Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Cabral, Célia Costa
Data de Publicação: 1998
Outros Autores: Kujal, Praveen
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/89036
Resumo: The incentives for governments to impose subsidies and tariffs on R&D and output is analysed in a differentiated good industry where firms invest in a cost saving technology. When government commitment is credible, subsidies to R&D and output are positive both under Bertrand and Cournot competition. However, if the government cannot commit to a policy action, it chooses a tariff under Bertrand competition and a subsidy under Cournot competition.
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spelling Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity CompetitionProduct DifferentiationTrade PoliciesCommitmentTariffsSubsidiesThe incentives for governments to impose subsidies and tariffs on R&D and output is analysed in a differentiated good industry where firms invest in a cost saving technology. When government commitment is credible, subsidies to R&D and output are positive both under Bertrand and Cournot competition. However, if the government cannot commit to a policy action, it chooses a tariff under Bertrand competition and a subsidy under Cournot competition.Nova SBERUNCabral, Célia CostaKujal, Praveen2019-12-02T14:55:45Z1998-12-281998-12-28T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/89036engCabral, Celia Costa and Trade Policy and Kujal, Praveen, Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition (December, 1998). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 334info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:39:33Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/89036Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:55.143563Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition
title Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition
spellingShingle Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition
Cabral, Célia Costa
Product Differentiation
Trade Policies
Commitment
Tariffs
Subsidies
title_short Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition
title_full Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition
title_fullStr Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition
title_full_unstemmed Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition
title_sort Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition
author Cabral, Célia Costa
author_facet Cabral, Célia Costa
Kujal, Praveen
author_role author
author2 Kujal, Praveen
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Cabral, Célia Costa
Kujal, Praveen
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Product Differentiation
Trade Policies
Commitment
Tariffs
Subsidies
topic Product Differentiation
Trade Policies
Commitment
Tariffs
Subsidies
description The incentives for governments to impose subsidies and tariffs on R&D and output is analysed in a differentiated good industry where firms invest in a cost saving technology. When government commitment is credible, subsidies to R&D and output are positive both under Bertrand and Cournot competition. However, if the government cannot commit to a policy action, it chooses a tariff under Bertrand competition and a subsidy under Cournot competition.
publishDate 1998
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1998-12-28
1998-12-28T00:00:00Z
2019-12-02T14:55:45Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/89036
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/89036
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Cabral, Celia Costa and Trade Policy and Kujal, Praveen, Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition (December, 1998). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 334
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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