Constrained efficient locations under delivered pricing

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pires, Cesaltina
Data de Publicação: 2005
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2259
Resumo: In this article, we extend previous results on competitive delivered pricing by considering the second-best problem in which the social planner can regulate firm’s locations but not their pricing. Assuming constant marginal costs, we show that the constrained socially optimal locations are an equilibrium of the location-price game when: (i) demand is perfectly inelastic and (ii) demand is price sensitive but firms practice first-degree price discrimination. However, with elastic demand and linear delivered pricing, the market equilibrium provides too much spatial differentiation.
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spelling Constrained efficient locations under delivered pricingDelivered pricingSpatial competitionIn this article, we extend previous results on competitive delivered pricing by considering the second-best problem in which the social planner can regulate firm’s locations but not their pricing. Assuming constant marginal costs, we show that the constrained socially optimal locations are an equilibrium of the location-price game when: (i) demand is perfectly inelastic and (ii) demand is price sensitive but firms practice first-degree price discrimination. However, with elastic demand and linear delivered pricing, the market equilibrium provides too much spatial differentiation.Elsevier2010-12-06T14:11:19Z2010-12-062005-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article46710 bytesapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10174/2259http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2259eng49– 5635Regional Science and Urban EconomicslivreCEFAGE Departamento de Gestãocpires@uevora.pt639Pires, Cesaltinainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-03T18:38:17Zoai:dspace.uevora.pt:10174/2259Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T00:57:53.036946Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Constrained efficient locations under delivered pricing
title Constrained efficient locations under delivered pricing
spellingShingle Constrained efficient locations under delivered pricing
Pires, Cesaltina
Delivered pricing
Spatial competition
title_short Constrained efficient locations under delivered pricing
title_full Constrained efficient locations under delivered pricing
title_fullStr Constrained efficient locations under delivered pricing
title_full_unstemmed Constrained efficient locations under delivered pricing
title_sort Constrained efficient locations under delivered pricing
author Pires, Cesaltina
author_facet Pires, Cesaltina
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pires, Cesaltina
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Delivered pricing
Spatial competition
topic Delivered pricing
Spatial competition
description In this article, we extend previous results on competitive delivered pricing by considering the second-best problem in which the social planner can regulate firm’s locations but not their pricing. Assuming constant marginal costs, we show that the constrained socially optimal locations are an equilibrium of the location-price game when: (i) demand is perfectly inelastic and (ii) demand is price sensitive but firms practice first-degree price discrimination. However, with elastic demand and linear delivered pricing, the market equilibrium provides too much spatial differentiation.
publishDate 2005
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2005-01-01T00:00:00Z
2010-12-06T14:11:19Z
2010-12-06
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2259
http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2259
url http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2259
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 49– 56
35
Regional Science and Urban Economics
livre
CEFAGE Departamento de Gestão
cpires@uevora.pt
639
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 46710 bytes
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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