Value-Free ideal is an epistemic ideal: an objection to the argument from inductive risk

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Sheykh Rezaee, Hossein
Data de Publicação: 2023
Outros Autores: Bikaraan-Behesht, Hamed
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80487
Resumo: Arguing from inductive risk, Heather Douglas tried to show that the ideal of value-free science is completely unfounded. The argument has been widely acknowledged to be a strong argument against the ideal. In this paper, beginning with an analysis of the concept of an ideal, we argue that the value-free ideal is an epistemic ideal rather than a practical or ethical ideal. Then, we aim to show that the argument from inductive risk cannot be employed against the value-free ideal as far as it is understood as an epistemic ideal. We try to show that the argument takes practical and ethical limitations of actual scientific enterprise into account to undermine the value-free ideal. But employing non-epistemic considerations makes the argument impotent against an epistemic ideal.
id UFSC-5_a528522da880049b40fcf50eb6201733
oai_identifier_str oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/80487
network_acronym_str UFSC-5
network_name_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository_id_str
spelling Value-Free ideal is an epistemic ideal: an objection to the argument from inductive riskvalue-free idealinductive riskpolicy-makingepistemic idealscientific objectivityArguing from inductive risk, Heather Douglas tried to show that the ideal of value-free science is completely unfounded. The argument has been widely acknowledged to be a strong argument against the ideal. In this paper, beginning with an analysis of the concept of an ideal, we argue that the value-free ideal is an epistemic ideal rather than a practical or ethical ideal. Then, we aim to show that the argument from inductive risk cannot be employed against the value-free ideal as far as it is understood as an epistemic ideal. We try to show that the argument takes practical and ethical limitations of actual scientific enterprise into account to undermine the value-free ideal. But employing non-epistemic considerations makes the argument impotent against an epistemic ideal.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2023-05-26info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/8048710.5007/1808-1711.2023.e80487Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 137-163Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 137-163Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 137-1631808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80487/53300Copyright (c) 2023 Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, Hamed Bikaraan-Beheshthttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSheykh Rezaee, HosseinBikaraan-Behesht, Hamed2023-10-22T20:37:35Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/80487Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2023-10-22T20:37:35Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Value-Free ideal is an epistemic ideal: an objection to the argument from inductive risk
title Value-Free ideal is an epistemic ideal: an objection to the argument from inductive risk
spellingShingle Value-Free ideal is an epistemic ideal: an objection to the argument from inductive risk
Sheykh Rezaee, Hossein
value-free ideal
inductive risk
policy-making
epistemic ideal
scientific objectivity
title_short Value-Free ideal is an epistemic ideal: an objection to the argument from inductive risk
title_full Value-Free ideal is an epistemic ideal: an objection to the argument from inductive risk
title_fullStr Value-Free ideal is an epistemic ideal: an objection to the argument from inductive risk
title_full_unstemmed Value-Free ideal is an epistemic ideal: an objection to the argument from inductive risk
title_sort Value-Free ideal is an epistemic ideal: an objection to the argument from inductive risk
author Sheykh Rezaee, Hossein
author_facet Sheykh Rezaee, Hossein
Bikaraan-Behesht, Hamed
author_role author
author2 Bikaraan-Behesht, Hamed
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Sheykh Rezaee, Hossein
Bikaraan-Behesht, Hamed
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv value-free ideal
inductive risk
policy-making
epistemic ideal
scientific objectivity
topic value-free ideal
inductive risk
policy-making
epistemic ideal
scientific objectivity
description Arguing from inductive risk, Heather Douglas tried to show that the ideal of value-free science is completely unfounded. The argument has been widely acknowledged to be a strong argument against the ideal. In this paper, beginning with an analysis of the concept of an ideal, we argue that the value-free ideal is an epistemic ideal rather than a practical or ethical ideal. Then, we aim to show that the argument from inductive risk cannot be employed against the value-free ideal as far as it is understood as an epistemic ideal. We try to show that the argument takes practical and ethical limitations of actual scientific enterprise into account to undermine the value-free ideal. But employing non-epistemic considerations makes the argument impotent against an epistemic ideal.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-05-26
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80487
10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e80487
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80487
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e80487
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80487/53300
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 137-163
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 137-163
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 137-163
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
_version_ 1799875201179058176

Registros relacionados