A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Economic Analysis of law Review |
Texto Completo: | https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8770 |
Resumo: | The article addresses the issue of insider trading in its theoretical aspects, analyzes the legislation and the jurisprudence of the Securities and Exchange Commission in light of the economic analysis of the law. The purpose is to gauge the legal framework and, by comparison, the interpretation of the administrative authority. It seeks to identify if the system adopted today in relation to the practice of the insider is effective in order to avoid criminal behavior on the part of financial market players. The use of inside information by agents who had access to them before they were made known to the general public - insider trading - has negative effects on the market and creates a situation of insecurity incompatible with the good performance of the markets. Informational asymmetry is a market failure identified by the economic analysis of the law and, although inherent in most businesses, it is a condition of anomaly when it serves as an instrument to obtain undue advantages from violators, a hypothesis recognized as opportunistic behavior. Bibliographical and data analysis is used to conclude that, despite the existence of regulations in Brazil, market agents have been eagerly promoting sophisticated methods of trading based on privileged information, with the consequence of finding efficacy failures in the market. model of repression to unwanted practice. |
id |
UCB-6_46e88835047ee948f469014a68872eba |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/8770 |
network_acronym_str |
UCB-6 |
network_name_str |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOSinsider trading legal discipline efficiencyThe article addresses the issue of insider trading in its theoretical aspects, analyzes the legislation and the jurisprudence of the Securities and Exchange Commission in light of the economic analysis of the law. The purpose is to gauge the legal framework and, by comparison, the interpretation of the administrative authority. It seeks to identify if the system adopted today in relation to the practice of the insider is effective in order to avoid criminal behavior on the part of financial market players. The use of inside information by agents who had access to them before they were made known to the general public - insider trading - has negative effects on the market and creates a situation of insecurity incompatible with the good performance of the markets. Informational asymmetry is a market failure identified by the economic analysis of the law and, although inherent in most businesses, it is a condition of anomaly when it serves as an instrument to obtain undue advantages from violators, a hypothesis recognized as opportunistic behavior. Bibliographical and data analysis is used to conclude that, despite the existence of regulations in Brazil, market agents have been eagerly promoting sophisticated methods of trading based on privileged information, with the consequence of finding efficacy failures in the market. model of repression to unwanted practice.Universidade Católica de Brasília2019-11-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado por Pares; Peer ReviewedRevisão de literatura; análise da dadosapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/877010.31501/ealr.v10i1.8770Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 10 No. 1 (2019): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 142-157Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 10 Núm. 1 (2019): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 142-157Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 10 n. 1 (2019): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 142-1572178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBporhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8770/6507Copyright (c) 2019 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCharão, Anderson PereiraRibeiro, Marcia Carla Pereira2021-05-19T10:24:22Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/8770Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2021-05-19T10:24:22Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS |
title |
A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS |
spellingShingle |
A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS Charão, Anderson Pereira insider trading legal discipline efficiency |
title_short |
A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS |
title_full |
A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS |
title_fullStr |
A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS |
title_full_unstemmed |
A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS |
title_sort |
A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS |
author |
Charão, Anderson Pereira |
author_facet |
Charão, Anderson Pereira Ribeiro, Marcia Carla Pereira |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Ribeiro, Marcia Carla Pereira |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Charão, Anderson Pereira Ribeiro, Marcia Carla Pereira |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
insider trading legal discipline efficiency |
topic |
insider trading legal discipline efficiency |
description |
The article addresses the issue of insider trading in its theoretical aspects, analyzes the legislation and the jurisprudence of the Securities and Exchange Commission in light of the economic analysis of the law. The purpose is to gauge the legal framework and, by comparison, the interpretation of the administrative authority. It seeks to identify if the system adopted today in relation to the practice of the insider is effective in order to avoid criminal behavior on the part of financial market players. The use of inside information by agents who had access to them before they were made known to the general public - insider trading - has negative effects on the market and creates a situation of insecurity incompatible with the good performance of the markets. Informational asymmetry is a market failure identified by the economic analysis of the law and, although inherent in most businesses, it is a condition of anomaly when it serves as an instrument to obtain undue advantages from violators, a hypothesis recognized as opportunistic behavior. Bibliographical and data analysis is used to conclude that, despite the existence of regulations in Brazil, market agents have been eagerly promoting sophisticated methods of trading based on privileged information, with the consequence of finding efficacy failures in the market. model of repression to unwanted practice. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-11-21 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed Revisão de literatura; análise da dados |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8770 10.31501/ealr.v10i1.8770 |
url |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8770 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31501/ealr.v10i1.8770 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8770/6507 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 Economic Analysis of Law Review info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 Economic Analysis of Law Review |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 10 No. 1 (2019): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 142-157 Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 10 Núm. 1 (2019): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 142-157 Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 10 n. 1 (2019): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 142-157 2178-0587 reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) instacron:UCB |
instname_str |
Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
instacron_str |
UCB |
institution |
UCB |
reponame_str |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
collection |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1798675422974574592 |