O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiros
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2003 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582003000400002 |
Resumo: | Shugart and Carey posit that presidential democracies in which legislators have a parochial focus of representation are electorally inefficient because voters are not offered highly identifiable choices on national policies. Such systems are driven by an inefficient secret, which is essentially a nonpartisan representation of the policy process. To check the propositions of the inefficient secret model (ISM), this article investigates the aggregation level, effect, and subject of Brazilian deputies' legislative input and output. Our empirical analysis indicates that, although some ISM-related factors drive legislative output, there is partisanship in deputies' legislative input. This result means that the ISM underestimates the prospects for programmatic parties (especially in the opposition) to emerge within systems where the electoral and constitutional rules encourage particularism. |
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O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiroslegislative outputBrazilian Congressinefficient secretShugart and Carey posit that presidential democracies in which legislators have a parochial focus of representation are electorally inefficient because voters are not offered highly identifiable choices on national policies. Such systems are driven by an inefficient secret, which is essentially a nonpartisan representation of the policy process. To check the propositions of the inefficient secret model (ISM), this article investigates the aggregation level, effect, and subject of Brazilian deputies' legislative input and output. Our empirical analysis indicates that, although some ISM-related factors drive legislative output, there is partisanship in deputies' legislative input. This result means that the ISM underestimates the prospects for programmatic parties (especially in the opposition) to emerge within systems where the electoral and constitutional rules encourage particularism.Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)2003-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582003000400002Dados v.46 n.4 2003reponame:Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociaisinstname:Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)instacron:UERJ10.1590/S0011-52582003000400002info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAmorim Neto,OctavioSantos,Fabianopor2004-04-20T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0011-52582003000400002Revistahttp://dados.iesp.uerj.br/PUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||dados@iesp.uerj.br1678-45880011-5258opendoar:2004-04-20T00:00Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais - Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiros |
title |
O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiros |
spellingShingle |
O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiros Amorim Neto,Octavio legislative output Brazilian Congress inefficient secret |
title_short |
O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiros |
title_full |
O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiros |
title_fullStr |
O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiros |
title_full_unstemmed |
O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiros |
title_sort |
O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiros |
author |
Amorim Neto,Octavio |
author_facet |
Amorim Neto,Octavio Santos,Fabiano |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Santos,Fabiano |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Amorim Neto,Octavio Santos,Fabiano |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
legislative output Brazilian Congress inefficient secret |
topic |
legislative output Brazilian Congress inefficient secret |
description |
Shugart and Carey posit that presidential democracies in which legislators have a parochial focus of representation are electorally inefficient because voters are not offered highly identifiable choices on national policies. Such systems are driven by an inefficient secret, which is essentially a nonpartisan representation of the policy process. To check the propositions of the inefficient secret model (ISM), this article investigates the aggregation level, effect, and subject of Brazilian deputies' legislative input and output. Our empirical analysis indicates that, although some ISM-related factors drive legislative output, there is partisanship in deputies' legislative input. This result means that the ISM underestimates the prospects for programmatic parties (especially in the opposition) to emerge within systems where the electoral and constitutional rules encourage particularism. |
publishDate |
2003 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2003-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582003000400002 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582003000400002 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/S0011-52582003000400002 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Dados v.46 n.4 2003 reponame:Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais instname:Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) instacron:UERJ |
instname_str |
Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
instacron_str |
UERJ |
institution |
UERJ |
reponame_str |
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais |
collection |
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais - Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||dados@iesp.uerj.br |
_version_ |
1750312647873527808 |