“MUSIC TO THE EARS OF WEAKLINGS”: MORAL HYDRAULICS AND THE UNSEATING OF DESIRE
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
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Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400071 |
Resumo: | Abstract Psychological eudaimonism (PE) is the view that we are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about (and co-instantiated desire for) that object (§I). There is more than one way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an intellectualist picture (§II). This paper arbitrates between two readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the aim of constructing a model of moral education based on PE's implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view that when we come to see - through prudential reasoning - that our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs and desires as worthy of pursuit (§III). This form of 'hydraulic education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive practical reasoning. |
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“MUSIC TO THE EARS OF WEAKLINGS”: MORAL HYDRAULICS AND THE UNSEATING OF DESIREMoral HydraulicsPractical reasoningMoral educationPsychological EudaimonismPlato's MenoAbstract Psychological eudaimonism (PE) is the view that we are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about (and co-instantiated desire for) that object (§I). There is more than one way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an intellectualist picture (§II). This paper arbitrates between two readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the aim of constructing a model of moral education based on PE's implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view that when we come to see - through prudential reasoning - that our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs and desires as worthy of pursuit (§III). This form of 'hydraulic education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive practical reasoning.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2018-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400071Manuscrito v.41 n.4 2018reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.clinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCHAPMAN,LOUISE REBECCASANDIS,CONSTANTINEeng2018-12-04T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452018000400071Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
“MUSIC TO THE EARS OF WEAKLINGS”: MORAL HYDRAULICS AND THE UNSEATING OF DESIRE |
title |
“MUSIC TO THE EARS OF WEAKLINGS”: MORAL HYDRAULICS AND THE UNSEATING OF DESIRE |
spellingShingle |
“MUSIC TO THE EARS OF WEAKLINGS”: MORAL HYDRAULICS AND THE UNSEATING OF DESIRE CHAPMAN,LOUISE REBECCA Moral Hydraulics Practical reasoning Moral education Psychological Eudaimonism Plato's Meno |
title_short |
“MUSIC TO THE EARS OF WEAKLINGS”: MORAL HYDRAULICS AND THE UNSEATING OF DESIRE |
title_full |
“MUSIC TO THE EARS OF WEAKLINGS”: MORAL HYDRAULICS AND THE UNSEATING OF DESIRE |
title_fullStr |
“MUSIC TO THE EARS OF WEAKLINGS”: MORAL HYDRAULICS AND THE UNSEATING OF DESIRE |
title_full_unstemmed |
“MUSIC TO THE EARS OF WEAKLINGS”: MORAL HYDRAULICS AND THE UNSEATING OF DESIRE |
title_sort |
“MUSIC TO THE EARS OF WEAKLINGS”: MORAL HYDRAULICS AND THE UNSEATING OF DESIRE |
author |
CHAPMAN,LOUISE REBECCA |
author_facet |
CHAPMAN,LOUISE REBECCA SANDIS,CONSTANTINE |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
SANDIS,CONSTANTINE |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
CHAPMAN,LOUISE REBECCA SANDIS,CONSTANTINE |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Moral Hydraulics Practical reasoning Moral education Psychological Eudaimonism Plato's Meno |
topic |
Moral Hydraulics Practical reasoning Moral education Psychological Eudaimonism Plato's Meno |
description |
Abstract Psychological eudaimonism (PE) is the view that we are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about (and co-instantiated desire for) that object (§I). There is more than one way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an intellectualist picture (§II). This paper arbitrates between two readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the aim of constructing a model of moral education based on PE's implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view that when we come to see - through prudential reasoning - that our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs and desires as worthy of pursuit (§III). This form of 'hydraulic education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive practical reasoning. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-12-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400071 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400071 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.cl |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito v.41 n.4 2018 reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1748950065428299776 |