Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/75845 |
Resumo: | This paper investigates the role of an incumbent.s data investment decisions in shaping the competitive interaction of .rms and market structure. We provide antitrust agencies with some insights that may help them to determine whether and when personalized pricing (PP) by a dominant .rm, which is enabled by the use of exclusive data, dampens competition and harms consumers. In markets with intermediate entry costs, where entry is blocked without any intervention, a data openness remedy, by means of a mandatory information sharing, is an e¤ective tool to restore competition and boost consumer welfare. Even in markets where entry is inevitable, due to low entry costs, a mandatory information sharing to promote competitive PP further boosts consumer surplus in comparison to the case where only the incumbent employs PP. In contrast, public agencies should consider a ban on PP in markets with su¢ ciently high entry costs. In these markets, a mandatory information sharing remedy would simply not produce the desired competitive outcome. |
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Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing?Price discriminationData investmentsData barrier to entryInformation sharingDigital marketsGDPRCompetition policy and regulationThis paper investigates the role of an incumbent.s data investment decisions in shaping the competitive interaction of .rms and market structure. We provide antitrust agencies with some insights that may help them to determine whether and when personalized pricing (PP) by a dominant .rm, which is enabled by the use of exclusive data, dampens competition and harms consumers. In markets with intermediate entry costs, where entry is blocked without any intervention, a data openness remedy, by means of a mandatory information sharing, is an e¤ective tool to restore competition and boost consumer welfare. Even in markets where entry is inevitable, due to low entry costs, a mandatory information sharing to promote competitive PP further boosts consumer surplus in comparison to the case where only the incumbent employs PP. In contrast, public agencies should consider a ban on PP in markets with su¢ ciently high entry costs. In these markets, a mandatory information sharing remedy would simply not produce the desired competitive outcome.Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)Universidade do MinhoEsteves, Rosa BrancaCarballo-Cruz, Francisco20212021-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/75845porhttps://nipe.eeg.uminho.pt/publicacoes-nipe/#documentos-de-trabalhoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-08-19T01:15:38ZPortal AgregadorONG |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing? |
title |
Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing? |
spellingShingle |
Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing? Esteves, Rosa Branca Price discrimination Data investments Data barrier to entry Information sharing Digital markets GDPR Competition policy and regulation |
title_short |
Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing? |
title_full |
Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing? |
title_fullStr |
Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing? |
title_sort |
Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing? |
author |
Esteves, Rosa Branca |
author_facet |
Esteves, Rosa Branca Carballo-Cruz, Francisco |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Carballo-Cruz, Francisco |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Esteves, Rosa Branca Carballo-Cruz, Francisco |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Price discrimination Data investments Data barrier to entry Information sharing Digital markets GDPR Competition policy and regulation |
topic |
Price discrimination Data investments Data barrier to entry Information sharing Digital markets GDPR Competition policy and regulation |
description |
This paper investigates the role of an incumbent.s data investment decisions in shaping the competitive interaction of .rms and market structure. We provide antitrust agencies with some insights that may help them to determine whether and when personalized pricing (PP) by a dominant .rm, which is enabled by the use of exclusive data, dampens competition and harms consumers. In markets with intermediate entry costs, where entry is blocked without any intervention, a data openness remedy, by means of a mandatory information sharing, is an e¤ective tool to restore competition and boost consumer welfare. Even in markets where entry is inevitable, due to low entry costs, a mandatory information sharing to promote competitive PP further boosts consumer surplus in comparison to the case where only the incumbent employs PP. In contrast, public agencies should consider a ban on PP in markets with su¢ ciently high entry costs. In these markets, a mandatory information sharing remedy would simply not produce the desired competitive outcome. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021 2021-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/75845 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/75845 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://nipe.eeg.uminho.pt/publicacoes-nipe/#documentos-de-trabalho |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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1777303702138257408 |