An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory
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Data de Publicação: | 2012 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Psicologia (Universidade de Brasília. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17569 |
Resumo: | Dennett (1981/1987b) characterizes his approach as to how intentional terms (those for the so called propositional attitudes) work as a “holistic logical behaviorism,” or a holistic version of some of Ryle’s (1949) conceptual remarks. This paper examines possible contributions and disadvantages of Dennett’s approach, as well as the consequences of this proposal in relation to the employment of intentional terms in psychology. It is argued that Dennett’s approach does not turn out to be more accurate than his predecessor’s, since the mentalistic dimension it adds to the latter is erroneous. Accordingly, Dennett’s contributions and related proposal should be understood without the implications of this dimension. A non-mentalistic alternative, based upon Skinner’s selectionist model, for eventually adopting intentional terms in psychology is briefly discussed. |
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An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems TheoryUm balanço de parte da teoria dos sistemas intencionais de DennettFilosofia; Epistemologia da PsicologiaTermos intencionaisDennettRyleSeleção pelas consequênciasBehaviorismoIntentional termsDennettRyleSelection by consequencesBehaviorismDennett (1981/1987b) characterizes his approach as to how intentional terms (those for the so called propositional attitudes) work as a “holistic logical behaviorism,” or a holistic version of some of Ryle’s (1949) conceptual remarks. This paper examines possible contributions and disadvantages of Dennett’s approach, as well as the consequences of this proposal in relation to the employment of intentional terms in psychology. It is argued that Dennett’s approach does not turn out to be more accurate than his predecessor’s, since the mentalistic dimension it adds to the latter is erroneous. Accordingly, Dennett’s contributions and related proposal should be understood without the implications of this dimension. A non-mentalistic alternative, based upon Skinner’s selectionist model, for eventually adopting intentional terms in psychology is briefly discussed.Dennett (1981/1987b) caracteriza sua abordagem do funcionamento dos termos intencionais como um “behaviorismo lógico holista”, ou versão holista de delineamentos conceituais traçados por Ryle (1949). Este artigo avalia algumas de suas possíveis contribuições e desvantagens para tais delineamentos, e algumas consequências para sua proposta de utilização destes termos em psicologia. Argumenta-se que a abordagem não se mostra mais plausível do que a de seu predecessor, caso a dimensão mentalista que lhe acresce seja equivocada, e que de fato este é o caso. Resulta-se que suas contribuições e proposta correlata devem ser entendidas com independência daquilo que tal dimensão implica. Uma alternativa não-mentalista, baseada no modelo selecionista de Skinner, para uma eventual adoção dos termos intencionais em psicologia é brevemente discutida.Instituto de Psicologia - Universidade de Brasília2012-07-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17569Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa; Vol. 28 No. 2 (2012): Revista Psicologia: teoria e pesquisa; 245-253Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa; Vol. 28 Núm. 2 (2012): Revista Psicologia: teoria e pesquisa; 245-253Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa; Vol. 28 No. 2 (2012): Revista Psicologia: teoria e pesquisa; 245-253Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa; v. 28 n. 2 (2012): Revista Psicologia: teoria e pesquisa; 245-2531806-34460102-3772reponame:Psicologia (Universidade de Brasília. Online)instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBporhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17569/16081https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17569/16904Lazzeri, Filipeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2018-10-25T15:57:20Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/17569Revistahttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/indexPUBhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/oairevistaptp@gmail.com1806-34460102-3772opendoar:2018-10-25T15:57:20Psicologia (Universidade de Brasília. Online) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory Um balanço de parte da teoria dos sistemas intencionais de Dennett |
title |
An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory |
spellingShingle |
An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory Lazzeri, Filipe Filosofia; Epistemologia da Psicologia Termos intencionais Dennett Ryle Seleção pelas consequências Behaviorismo Intentional terms Dennett Ryle Selection by consequences Behaviorism |
title_short |
An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory |
title_full |
An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory |
title_fullStr |
An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory |
title_full_unstemmed |
An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory |
title_sort |
An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory |
author |
Lazzeri, Filipe |
author_facet |
Lazzeri, Filipe |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lazzeri, Filipe |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Filosofia; Epistemologia da Psicologia Termos intencionais Dennett Ryle Seleção pelas consequências Behaviorismo Intentional terms Dennett Ryle Selection by consequences Behaviorism |
topic |
Filosofia; Epistemologia da Psicologia Termos intencionais Dennett Ryle Seleção pelas consequências Behaviorismo Intentional terms Dennett Ryle Selection by consequences Behaviorism |
description |
Dennett (1981/1987b) characterizes his approach as to how intentional terms (those for the so called propositional attitudes) work as a “holistic logical behaviorism,” or a holistic version of some of Ryle’s (1949) conceptual remarks. This paper examines possible contributions and disadvantages of Dennett’s approach, as well as the consequences of this proposal in relation to the employment of intentional terms in psychology. It is argued that Dennett’s approach does not turn out to be more accurate than his predecessor’s, since the mentalistic dimension it adds to the latter is erroneous. Accordingly, Dennett’s contributions and related proposal should be understood without the implications of this dimension. A non-mentalistic alternative, based upon Skinner’s selectionist model, for eventually adopting intentional terms in psychology is briefly discussed. |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2012-07-02 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17569 |
url |
https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17569 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17569/16081 https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17569/16904 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto de Psicologia - Universidade de Brasília |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto de Psicologia - Universidade de Brasília |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa; Vol. 28 No. 2 (2012): Revista Psicologia: teoria e pesquisa; 245-253 Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa; Vol. 28 Núm. 2 (2012): Revista Psicologia: teoria e pesquisa; 245-253 Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa; Vol. 28 No. 2 (2012): Revista Psicologia: teoria e pesquisa; 245-253 Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa; v. 28 n. 2 (2012): Revista Psicologia: teoria e pesquisa; 245-253 1806-3446 0102-3772 reponame:Psicologia (Universidade de Brasília. Online) instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB) instacron:UNB |
instname_str |
Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
instacron_str |
UNB |
institution |
UNB |
reponame_str |
Psicologia (Universidade de Brasília. Online) |
collection |
Psicologia (Universidade de Brasília. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Psicologia (Universidade de Brasília. Online) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revistaptp@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1800211712297664512 |