Price discrimination with private and imperfect information

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Esteves, Rosa Branca
Data de Publicação: 2012
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/21382
Resumo: This paper investigates the competitive and welfare effects of information accuracy improvements in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer’s brand preference. It shows that firms charge more to customers they believe have a brand preference for them, and that this price has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the signal’s accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal’s accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically as price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.
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spelling Price discrimination with private and imperfect informationCompetitive price discriminationImperfect customer recognitionImperfect informationThis paper investigates the competitive and welfare effects of information accuracy improvements in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer’s brand preference. It shows that firms charge more to customers they believe have a brand preference for them, and that this price has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the signal’s accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal’s accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically as price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.COMPETE; QREN; FEDER; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)Universidade do MinhoUniversidade do MinhoEsteves, Rosa Branca20122012-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/21382enghttp://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2012/NIPE_WP_12_2012.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:23:37ZPortal AgregadorONG
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Price discrimination with private and imperfect information
title Price discrimination with private and imperfect information
spellingShingle Price discrimination with private and imperfect information
Esteves, Rosa Branca
Competitive price discrimination
Imperfect customer recognition
Imperfect information
title_short Price discrimination with private and imperfect information
title_full Price discrimination with private and imperfect information
title_fullStr Price discrimination with private and imperfect information
title_full_unstemmed Price discrimination with private and imperfect information
title_sort Price discrimination with private and imperfect information
author Esteves, Rosa Branca
author_facet Esteves, Rosa Branca
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Esteves, Rosa Branca
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Competitive price discrimination
Imperfect customer recognition
Imperfect information
topic Competitive price discrimination
Imperfect customer recognition
Imperfect information
description This paper investigates the competitive and welfare effects of information accuracy improvements in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer’s brand preference. It shows that firms charge more to customers they believe have a brand preference for them, and that this price has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the signal’s accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal’s accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically as price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012
2012-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1822/21382
url http://hdl.handle.net/1822/21382
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2012/NIPE_WP_12_2012.pdf
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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