Frege on singular senses

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Ruffino, Marco
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Princípios (Natal. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29816
Resumo: In this article the author discusses what seems to be a puzzle for Frege’s notion of singular senses, in particular senses of definite descriptions. These senses are supposed to be complete (or saturated), but they are composed of the incomplete (unsaturated) senses of conceptual terms (i.e., conceptual senses). The author asks how the definite article (or what it expresses) transforms an unsaturated sense into a saturated one and reviews some attempted explanations in the literature. He argues that none of them is compatible with Frege’s views in semantics. Next, he discusses an alternative that Frege himself endorses and argues that it is also incompatible with his semantics. The author concludes that Frege has no coherent view on the senses of definite descriptions. If we assume that every name expresses a descriptive sense, then we must conclude that Frege has no coherent explanation for singular senses in general.
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spelling Frege on singular sensesFregeDefinite articleProper namesReferenceIn this article the author discusses what seems to be a puzzle for Frege’s notion of singular senses, in particular senses of definite descriptions. These senses are supposed to be complete (or saturated), but they are composed of the incomplete (unsaturated) senses of conceptual terms (i.e., conceptual senses). The author asks how the definite article (or what it expresses) transforms an unsaturated sense into a saturated one and reviews some attempted explanations in the literature. He argues that none of them is compatible with Frege’s views in semantics. Next, he discusses an alternative that Frege himself endorses and argues that it is also incompatible with his semantics. The author concludes that Frege has no coherent view on the senses of definite descriptions. If we assume that every name expresses a descriptive sense, then we must conclude that Frege has no coherent explanation for singular senses in general.EDUFRN2022-08-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29816Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 29 n. 59 (2022): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); 48-701983-21090104-869410.21680/1983-2109.2022v29n59reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)instacron:UFRNporhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29816/15987Copyright (c) 2022 Marco Ruffinohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRuffino, Marco2022-08-04T23:01:45Zoai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/29816Revistahttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principiosPUBhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/oai||principios@cchla.ufrn.br1983-21090104-8694opendoar:2022-08-04T23:01:45Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Frege on singular senses
title Frege on singular senses
spellingShingle Frege on singular senses
Ruffino, Marco
Frege
Definite article
Proper names
Reference
title_short Frege on singular senses
title_full Frege on singular senses
title_fullStr Frege on singular senses
title_full_unstemmed Frege on singular senses
title_sort Frege on singular senses
author Ruffino, Marco
author_facet Ruffino, Marco
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ruffino, Marco
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Frege
Definite article
Proper names
Reference
topic Frege
Definite article
Proper names
Reference
description In this article the author discusses what seems to be a puzzle for Frege’s notion of singular senses, in particular senses of definite descriptions. These senses are supposed to be complete (or saturated), but they are composed of the incomplete (unsaturated) senses of conceptual terms (i.e., conceptual senses). The author asks how the definite article (or what it expresses) transforms an unsaturated sense into a saturated one and reviews some attempted explanations in the literature. He argues that none of them is compatible with Frege’s views in semantics. Next, he discusses an alternative that Frege himself endorses and argues that it is also incompatible with his semantics. The author concludes that Frege has no coherent view on the senses of definite descriptions. If we assume that every name expresses a descriptive sense, then we must conclude that Frege has no coherent explanation for singular senses in general.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-08-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29816
url https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29816
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29816/15987
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Marco Ruffino
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Marco Ruffino
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv EDUFRN
publisher.none.fl_str_mv EDUFRN
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 29 n. 59 (2022): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); 48-70
1983-2109
0104-8694
10.21680/1983-2109.2022v29n59
reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
instacron:UFRN
instname_str Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
instacron_str UFRN
institution UFRN
reponame_str Princípios (Natal. Online)
collection Princípios (Natal. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||principios@cchla.ufrn.br
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