explain the success of science and at the same time defend the continuity of structures. I will demonstrate in this paper that the accomplishment of the two mentioned requirements imply a capitulation in favor of realistic intuitions. |
publishDate |
2010 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2010-11-16 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n1p87 10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p87 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n1p87 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p87 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n1p87/14900 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Susana Lucero info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Susana Lucero |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 12 No. 1 (2008); 87-96 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 12 Núm. 1 (2008); 87-96 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 12 n. 1 (2008); 87-96 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435110276202496 |