A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of information
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2011 |
Outros Autores: | , , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
Texto Completo: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2011.03.007 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/24721 |
Resumo: | In this work we study an agent based model to investigate the role of asymmetric information degrees for market evolution. This model is quite simple and may be treated analytically since the consumers evaluate the quality of a certain good taking into account only the quality of the last good purchased plus her perceptive capacity beta. As a consequence, the system evolves according to a stationary Markov chain. The value of a good offered by the firms increases along with quality according to an exponent alpha, which is a measure of the technology. It incorporates all the technological capacity of the production systems such as education, scientific development and techniques that change the productivity rates. The technological level plays an important role to explain how the asymmetry of information may affect the market evolution in this model. We observe that, for high technological levels, the market can detect adverse selection. The model allows us to compute the maximum asymmetric information degree before the market collapses. Below this critical point the market evolves during a limited period of time and then dies out completely. When beta is closer to 1 (symmetric information), the market becomes more profitable for high quality goods, although high and low quality markets coexist. The maximum asymmetric information level is a consequence of an ergodicity breakdown in the process of quality evaluation. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
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A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of informationMarkovian market modelAsymmetric informationTechnological evolutionIn this work we study an agent based model to investigate the role of asymmetric information degrees for market evolution. This model is quite simple and may be treated analytically since the consumers evaluate the quality of a certain good taking into account only the quality of the last good purchased plus her perceptive capacity beta. As a consequence, the system evolves according to a stationary Markov chain. The value of a good offered by the firms increases along with quality according to an exponent alpha, which is a measure of the technology. It incorporates all the technological capacity of the production systems such as education, scientific development and techniques that change the productivity rates. The technological level plays an important role to explain how the asymmetry of information may affect the market evolution in this model. We observe that, for high technological levels, the market can detect adverse selection. The model allows us to compute the maximum asymmetric information degree before the market collapses. Below this critical point the market evolves during a limited period of time and then dies out completely. When beta is closer to 1 (symmetric information), the market becomes more profitable for high quality goods, although high and low quality markets coexist. The maximum asymmetric information level is a consequence of an ergodicity breakdown in the process of quality evaluation. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)Univ São Paulo, EACH, BR-03828000 São Paulo, BrazilUniv Estadual Paulista, Inst Fis Teor, BR-01156970 São Paulo, BrazilUniv Estadual Paulista, Inst Fis Teor, BR-01156970 São Paulo, BrazilElsevier B.V.Universidade de São Paulo (USP)Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)Tilles, Paulo F. C. [UNESP]Ferreira, Fernando F.Francisco, Gerson [UNESP]Pereira, Carlos de B.Sarti, Flavia Medeiros [UNESP]2013-09-30T19:03:49Z2014-05-20T14:14:29Z2013-09-30T19:03:49Z2014-05-20T14:14:29Z2011-07-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article2562-2570application/pdfhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2011.03.007Physica A-statistical Mechanics and Its Applications. Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V., v. 390, n. 13, p. 2562-2570, 2011.0378-4371http://hdl.handle.net/11449/2472110.1016/j.physa.2011.03.007WOS:000291136200012WOS000291136200012.pdfWeb of Sciencereponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPengPhysica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications2.1320,773info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2023-10-04T06:01:37Zoai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/24721Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.unesp.br/oai/requestopendoar:29462023-10-04T06:01:37Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of information |
title |
A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of information |
spellingShingle |
A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of information Tilles, Paulo F. C. [UNESP] Markovian market model Asymmetric information Technological evolution |
title_short |
A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of information |
title_full |
A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of information |
title_fullStr |
A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of information |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of information |
title_sort |
A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of information |
author |
Tilles, Paulo F. C. [UNESP] |
author_facet |
Tilles, Paulo F. C. [UNESP] Ferreira, Fernando F. Francisco, Gerson [UNESP] Pereira, Carlos de B. Sarti, Flavia Medeiros [UNESP] |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Ferreira, Fernando F. Francisco, Gerson [UNESP] Pereira, Carlos de B. Sarti, Flavia Medeiros [UNESP] |
author2_role |
author author author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade de São Paulo (USP) Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp) |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Tilles, Paulo F. C. [UNESP] Ferreira, Fernando F. Francisco, Gerson [UNESP] Pereira, Carlos de B. Sarti, Flavia Medeiros [UNESP] |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Markovian market model Asymmetric information Technological evolution |
topic |
Markovian market model Asymmetric information Technological evolution |
description |
In this work we study an agent based model to investigate the role of asymmetric information degrees for market evolution. This model is quite simple and may be treated analytically since the consumers evaluate the quality of a certain good taking into account only the quality of the last good purchased plus her perceptive capacity beta. As a consequence, the system evolves according to a stationary Markov chain. The value of a good offered by the firms increases along with quality according to an exponent alpha, which is a measure of the technology. It incorporates all the technological capacity of the production systems such as education, scientific development and techniques that change the productivity rates. The technological level plays an important role to explain how the asymmetry of information may affect the market evolution in this model. We observe that, for high technological levels, the market can detect adverse selection. The model allows us to compute the maximum asymmetric information degree before the market collapses. Below this critical point the market evolves during a limited period of time and then dies out completely. When beta is closer to 1 (symmetric information), the market becomes more profitable for high quality goods, although high and low quality markets coexist. The maximum asymmetric information level is a consequence of an ergodicity breakdown in the process of quality evaluation. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
publishDate |
2011 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2011-07-01 2013-09-30T19:03:49Z 2013-09-30T19:03:49Z 2014-05-20T14:14:29Z 2014-05-20T14:14:29Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2011.03.007 Physica A-statistical Mechanics and Its Applications. Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V., v. 390, n. 13, p. 2562-2570, 2011. 0378-4371 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/24721 10.1016/j.physa.2011.03.007 WOS:000291136200012 WOS000291136200012.pdf |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2011.03.007 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/24721 |
identifier_str_mv |
Physica A-statistical Mechanics and Its Applications. Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V., v. 390, n. 13, p. 2562-2570, 2011. 0378-4371 10.1016/j.physa.2011.03.007 WOS:000291136200012 WOS000291136200012.pdf |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 2.132 0,773 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
2562-2570 application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier B.V. |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier B.V. |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Web of Science reponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESP instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) instacron:UNESP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
instacron_str |
UNESP |
institution |
UNESP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
collection |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799964423786332160 |