Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/88067 |
Resumo: | Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive. |
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Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against PhysicalismEpistemic possibilitiesIntensionsMetaphysical plenitudeMetaphysical possibilitiesStrong necessitiesChalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive. Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2023-10-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/8806710.5007/1808-1711.2023.e88067Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 2 (2023); 263–279Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 2 (2023); 263–279Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 2 (2023); 263–2791808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/88067/54358Copyright (c) 2023 Wilson Mendonça, Julia Telles de Menezeshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMendonça, WilsonTelles de Menezes, Julia2023-10-22T20:38:02Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/88067Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2023-10-22T20:38:02Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
title |
Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
spellingShingle |
Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism Mendonça, Wilson Epistemic possibilities Intensions Metaphysical plenitude Metaphysical possibilities Strong necessities |
title_short |
Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
title_full |
Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
title_fullStr |
Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
title_full_unstemmed |
Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
title_sort |
Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
author |
Mendonça, Wilson |
author_facet |
Mendonça, Wilson Telles de Menezes, Julia |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Telles de Menezes, Julia |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Mendonça, Wilson Telles de Menezes, Julia |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Epistemic possibilities Intensions Metaphysical plenitude Metaphysical possibilities Strong necessities |
topic |
Epistemic possibilities Intensions Metaphysical plenitude Metaphysical possibilities Strong necessities |
description |
Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-10-06 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/88067 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e88067 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/88067 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e88067 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/88067/54358 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Wilson Mendonça, Julia Telles de Menezes http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Wilson Mendonça, Julia Telles de Menezes http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 2 (2023); 263–279 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 2 (2023); 263–279 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 2 (2023); 263–279 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1799875201221001216 |