Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: GUO,Yuchen
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000200029
Resumo: ABSTRACT In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I argue that genuine desires fail to make sense of our attitudes towards real objects in fictional situations, and that i-desire is psychologically indispensable in explaining our attitudes in such cases.
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spelling Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable statesI-desireDesire-like imaginingImaginationFictionPretenseABSTRACT In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I argue that genuine desires fail to make sense of our attitudes towards real objects in fictional situations, and that i-desire is psychologically indispensable in explaining our attitudes in such cases.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2018-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000200029Manuscrito v.41 n.2 2018reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n2.yginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGUO,Yucheneng2018-08-14T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452018000200029Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-08-14T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
title Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
spellingShingle Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
GUO,Yuchen
I-desire
Desire-like imagining
Imagination
Fiction
Pretense
title_short Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
title_full Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
title_fullStr Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
title_full_unstemmed Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
title_sort Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
author GUO,Yuchen
author_facet GUO,Yuchen
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv GUO,Yuchen
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv I-desire
Desire-like imagining
Imagination
Fiction
Pretense
topic I-desire
Desire-like imagining
Imagination
Fiction
Pretense
description ABSTRACT In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I argue that genuine desires fail to make sense of our attitudes towards real objects in fictional situations, and that i-desire is psychologically indispensable in explaining our attitudes in such cases.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-06-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000200029
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000200029
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n2.yg
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.41 n.2 2018
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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