Corporate governance and its effect on bond yield spreads

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Retterath, Katrin
Data de Publicação: 2019
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/69928
Resumo: This paper investigates, whether including more corporate governance provisions or adding takeover defenses at annual shareholder meetings has a material impact on bond yield spreads. The analysis focuses on close call votes at annual shareholder meetings and uses a regression discontinuity design. This provides a clean estimate that accounts for the market expectations which form prior to the voting event and can therefore deliver more accurate estimates. I found that the bond yield spread increases by 0.29 percentage points if a governance proposal is passed but decreases by -1.77 percentage points if a takeover defense is added, after the voting percentage has surpassed the required threshold.
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spelling Corporate governance and its effect on bond yield spreadsRegression discontinuityCorporate governanceTakeover defensesDomínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e GestãoThis paper investigates, whether including more corporate governance provisions or adding takeover defenses at annual shareholder meetings has a material impact on bond yield spreads. The analysis focuses on close call votes at annual shareholder meetings and uses a regression discontinuity design. This provides a clean estimate that accounts for the market expectations which form prior to the voting event and can therefore deliver more accurate estimates. I found that the bond yield spread increases by 0.29 percentage points if a governance proposal is passed but decreases by -1.77 percentage points if a takeover defense is added, after the voting percentage has surpassed the required threshold.Ferreira, Miguel AlvesRUNRetterath, Katrin2019-05-17T14:10:57Z2019-01-152019-01-15T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/69928TID:202226719enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:33:11Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/69928Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:35:02.757020Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Corporate governance and its effect on bond yield spreads
title Corporate governance and its effect on bond yield spreads
spellingShingle Corporate governance and its effect on bond yield spreads
Retterath, Katrin
Regression discontinuity
Corporate governance
Takeover defenses
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
title_short Corporate governance and its effect on bond yield spreads
title_full Corporate governance and its effect on bond yield spreads
title_fullStr Corporate governance and its effect on bond yield spreads
title_full_unstemmed Corporate governance and its effect on bond yield spreads
title_sort Corporate governance and its effect on bond yield spreads
author Retterath, Katrin
author_facet Retterath, Katrin
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Ferreira, Miguel Alves
RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Retterath, Katrin
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Regression discontinuity
Corporate governance
Takeover defenses
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
topic Regression discontinuity
Corporate governance
Takeover defenses
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
description This paper investigates, whether including more corporate governance provisions or adding takeover defenses at annual shareholder meetings has a material impact on bond yield spreads. The analysis focuses on close call votes at annual shareholder meetings and uses a regression discontinuity design. This provides a clean estimate that accounts for the market expectations which form prior to the voting event and can therefore deliver more accurate estimates. I found that the bond yield spread increases by 0.29 percentage points if a governance proposal is passed but decreases by -1.77 percentage points if a takeover defense is added, after the voting percentage has surpassed the required threshold.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-05-17T14:10:57Z
2019-01-15
2019-01-15T00:00:00Z
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dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/69928
TID:202226719
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dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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