The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Muramatsu, Roberta
Data de Publicação: 2021
Outros Autores: Bianchi, Ana Maria A. F., Orlandi, Karolina Wachowiciz
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Nova Economia (Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.face.ufmg.br/index.php/novaeconomia/article/view/6396
Resumo: The departure point of this paper is the conjecture that the standard economic explanation of corruption in terms of the principal agent-model is necessary but insufficient to understand why corruption emerges and persists over time. More precisely, this article advances the thesis that reciprocity mechanisms together with heuristics and biases play an important role in the explanation of corrupt choice behaviors. Inspired by available experimental evidence in support of our bold claim, we examine what implications the so-called “behavioral turn to corruption research” might carry for the anti-corruption agenda.   Keywords: behavioral economics, corruption, reciprocity, experiments. JEL Codes: B40, B41, D90.
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spelling The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferencesBases colaborativas da corrupção: o lado sombrio das preferências sociaisThe departure point of this paper is the conjecture that the standard economic explanation of corruption in terms of the principal agent-model is necessary but insufficient to understand why corruption emerges and persists over time. More precisely, this article advances the thesis that reciprocity mechanisms together with heuristics and biases play an important role in the explanation of corrupt choice behaviors. Inspired by available experimental evidence in support of our bold claim, we examine what implications the so-called “behavioral turn to corruption research” might carry for the anti-corruption agenda.   Keywords: behavioral economics, corruption, reciprocity, experiments. JEL Codes: B40, B41, D90.  El punto de partida de este trabajo es la conjetura de que la explicación económica tradicional de la corrupción en términos del modelo-agente principal es necesaria pero insuficiente para entender por qué la corrupción emerge y persiste en el tiempo. Más precisamente, este artículo avanza la tesis de que las preferencias sociales y los mecanismos de reciprocidad, subyacentes a la evolución de la cooperación humana, también tienen un papel importante en la explicación de los esquemas de corrupción. Inspirándonos en la evidencia experimental disponible en apoyo de nuestra audaz afirmación, examinamos las implicaciones que podría tener la dimensión de la corrupción en la escala de reciprocidad para el debate sobre cómo promover políticas de integridad pública informadas sobre el comportamiento.  O ponto de partida deste artigo é a conjectura de que a explicação econômica tradicional para a corrupção baseada no modelo agente-principal é necessária, porém insuficiente para compreender por que a corrupção surge e persiste ao longo do tempo. Mais precisamente, o artigo sustenta a tese de que mecanismos de reciprocidade, juntamente com heurísticas e vieses, têm papel importante na explicação de condutas corruptas. Com base nas evidências experimentais que dão sustentação à nossa conjectura ousada, examinamos as implicações da chamada “guinada comportamental” para a agenda anticorrupção. Palavras-chave: economia comportamental, corrupção, reciprocidade, experimentos. Códigos JEL: B40, B41, D90.Departamento de Ciências Econômicas da UFMG2021-12-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttps://revistas.face.ufmg.br/index.php/novaeconomia/article/view/6396Nova Economia; Vol. 31 No. 3 (2021): Revista Nova Economia; 1009-1037Nova Economia; v. 31 n. 3 (2021): Revista Nova Economia; 1009-10371980-53810103-6351reponame:Nova Economia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGporhttps://revistas.face.ufmg.br/index.php/novaeconomia/article/view/6396/3636Copyright (c) 2021 Roberta Muramatsu, Ana Maria Bianchi, Karolina Wachowiczhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMuramatsu, RobertaBianchi, Ana Maria A. F.Orlandi, Karolina Wachowiciz 2022-02-22T19:02:42Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/6396Revistahttps://revistas.face.ufmg.br/index.php/novaeconomiaPUBhttps://revistas.face.ufmg.br/index.php/novaeconomia/oai||ne@face.ufmg.br1980-53810103-6351opendoar:2022-02-22T19:02:42Nova Economia (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences
Bases colaborativas da corrupção: o lado sombrio das preferências sociais
title The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences
spellingShingle The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences
Muramatsu, Roberta
title_short The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences
title_full The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences
title_fullStr The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences
title_full_unstemmed The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences
title_sort The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences
author Muramatsu, Roberta
author_facet Muramatsu, Roberta
Bianchi, Ana Maria A. F.
Orlandi, Karolina Wachowiciz
author_role author
author2 Bianchi, Ana Maria A. F.
Orlandi, Karolina Wachowiciz
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Muramatsu, Roberta
Bianchi, Ana Maria A. F.
Orlandi, Karolina Wachowiciz
description The departure point of this paper is the conjecture that the standard economic explanation of corruption in terms of the principal agent-model is necessary but insufficient to understand why corruption emerges and persists over time. More precisely, this article advances the thesis that reciprocity mechanisms together with heuristics and biases play an important role in the explanation of corrupt choice behaviors. Inspired by available experimental evidence in support of our bold claim, we examine what implications the so-called “behavioral turn to corruption research” might carry for the anti-corruption agenda.   Keywords: behavioral economics, corruption, reciprocity, experiments. JEL Codes: B40, B41, D90.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-12-30
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.face.ufmg.br/index.php/novaeconomia/article/view/6396
url https://revistas.face.ufmg.br/index.php/novaeconomia/article/view/6396
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.face.ufmg.br/index.php/novaeconomia/article/view/6396/3636
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Roberta Muramatsu, Ana Maria Bianchi, Karolina Wachowicz
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Roberta Muramatsu, Ana Maria Bianchi, Karolina Wachowicz
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Departamento de Ciências Econômicas da UFMG
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Departamento de Ciências Econômicas da UFMG
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Nova Economia; Vol. 31 No. 3 (2021): Revista Nova Economia; 1009-1037
Nova Economia; v. 31 n. 3 (2021): Revista Nova Economia; 1009-1037
1980-5381
0103-6351
reponame:Nova Economia (Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron:UFMG
instname_str Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron_str UFMG
institution UFMG
reponame_str Nova Economia (Online)
collection Nova Economia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Nova Economia (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||ne@face.ufmg.br
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