¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Suarez-Rivero, David
Data de Publicação: 2016
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: spa
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427
Resumo: In this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper “On sense and reference”. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege’s argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon.
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spelling ¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard WettsteinIn this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper “On sense and reference”. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege’s argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2016-09-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p42710.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p427Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 No. 3 (2016); 427-453Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 Núm. 3 (2016); 427-453Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 20 n. 3 (2016); 427-4531808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCspahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427/33916Copyright (c) 2021 David Suarez-Riveroinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSuarez-Rivero, David2019-09-13T11:11:50Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/42865Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T11:11:50Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv ¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein
title ¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein
spellingShingle ¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein
Suarez-Rivero, David
title_short ¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein
title_full ¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein
title_fullStr ¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein
title_full_unstemmed ¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein
title_sort ¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein
author Suarez-Rivero, David
author_facet Suarez-Rivero, David
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Suarez-Rivero, David
description In this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper “On sense and reference”. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege’s argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-09-09
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427
10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p427
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p427
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427/33916
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 David Suarez-Rivero
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 David Suarez-Rivero
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 No. 3 (2016); 427-453
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 Núm. 3 (2016); 427-453
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 20 n. 3 (2016); 427-453
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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