Sentimentos existenciais e desordem psiquiátrica: contribuições fenomenológicas
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
Texto Completo: | http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/26558 |
Resumo: | Numerous approaches in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive sciences emphasize the role of affectivity as constituting a basic layer of our mental life. More recently, contemporary phenomenology has emphasized the experiential dimension of emotions and feelings, drawing attention to their relation to taxonomic and ontological issues. This work aims to contribute to this debate by presenting and discussing Matthew Ratcliffe’s concept of existential feelings. The concept refers to an affectivestructural dimension that is difficult to capture conceptually. Its use also allows us to accurately describe elements of disturbance in our familiar relationship with the world identified in some psychiatric disorders. The ways in which the common and everyday experience can be interrupted concern a very subtle balance in the inseparable relationship between self and world, whose mediation happens fundamentally through these feelings. In theoretical terms, examining these feelings also implies a critical assessment of the reductionist and anti-ecological philosophical perspectives on cognition, which culminate in a narrow conception of its disorders, understood as mere biological or psychological processes confined to the brain. Taking this critical perspective as the starting point, this work lies in the intersection between the philosophy of emotion and psychiatry from a phenomenological perspective. It contributes to the assessment and development of the concept of existential feelings. I defend this proposal throughout the five articles that make up the thesis, plus a discussion section. The first article evaluates the relationship between the notion of existential feelings and the concept of Stimmung in the Heideggerian tradition, taking into account the distinction between these concepts from their methodological function; the second article maintains that the notion of existential feelings plays a central role in the determination and individuation of the entity that exhibits the possibility of experiencing what I call disordered existence; the third article presents and discusses in detail the formulation and development of the notion of existential feelings. I also evaluate how to adequately access these feelings through the emergence of psychiatric disorders, and exemplify the experiential disruption such disorders promote through the existential feeling of doubt; the fourth article presents a specific contribution to the theory of existential feelings by approaching the dimension of body memory as an intrinsic and constitutive element of this phenomenological category; the fifth article discusses ways in which experiences of depression can be understood from the notion of "pararealism", in terms of structural modifications in the sense of reality of these individuals. The general aim of this thesis consists of a presentation and discussion of the notion of existential feelings in contemporary phenomenology while defending its usefulness for the discussion of access to and description of psychiatric disorders. |
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Sentimentos existenciais e desordem psiquiátrica: contribuições fenomenológicasExistential feelings and psychiatric disorder: phenomenological contributionsSentimentos existenciaisFenomenologiaFilosofia da emoçãoFilosofia da psiquiatriaExistential feelingsPhenomenologyPhilosophy of emotionPhilosophy of psychiatryCNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIANumerous approaches in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive sciences emphasize the role of affectivity as constituting a basic layer of our mental life. More recently, contemporary phenomenology has emphasized the experiential dimension of emotions and feelings, drawing attention to their relation to taxonomic and ontological issues. This work aims to contribute to this debate by presenting and discussing Matthew Ratcliffe’s concept of existential feelings. The concept refers to an affectivestructural dimension that is difficult to capture conceptually. Its use also allows us to accurately describe elements of disturbance in our familiar relationship with the world identified in some psychiatric disorders. The ways in which the common and everyday experience can be interrupted concern a very subtle balance in the inseparable relationship between self and world, whose mediation happens fundamentally through these feelings. In theoretical terms, examining these feelings also implies a critical assessment of the reductionist and anti-ecological philosophical perspectives on cognition, which culminate in a narrow conception of its disorders, understood as mere biological or psychological processes confined to the brain. Taking this critical perspective as the starting point, this work lies in the intersection between the philosophy of emotion and psychiatry from a phenomenological perspective. It contributes to the assessment and development of the concept of existential feelings. I defend this proposal throughout the five articles that make up the thesis, plus a discussion section. The first article evaluates the relationship between the notion of existential feelings and the concept of Stimmung in the Heideggerian tradition, taking into account the distinction between these concepts from their methodological function; the second article maintains that the notion of existential feelings plays a central role in the determination and individuation of the entity that exhibits the possibility of experiencing what I call disordered existence; the third article presents and discusses in detail the formulation and development of the notion of existential feelings. I also evaluate how to adequately access these feelings through the emergence of psychiatric disorders, and exemplify the experiential disruption such disorders promote through the existential feeling of doubt; the fourth article presents a specific contribution to the theory of existential feelings by approaching the dimension of body memory as an intrinsic and constitutive element of this phenomenological category; the fifth article discusses ways in which experiences of depression can be understood from the notion of "pararealism", in terms of structural modifications in the sense of reality of these individuals. The general aim of this thesis consists of a presentation and discussion of the notion of existential feelings in contemporary phenomenology while defending its usefulness for the discussion of access to and description of psychiatric disorders.Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPESInúmeras abordagens em filosofia, psicologia e ciências cognitivas enfatizaram o papel da afetividade na constituição de uma camada básica de nossa vida mental. Mais recentemente, a fenomenologia contemporânea vem dando grande ênfase à dimensão experiencial das emoções e dos sentimentos, chamando atenção para sua relação com questões taxonômicas e ontológicas. A presente tese visa contribuir para esse debate, apresentando e discutindo o conceito de sentimentos existenciais, recentemente formulado por Matthew Ratcliffe. O construto diz respeito a uma dimensão afetivoestrutural que dificilmente se deixa capturar conceitualmente. Seu emprego permite descrever, com precisão, elementos de perturbação de nossa relação familiar com o mundo, identificados em algumas desordens psiquiátricas. Os modos pelos quais a experiência habitual e cotidiana pode ser interrompida dizem respeito a um equilíbrio muito sutil na relação indissociável entre self e mundo, cuja mediação é feita, fundamentalmente, por esses sentimentos. Em termos teóricos, a consideração desses sentimentos implica também uma avaliação crítica das perspectivas filosóficas redutivistas e antiecológicas da cognição, as quais culminam em uma concepção bastante restrita também de suas desordens, entendidas como meros processos biológicos ou psicológicos confinados ao cérebro. Tomando essa perspectiva crítica como ponto de partida, este trabalho se insere na intersecção entre filosofia da emoção e filosofia da psiquiatria, partindo de uma perspectiva fenomenológica, e propõe-se a apresentar uma contribuição para a avaliação e o desenvolvimento do tema dos sentimentos existenciais. A proposta é defendida ao longo dos cinco artigos que compõem a tese, além de uma seção de discussão. O primeiro artigo avalia a relação entre a noção de sentimentos existenciais e o conceito de Stimmung na tradição heideggeriana, tendo em vista a diferenciação entre esses conceitos a partir de sua função metodológica. O segundo artigo defende que a noção de sentimentos existenciais desempenha um papel central na determinação e na individuação do ente que exibe a possibilidade de experienciar aquilo que chamo de existência desordenada. O terceiro artigo apresenta e discute detalhadamente a formulação e o desenvolvimento da noção de sentimentos existenciais; ainda, é avaliada a forma de acesso adequado a esses sentimentos a partir da emergência de desordens psiquiátricas, sendo exemplificada a ruptura experiencial promovida por tais desordens a partir do sentimento de dúvida existencial. O quarto artigo articula uma contribuição específica no âmbito da teoria dos sentimentos existenciais, apresentando a dimensão da memória corporal como um elemento intrínseco e constitutivo dessa categoria fenomenológica. Por fim, o quinto artigo discute modos nos quais experiências de depressão podem ser entendidas a partir da noção de “pararealismo”, em termos de modificações estruturais no senso de realidade desses indivíduos. A proposta geral da tese consiste, portanto, em uma apresentação e discussão da noção de sentimentos existenciais na fenomenologia contemporânea, ao mesmo tempo que é defendida sua utilidade para a discussão do acesso e descrição de desordens psiquiátricas.Universidade Federal de Santa MariaBrasilFilosofiaUFSMPrograma de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaCentro de Ciências Sociais e HumanasReis, Róbson Ramos doshttp://lattes.cnpq.br/0127419824935492Castro, Fabio Caprio Leite deWilliges, FlavioMessas, Guilherme PeresCasanova, Marco AntonioLopes, Marcelo Vieira2022-10-19T13:42:26Z2022-10-19T13:42:26Z2022-09-27info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisapplication/pdfhttp://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/26558porAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSMinstname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)instacron:UFSM2022-10-19T13:42:26Zoai:repositorio.ufsm.br:1/26558Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/ONGhttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/oai/requestatendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.comopendoar:2022-10-19T13:42:26Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Sentimentos existenciais e desordem psiquiátrica: contribuições fenomenológicas Existential feelings and psychiatric disorder: phenomenological contributions |
title |
Sentimentos existenciais e desordem psiquiátrica: contribuições fenomenológicas |
spellingShingle |
Sentimentos existenciais e desordem psiquiátrica: contribuições fenomenológicas Lopes, Marcelo Vieira Sentimentos existenciais Fenomenologia Filosofia da emoção Filosofia da psiquiatria Existential feelings Phenomenology Philosophy of emotion Philosophy of psychiatry CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
title_short |
Sentimentos existenciais e desordem psiquiátrica: contribuições fenomenológicas |
title_full |
Sentimentos existenciais e desordem psiquiátrica: contribuições fenomenológicas |
title_fullStr |
Sentimentos existenciais e desordem psiquiátrica: contribuições fenomenológicas |
title_full_unstemmed |
Sentimentos existenciais e desordem psiquiátrica: contribuições fenomenológicas |
title_sort |
Sentimentos existenciais e desordem psiquiátrica: contribuições fenomenológicas |
author |
Lopes, Marcelo Vieira |
author_facet |
Lopes, Marcelo Vieira |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Reis, Róbson Ramos dos http://lattes.cnpq.br/0127419824935492 Castro, Fabio Caprio Leite de Williges, Flavio Messas, Guilherme Peres Casanova, Marco Antonio |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lopes, Marcelo Vieira |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Sentimentos existenciais Fenomenologia Filosofia da emoção Filosofia da psiquiatria Existential feelings Phenomenology Philosophy of emotion Philosophy of psychiatry CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
topic |
Sentimentos existenciais Fenomenologia Filosofia da emoção Filosofia da psiquiatria Existential feelings Phenomenology Philosophy of emotion Philosophy of psychiatry CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
description |
Numerous approaches in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive sciences emphasize the role of affectivity as constituting a basic layer of our mental life. More recently, contemporary phenomenology has emphasized the experiential dimension of emotions and feelings, drawing attention to their relation to taxonomic and ontological issues. This work aims to contribute to this debate by presenting and discussing Matthew Ratcliffe’s concept of existential feelings. The concept refers to an affectivestructural dimension that is difficult to capture conceptually. Its use also allows us to accurately describe elements of disturbance in our familiar relationship with the world identified in some psychiatric disorders. The ways in which the common and everyday experience can be interrupted concern a very subtle balance in the inseparable relationship between self and world, whose mediation happens fundamentally through these feelings. In theoretical terms, examining these feelings also implies a critical assessment of the reductionist and anti-ecological philosophical perspectives on cognition, which culminate in a narrow conception of its disorders, understood as mere biological or psychological processes confined to the brain. Taking this critical perspective as the starting point, this work lies in the intersection between the philosophy of emotion and psychiatry from a phenomenological perspective. It contributes to the assessment and development of the concept of existential feelings. I defend this proposal throughout the five articles that make up the thesis, plus a discussion section. The first article evaluates the relationship between the notion of existential feelings and the concept of Stimmung in the Heideggerian tradition, taking into account the distinction between these concepts from their methodological function; the second article maintains that the notion of existential feelings plays a central role in the determination and individuation of the entity that exhibits the possibility of experiencing what I call disordered existence; the third article presents and discusses in detail the formulation and development of the notion of existential feelings. I also evaluate how to adequately access these feelings through the emergence of psychiatric disorders, and exemplify the experiential disruption such disorders promote through the existential feeling of doubt; the fourth article presents a specific contribution to the theory of existential feelings by approaching the dimension of body memory as an intrinsic and constitutive element of this phenomenological category; the fifth article discusses ways in which experiences of depression can be understood from the notion of "pararealism", in terms of structural modifications in the sense of reality of these individuals. The general aim of this thesis consists of a presentation and discussion of the notion of existential feelings in contemporary phenomenology while defending its usefulness for the discussion of access to and description of psychiatric disorders. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-10-19T13:42:26Z 2022-10-19T13:42:26Z 2022-09-27 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/26558 |
url |
http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/26558 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria Brasil Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria Brasil Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) instacron:UFSM |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
instacron_str |
UFSM |
institution |
UFSM |
reponame_str |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
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Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
atendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.com |
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1805922175682609152 |