Social control of public expenditures in a multilevel principal-agent approach

• Autor(a) principal: PIRES,VALDEMIR
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Outros Autores: GUIMARÃES,ANDRÉ SATHLER
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Revista de Economia Política
• Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572015000400878
• topic: public management; principal-agent model; public expenditure social control

ABSTRACTThis study enhances the principal-agent model by incorporating a multilevel perspective and differences among agency situations. A theoretical discussion is developed using a proposed intersection of methodological focuses and a descriptive-exemplificative hypothetical analysis. The analysis is applied to public expenditure social control in representative democracies, and as a result, a principal-agent model unfolds that incorporates a decision-making perspective and focuses on formulation, negotiation, articulation, and implementation competencies. Thus, it is possible to incorporate elements into the principal-agent model to make it more permeable to individual, group, and societal idiosyncrasies with respect to public expenditure social control.