Influence of board interlocking on earnings management

• Autor(a) principal: Cunha, Paulo Roberto da
• Data de Publicação: 2017
• Outros Autores: Piccoli, Marcio Roberto
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng; por
• Título da fonte: Revista Contabilidade & Finanças (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://www.revistas.usp.br/rcf/article/view/131270
• topic: board interlocking; board of directors; earnings management; degree centrality; intermediation centrality; board interlocking; conselho de administração; gerenciamento de resultados; centralidade de grau; centralidade de intermediação

The participation of directors on more than one board is called “board interlocking”. This phenomenon contributes to the spread of management and governance practices, through directors sharing their knowledge and experiences on other boards. Thus, directors could “carry” the earnings management practices present in one company into another in which they sit on the board. It is assumed that the greater directors’ direct or indirect connections on boards, the greater the sharing of information, especially information that can be reflected in company earnings quality. In light of the above, the aim of this study is to verify the influence of board interlocking on earnings management in companies listed on the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBovespa). The study is characterized as descriptive, quantitative, and documentary, and uses a sample of companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA between 2011 and 2013. For earnings management, the model from Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) was used, while for interlocking, degree centrality measures were used for direct board member connections, and intermediation centrality for indirect connections. The results indicate that earnings management is influenced by the interlocking of board members. It is concluded that the greater the degree centrality, the greater positive earnings management is, and that variations in positive and negative accruals are influenced by board member intermediation. The results reinforce the idea that earnings management behavior can be transferred between companies by the directors that make up their boards.