The effectiveness of political cycles in brazilian municipalities: A focus on accounting

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vicente, Ernesto Fernando Rodrigues
Data de Publicação: 2012
Outros Autores: do Nascimento, Leonardo Silveira
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista de contabilidade e organizações
Texto Completo: https://www.revistas.usp.br/rco/article/view/45402
Resumo: Based on the political cycles theories, this paper aims to demonstrate how the accounting indicators can be related to an “opportunistic” behavior of the governors, seen as one who is directed to them hold on power or their political allies. We started from a sample of 3,404 municipalities covering the period leading up to the elections for the office of Mayor occurring in the years 2000, 2004 and 2008. The results showed significant effects on the following variables: i) The increase in the Budget Balance and Current Budget Balance in election years reduces the likelihood of reelection; ii) Cash flow generation in election years and post-election years increases the probability of reelection; iii ) the increase in net financial result calculated on the balance sheet in pre-election years have a positive impact on the chances of reappointment, and iv) the increase in investment spending increases the probability of renewal. Given the results, as expected, the informational asymmetry exerts a significant influence on political cycles, so that, to remain in power, governments can take advantage of a lack of rationality of the voters and their inability to foresee the “opportunistic” behavior pointed to the reelection.
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spelling The effectiveness of political cycles in brazilian municipalities: A focus on accountingA efetividade dos ciclos políticos nos municípios brasileiros: Um enfoque contábilContabilidade PúblicaCiclos PolíticosTeoria da Escolha Pública.Public Sector AccountingPolitical CyclesPublic Choice Theory.Based on the political cycles theories, this paper aims to demonstrate how the accounting indicators can be related to an “opportunistic” behavior of the governors, seen as one who is directed to them hold on power or their political allies. We started from a sample of 3,404 municipalities covering the period leading up to the elections for the office of Mayor occurring in the years 2000, 2004 and 2008. The results showed significant effects on the following variables: i) The increase in the Budget Balance and Current Budget Balance in election years reduces the likelihood of reelection; ii) Cash flow generation in election years and post-election years increases the probability of reelection; iii ) the increase in net financial result calculated on the balance sheet in pre-election years have a positive impact on the chances of reappointment, and iv) the increase in investment spending increases the probability of renewal. Given the results, as expected, the informational asymmetry exerts a significant influence on political cycles, so that, to remain in power, governments can take advantage of a lack of rationality of the voters and their inability to foresee the “opportunistic” behavior pointed to the reelection.Com base nas teorias de ciclos políticos, este artigo tem o objetivo de demonstrar de que forma os indicadores contábeis podem estar relacionados ao comportamento “oportunista” dosgovernantes, entendido como aquele que é direcionado à sua permanência no poder ou a de seus aliados políticos. Partiu-se de uma amostra de 3.404 municípios brasileiros abrangendo os mandatos de Prefeito findos em 2000, 2004 e 2008. Os resultados apontaram efeitos significativos nas seguintes variáveis: i) A elevação do Resultado Orçamentário e do Resultado Orçamentário Corrente em anos eleitorais reduz a probabilidade de recondução; ii) A geração de caixa em anos eleitorais e pós-eleitorais eleva a probabilidade de recondução; iii) A elevação do resultado financeiro apurado no balanço patrimonial em anos pré-eleitorais impacta positivamente nas chances de recondução; e iv) O aumento das despesas de investimentos eleva a probabilidade de recondução. Diante dos resultados, conforme o esperado, a assimetria informacional exerce uma influência significativa nos ciclos políticos, fazendo com que, para permanecer no poder, os governantes se aproveitem de uma possível falta de racionalidade do eleitor, incapaz de antever comportamentos “oportunistas”.Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto2012-04-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/xmlhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rco/article/view/4540210.11606/rco.v6i14.45402Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações; Vol. 6 No. 14 (2012); 106-126Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações; Vol. 6 Núm. 14 (2012); 106-126Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações; v. 6 n. 14 (2012); 106-1261982-6486reponame:Revista de contabilidade e organizaçõesinstname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USPporhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rco/article/view/45402/49014https://www.revistas.usp.br/rco/article/view/45402/153199Vicente, Ernesto Fernando Rodriguesdo Nascimento, Leonardo Silveirainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2018-08-28T16:39:31Zoai:revistas.usp.br:article/45402Revistahttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rcoPUBhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rco/oairco@usp.br1982-64861982-6486opendoar:2018-08-28T16:39:31Revista de contabilidade e organizações - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The effectiveness of political cycles in brazilian municipalities: A focus on accounting
A efetividade dos ciclos políticos nos municípios brasileiros: Um enfoque contábil
title The effectiveness of political cycles in brazilian municipalities: A focus on accounting
spellingShingle The effectiveness of political cycles in brazilian municipalities: A focus on accounting
Vicente, Ernesto Fernando Rodrigues
Contabilidade Pública
Ciclos Políticos
Teoria da Escolha Pública.
Public Sector Accounting
Political Cycles
Public Choice Theory.
title_short The effectiveness of political cycles in brazilian municipalities: A focus on accounting
title_full The effectiveness of political cycles in brazilian municipalities: A focus on accounting
title_fullStr The effectiveness of political cycles in brazilian municipalities: A focus on accounting
title_full_unstemmed The effectiveness of political cycles in brazilian municipalities: A focus on accounting
title_sort The effectiveness of political cycles in brazilian municipalities: A focus on accounting
author Vicente, Ernesto Fernando Rodrigues
author_facet Vicente, Ernesto Fernando Rodrigues
do Nascimento, Leonardo Silveira
author_role author
author2 do Nascimento, Leonardo Silveira
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vicente, Ernesto Fernando Rodrigues
do Nascimento, Leonardo Silveira
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Contabilidade Pública
Ciclos Políticos
Teoria da Escolha Pública.
Public Sector Accounting
Political Cycles
Public Choice Theory.
topic Contabilidade Pública
Ciclos Políticos
Teoria da Escolha Pública.
Public Sector Accounting
Political Cycles
Public Choice Theory.
description Based on the political cycles theories, this paper aims to demonstrate how the accounting indicators can be related to an “opportunistic” behavior of the governors, seen as one who is directed to them hold on power or their political allies. We started from a sample of 3,404 municipalities covering the period leading up to the elections for the office of Mayor occurring in the years 2000, 2004 and 2008. The results showed significant effects on the following variables: i) The increase in the Budget Balance and Current Budget Balance in election years reduces the likelihood of reelection; ii) Cash flow generation in election years and post-election years increases the probability of reelection; iii ) the increase in net financial result calculated on the balance sheet in pre-election years have a positive impact on the chances of reappointment, and iv) the increase in investment spending increases the probability of renewal. Given the results, as expected, the informational asymmetry exerts a significant influence on political cycles, so that, to remain in power, governments can take advantage of a lack of rationality of the voters and their inability to foresee the “opportunistic” behavior pointed to the reelection.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-04-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://www.revistas.usp.br/rco/article/view/45402
10.11606/rco.v6i14.45402
url https://www.revistas.usp.br/rco/article/view/45402
identifier_str_mv 10.11606/rco.v6i14.45402
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.revistas.usp.br/rco/article/view/45402/49014
https://www.revistas.usp.br/rco/article/view/45402/153199
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/xml
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações; Vol. 6 No. 14 (2012); 106-126
Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações; Vol. 6 Núm. 14 (2012); 106-126
Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações; v. 6 n. 14 (2012); 106-126
1982-6486
reponame:Revista de contabilidade e organizações
instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron:USP
instname_str Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron_str USP
institution USP
reponame_str Revista de contabilidade e organizações
collection Revista de contabilidade e organizações
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de contabilidade e organizações - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv rco@usp.br
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