Visiting moral twin earth
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
Texto Completo: | http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/3009 |
Resumo: | This paper aims to examine the assumptions of Moral Twin Earth, an argument formulated by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons with the intention of refuting the realistic naturalistic proposal of moral known as Cornell’s realism. The Moral Twin Earth provides some intuitive evidence that terms naming moral kinds are not rigid designators of natural properties and, therefore, it is not possible to offer a naturalistic definition for them, which is supposed to be a Cornell’s realism claim. However, in this paper, I try to demonstrate that Cornell’s realism does not assume rigid designation relations between terms for moral kinds and natural properties to support its naturalistic thesis. Instead of the identity relation between moral and natural kinds that would be brought about by the rigid designation, Cornell’s realism maintains only the metaphysical thesis that moral kinds are constituted or realized by natural properties which leaves it open the possibility of multiple realization of moral kinds. As Cornell’s realism does not commit itself with the semantic thesis that Horgan and Timmons criticize, then the Moral Twin Earth does not seem to offer an objection to this moral realism. |
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Visiting moral twin earthVisitando a terra gêmea moralRealismo de Cornell; Terra Gêmea Moral; Designação Rígida.Cornell’s realism; Moral Twin Earth; Rigid Designation.This paper aims to examine the assumptions of Moral Twin Earth, an argument formulated by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons with the intention of refuting the realistic naturalistic proposal of moral known as Cornell’s realism. The Moral Twin Earth provides some intuitive evidence that terms naming moral kinds are not rigid designators of natural properties and, therefore, it is not possible to offer a naturalistic definition for them, which is supposed to be a Cornell’s realism claim. However, in this paper, I try to demonstrate that Cornell’s realism does not assume rigid designation relations between terms for moral kinds and natural properties to support its naturalistic thesis. Instead of the identity relation between moral and natural kinds that would be brought about by the rigid designation, Cornell’s realism maintains only the metaphysical thesis that moral kinds are constituted or realized by natural properties which leaves it open the possibility of multiple realization of moral kinds. As Cornell’s realism does not commit itself with the semantic thesis that Horgan and Timmons criticize, then the Moral Twin Earth does not seem to offer an objection to this moral realism.Este texto pretende examinar os pressupostos da Terra-gêmea-moral, argumento formulado por Terence Horgan e Mark Timmons com intenção de refutar a proposta realista naturalista da moral conhecida como realismo de Cornell. A Terra-gêmea-moral fornece alguma evidência intuitiva de que termos que nomeiam tipos morais não são designadores rígidos de propriedades naturais e que, portanto, não é possível oferecer uma definição naturalista para eles, o que deveria ser um comprometimento do realismo de Cornell. Entretanto, neste texto, procuramos demonstrar que o realismo de Cornell não se compromete com relações de designação rígida entre termos para tipos morais e propriedades naturais para sustentar sua postura naturalista. Em vez da relação de identidade entre tipos morais e naturais que seria trazida pela designação rígida, o realismo de Cornell mantém apenas a tese metafísica segundo a qual tipos morais são constituídos ou realizados por propriedades naturais deixando aberta a possibilidade de múltipla realização dos tipos morais. Como o realismo de Cornell não se compromete com a tese semântica que Horgan e Timmons criticam, então a Terra-gêmea-moral não parece oferecer uma objeção à posição realista.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2022-10-28info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/300910.31977/grirfi.v22i3.3009Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 3 (2022); 102-1152178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/3009/1787Copyright (c) 2022 Ísis Esteves Ruffohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessEsteves Ruffo, Ísis2022-10-28T21:38:09Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/3009Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2022-10-28T21:38:09Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Visiting moral twin earth Visitando a terra gêmea moral |
title |
Visiting moral twin earth |
spellingShingle |
Visiting moral twin earth Esteves Ruffo, Ísis Realismo de Cornell; Terra Gêmea Moral; Designação Rígida. Cornell’s realism; Moral Twin Earth; Rigid Designation. |
title_short |
Visiting moral twin earth |
title_full |
Visiting moral twin earth |
title_fullStr |
Visiting moral twin earth |
title_full_unstemmed |
Visiting moral twin earth |
title_sort |
Visiting moral twin earth |
author |
Esteves Ruffo, Ísis |
author_facet |
Esteves Ruffo, Ísis |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Esteves Ruffo, Ísis |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Realismo de Cornell; Terra Gêmea Moral; Designação Rígida. Cornell’s realism; Moral Twin Earth; Rigid Designation. |
topic |
Realismo de Cornell; Terra Gêmea Moral; Designação Rígida. Cornell’s realism; Moral Twin Earth; Rigid Designation. |
description |
This paper aims to examine the assumptions of Moral Twin Earth, an argument formulated by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons with the intention of refuting the realistic naturalistic proposal of moral known as Cornell’s realism. The Moral Twin Earth provides some intuitive evidence that terms naming moral kinds are not rigid designators of natural properties and, therefore, it is not possible to offer a naturalistic definition for them, which is supposed to be a Cornell’s realism claim. However, in this paper, I try to demonstrate that Cornell’s realism does not assume rigid designation relations between terms for moral kinds and natural properties to support its naturalistic thesis. Instead of the identity relation between moral and natural kinds that would be brought about by the rigid designation, Cornell’s realism maintains only the metaphysical thesis that moral kinds are constituted or realized by natural properties which leaves it open the possibility of multiple realization of moral kinds. As Cornell’s realism does not commit itself with the semantic thesis that Horgan and Timmons criticize, then the Moral Twin Earth does not seem to offer an objection to this moral realism. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-10-28 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-Reviewed Evaluados por los pares Avaliados pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/3009 10.31977/grirfi.v22i3.3009 |
url |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/3009 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31977/grirfi.v22i3.3009 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/3009/1787 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Ísis Esteves Ruffo http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Ísis Esteves Ruffo http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 3 (2022); 102-115 2178-1036 reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) instacron:UFRB |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
instacron_str |
UFRB |
institution |
UFRB |
reponame_str |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
collection |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||griotrevista@gmail.com |
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