A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2008 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25291 |
Resumo: | This paper analyses a model of a common value English auction with discrete bidding. In this model, we show that there exists a communication equilibrium in which the high signal bidder strategically chooses his rst bid so as to maximise his expected utility. Straightforward bidding, or increasing the bid by the minimum amount possible, is the equilibrium strategy for both bidders in all other auction rounds. We relate this result to recent research on English auctions with discrete bidding and auctions where bidders may have noisy information about their opponent s signals. |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete BiddingEnglish Auctionsdiscrete biddingcommunication equilibriumThis paper analyses a model of a common value English auction with discrete bidding. In this model, we show that there exists a communication equilibrium in which the high signal bidder strategically chooses his rst bid so as to maximise his expected utility. Straightforward bidding, or increasing the bid by the minimum amount possible, is the equilibrium strategy for both bidders in all other auction rounds. We relate this result to recent research on English auctions with discrete bidding and auctions where bidders may have noisy information about their opponent s signals.Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaGonçalves, Ricardo2018-07-30T11:02:55Z20082008-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25291engGonçalves, R. (2008). A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding. Working Papers: Economics. N.º 4, 18 p.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-12T17:30:40ZPortal AgregadorONG |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding |
title |
A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding |
spellingShingle |
A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding Gonçalves, Ricardo English Auctions discrete bidding communication equilibrium |
title_short |
A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding |
title_full |
A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding |
title_fullStr |
A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding |
title_sort |
A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding |
author |
Gonçalves, Ricardo |
author_facet |
Gonçalves, Ricardo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Gonçalves, Ricardo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
English Auctions discrete bidding communication equilibrium |
topic |
English Auctions discrete bidding communication equilibrium |
description |
This paper analyses a model of a common value English auction with discrete bidding. In this model, we show that there exists a communication equilibrium in which the high signal bidder strategically chooses his rst bid so as to maximise his expected utility. Straightforward bidding, or increasing the bid by the minimum amount possible, is the equilibrium strategy for both bidders in all other auction rounds. We relate this result to recent research on English auctions with discrete bidding and auctions where bidders may have noisy information about their opponent s signals. |
publishDate |
2008 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2008 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z 2018-07-30T11:02:55Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25291 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25291 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Gonçalves, R. (2008). A Communication Equilibrium in English Auctions with Discrete Bidding. Working Papers: Economics. N.º 4, 18 p. |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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1777303173593038848 |