Knowing what I have done

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Haase, Mathias
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654148
Resumo: The literature on agentive or practical knowledge tends to be focused on knowing what one is doing or what one is going to do. Knowing what one has done and has achieved thereby seems to be another matter. In fact, achievements are often taken to be beyond the ken of practical knowledge. I argue that this is a mistake. The intelligibility of the very idea of practical knowledge depends on the possibility of knowing one's achievements in the same manner. For if it is to be intelligible as knowledge of the actuality of one's action in the material world, knowing what one is doing has to include knowledge of what one has done so far.
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spelling Knowing what I have donePractical knowledge. Intentional action. Action and time. Anscombe.The literature on agentive or practical knowledge tends to be focused on knowing what one is doing or what one is going to do. Knowing what one has done and has achieved thereby seems to be another matter. In fact, achievements are often taken to be beyond the ken of practical knowledge. I argue that this is a mistake. The intelligibility of the very idea of practical knowledge depends on the possibility of knowing one's achievements in the same manner. For if it is to be intelligible as knowledge of the actuality of one's action in the material world, knowing what one is doing has to include knowledge of what one has done so far.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2018-12-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionNot applicableapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654148Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 195-253Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 195-253Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 195-2532317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654148/18859Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHaase, Mathias2018-12-04T09:48:51Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8654148Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T09:48:51Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Knowing what I have done
title Knowing what I have done
spellingShingle Knowing what I have done
Haase, Mathias
Practical knowledge. Intentional action. Action and time. Anscombe.
title_short Knowing what I have done
title_full Knowing what I have done
title_fullStr Knowing what I have done
title_full_unstemmed Knowing what I have done
title_sort Knowing what I have done
author Haase, Mathias
author_facet Haase, Mathias
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Haase, Mathias
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Practical knowledge. Intentional action. Action and time. Anscombe.
topic Practical knowledge. Intentional action. Action and time. Anscombe.
description The literature on agentive or practical knowledge tends to be focused on knowing what one is doing or what one is going to do. Knowing what one has done and has achieved thereby seems to be another matter. In fact, achievements are often taken to be beyond the ken of practical knowledge. I argue that this is a mistake. The intelligibility of the very idea of practical knowledge depends on the possibility of knowing one's achievements in the same manner. For if it is to be intelligible as knowledge of the actuality of one's action in the material world, knowing what one is doing has to include knowledge of what one has done so far.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-12-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654148
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654148
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654148/18859
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 195-253
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 195-253
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 195-253
2317-630X
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reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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