Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Guo, Yuchen
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8653288
Resumo: In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I argue that genuine desires fail to make sense of our attitudes towards real objects in fictional situations, and that i-desire is psychologically indispensable in explaining our attitudes in such cases.
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spelling Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable statesI-desire. Desire-like imagining. Imagination. Fiction. Pretense.In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I argue that genuine desires fail to make sense of our attitudes towards real objects in fictional situations, and that i-desire is psychologically indispensable in explaining our attitudes in such cases.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2018-08-28info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPesquisa teóricaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8653288Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 2 (2018): abr./jun.; 29-53Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 2 (2018): abr./jun.; 29-53Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 2 (2018): abr./jun.; 29-532317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8653288/18448Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGuo, Yuchen2018-08-28T11:32:17Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8653288Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-08-28T11:32:17Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
title Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
spellingShingle Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
Guo, Yuchen
I-desire. Desire-like imagining. Imagination. Fiction. Pretense.
title_short Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
title_full Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
title_fullStr Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
title_full_unstemmed Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
title_sort Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
author Guo, Yuchen
author_facet Guo, Yuchen
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Guo, Yuchen
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv I-desire. Desire-like imagining. Imagination. Fiction. Pretense.
topic I-desire. Desire-like imagining. Imagination. Fiction. Pretense.
description In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I argue that genuine desires fail to make sense of our attitudes towards real objects in fictional situations, and that i-desire is psychologically indispensable in explaining our attitudes in such cases.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-08-28
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Pesquisa teórica
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8653288
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8653288
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8653288/18448
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 2 (2018): abr./jun.; 29-53
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 2 (2018): abr./jun.; 29-53
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 2 (2018): abr./jun.; 29-53
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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