Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400518 |
Resumo: | Abstract In this paper, we discuss a family of arguments that show the inconsistency of the concept of omniscience, which is one of the central attributes of the theistic God. We introduce three member of this family: Grim’s Divine Liar Paradox, Milne’s Paradox and our own Divine Curry. They can be seen as theological counterparts of well-known semantic paradoxes. We argue that the very simple dialetheist response to these paradoxes doesn’t work well and then introduce our own response based on a framework that we call Logic of Impossible Truths (LIT). LIT is a non-dialetheist paraconsistent logic designed to represent divine ominiscience and to preserve the transparency of the truth predicate and which semantics rests on the concept of situation. Since some rules of classical logic are not valid in LIT, we are in a position to block the derivation of the paradoxes. Thus, LIT offers a way out of the dilemma of accepting that there are true contradictions (dialetheism) or giving up the idea that there is an all-powerful, omniscient and perfectly good being (atheism). |
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Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s OmniscienceParadoxesOmnscienceTruthDialetheismSituation SemanticsAbstract In this paper, we discuss a family of arguments that show the inconsistency of the concept of omniscience, which is one of the central attributes of the theistic God. We introduce three member of this family: Grim’s Divine Liar Paradox, Milne’s Paradox and our own Divine Curry. They can be seen as theological counterparts of well-known semantic paradoxes. We argue that the very simple dialetheist response to these paradoxes doesn’t work well and then introduce our own response based on a framework that we call Logic of Impossible Truths (LIT). LIT is a non-dialetheist paraconsistent logic designed to represent divine ominiscience and to preserve the transparency of the truth predicate and which semantics rests on the concept of situation. Since some rules of classical logic are not valid in LIT, we are in a position to block the derivation of the paradoxes. Thus, LIT offers a way out of the dilemma of accepting that there are true contradictions (dialetheism) or giving up the idea that there is an all-powerful, omniscient and perfectly good being (atheism).UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2021-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400518Manuscrito v.44 n.4 2021reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gcinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCARDOSO,GUILHERME ARAÚJOMIRANDA,SÉRGIO RICARDO NEVES DEeng2021-12-08T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452021000400518Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2021-12-08T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience |
title |
Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience |
spellingShingle |
Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience CARDOSO,GUILHERME ARAÚJO Paradoxes Omnscience Truth Dialetheism Situation Semantics |
title_short |
Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience |
title_full |
Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience |
title_fullStr |
Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience |
title_full_unstemmed |
Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience |
title_sort |
Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience |
author |
CARDOSO,GUILHERME ARAÚJO |
author_facet |
CARDOSO,GUILHERME ARAÚJO MIRANDA,SÉRGIO RICARDO NEVES DE |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
MIRANDA,SÉRGIO RICARDO NEVES DE |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
CARDOSO,GUILHERME ARAÚJO MIRANDA,SÉRGIO RICARDO NEVES DE |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Paradoxes Omnscience Truth Dialetheism Situation Semantics |
topic |
Paradoxes Omnscience Truth Dialetheism Situation Semantics |
description |
Abstract In this paper, we discuss a family of arguments that show the inconsistency of the concept of omniscience, which is one of the central attributes of the theistic God. We introduce three member of this family: Grim’s Divine Liar Paradox, Milne’s Paradox and our own Divine Curry. They can be seen as theological counterparts of well-known semantic paradoxes. We argue that the very simple dialetheist response to these paradoxes doesn’t work well and then introduce our own response based on a framework that we call Logic of Impossible Truths (LIT). LIT is a non-dialetheist paraconsistent logic designed to represent divine ominiscience and to preserve the transparency of the truth predicate and which semantics rests on the concept of situation. Since some rules of classical logic are not valid in LIT, we are in a position to block the derivation of the paradoxes. Thus, LIT offers a way out of the dilemma of accepting that there are true contradictions (dialetheism) or giving up the idea that there is an all-powerful, omniscient and perfectly good being (atheism). |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-12-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400518 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400518 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gc |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito v.44 n.4 2021 reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1748950066213683200 |